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Abstract
This thesis is an inquiry into the relationship between drama and traditional
stories and their potential contributions, when used together, to the moral
education of young children. The stimulus for this inquiry has stemmed from my
own academic interests and professional practice as a teacher educator for the
primary age range. It is underpinned by a belief that this is an area which has been
both under-researched and under-theorised but that it is nonetheless of interest and
importance for drama teachers, primary teachers and others who share an interest
in the moral development of young children. The research has proceeded with
two parallel but closely related forms of inquiry. The one has been an academic
investigation into those theoretical issues which underpin the project and the other
has consisted of fieldwork within primary classrooms, centred upon my own
teaching. In its final form, the thesis is presented in two parts of roughly equal
length, the one concentrating on theoretical concerns, the other consisting of a
critical analysis of my own classroom practice, where issues of theory are
investigated as they directly impinge upon it. However, it has been a key aim
throughout this project to relate theory closely to practice, so that the one might
continually inform the other as the research progressed. In the introduction, I give
an account of the genesis of the inquiry, provide an argument for its significance to
the contemporary educational debate and give a clear exposition of its parameters.
In Part I, I begin with a discussion of current developments in moral educational
theory and make the case for the importance of narrative and narrative literature in
the development of moral understanding. In applying these theories to literary
versions of traditional tales, however, it becomes quickly clear that the area is
problematic and informed by contradictory theories and profound disagreement. I
propose that the narrative form of these tales is inappropriate to didactic moral
teaching and argue that a perspective which is informed by their mythic and oral
origins is best placed to help our understanding of how they can be harnessed for
the purposes of moral learning. I argue that there are historical and artistic
reasons for seeing an important role for drama. in this process and examine how
moral processes are engaged and informed by the dramatic event. In Part IT, I
introduce the fieldwork with a critical look at how the practices of drama in
education can be used to engage children in ethical exploration as defined within
the parameters of this inquiry. I provide a detailed account of the research
methodology followed by three case studies, each of which recounts and analyses a
series of lessons with three separate classes of children, centred around three
distinct traditional tales. These case studies are discursive in nature, each focusing
upon issues and questions generated by the particular stories and lessons. They
are informed by the theoretical exposition in Part I but generate their own
theoretical perspectives and hypotheses which I propose to have implications for
general classroom practice within this area. In the concluding chapter, I propose
that the theoretical thrust and practical findings of the project signal an important
role for drama in a school's moral education policy and suggest particular areas of
inquiry which would further inform this argument.
INTRODUCTION
Early in 1992, I was asked to do some drama work with a class of 8-9
year-old children in a primary school local to the university where I work. The
teacher wanted the drama to be centred around The Pied Piper and to stretch over
four one-hour sessions. Looking again at Browning's version of the traditional
tale, I was amused by the witty and ironic moralising at the end of the poem but
was also impressed by the ambivalent moral tensions created by the story. It
managed to strike chords within me which could both celebrate the Piper's
vengeance and yet feel sympathy for those who suffer such dire punishment,
appealing at once to my rational sense of justice and my natural human sympathies.
I wondered if our drama might explore these conflicting moral tensions and, after
some deliberation, decided to start the drama where the story ends, in the country
to where the children are led beyond the mountain. Using freeze-frame, I the
children created images of a paradise in which they had everything they could
possibly want, and chose to depict a land of ice-cream trees, computer games,
funfairs and seemingly infinite leisure facilities. I decided to work against these
images which represented happiness in purely materialistic terms. Casting myself
in role as a small boy, I created my own image of an unhappy child, gazing
broodingly into the distance and clutching a small, sponge ball in my hand. When
asked to speculate, the children quickly agreed that this had been a gift from my
parents, that I was home-sick and, after some questioning of the boy, they decided
that they, too, would like to return home and see their families again. But how
could they do this? In the ensuing drama, the children "borrowed" the Piper's
flute as he lay asleep, only to discover that its magic would not work for them.
When confronted by the angry and indignant Piper, they listened to his complaints
against their parents and, in particular, the Mayor and agreed that the people of
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Hamelin had been wrong to break their promise but insisted that it was equally
wrong for him to make them, the children, suffer for it. If they would agree to
bring the Mayor back to face justice, would the Piper be prepared to let them go?
The Piper was unsure as to whether he could trust them to return; and they were
unsure whether he would release them if they did. Eventually both parties agreed
to trust one another - but back in Hamelin the children found the Mayor to be a
broken man, worn out and sick with worry and guilt over the catastrophe he had
caused. Furthermore, he no longer had any money to pay the Piper as it had all
been spent on searching for the children. Up to this point, I had been in role as
the Piper but now two children, a boy and a girl, took on this role collectively as I
continued to play the Mayor.' They listened with great seriousness to the story
and then forgave the Mayor on the understanding that he must never break a
promise again; and, to help ensure that he wouldn't, the boy-Piper announced that
he intended to settle down at last and live in Hamelin, which would enable him to
keep an eye on the Mayor. As Mayor, I accepted these conditions and the drama
ended with a celebratory dance, as the jubilant children were piped back to their
homes in Hamelin.
This turned out to be one of those dramas which leave the teacher with a
warm glow and the gut-feeling that something significant has been created and
shared between teacher and children. The children had worked with enthusiam
and their reactions and responses both inside the drama and after the lessons
showed that they had enjoyed and appreciated the whole experience; but I was
most pleased by the way they had apparently engaged with the moral content of
the drama, exploring as it did issues of justice and vengeance, trust and
forgiveness, and the nature of happiness. At the time, I was particularly struck by
the children's improvisation at the end of the drama. In portraying the Mayor as
weak, ill and repentant, instead of as the selfish tyrant the children had expected, I
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was deb1>eratelytrying to make the moral choices difficult for them. In the event,
the compassion and sensitivity articulated by the two eight year-olds was both
surprising and moving to me, as teacher. They wanted justice but not revenge
and, on hearing how poor and miserable Hamelin had become, the girl in role as
the Piper replied: "That will all stop when the children return. Just as my pipe
could pipe away happiness, it can pipe away sadness, too." Here, it seemed to
me, was an impressive celebration of fairness, forgiveness and social harmony.
On evaluating these sessions, it occurred to me how many of my more
successful dramas with young children took traditional stories - usually fairy
stories such as Rumplestiltskin and Jack and the Beanstalk - as their source
material and had at their heart the exploration of moral issues. It was evident
from the literature of drama in education that this was an experience common to
other primary school drama practitioners'. However, it was equally evident that
little had been written to explore the two questions which interested me most.
First of all, why should traditional stories lend themselves so readily to moral
exploration through drama? My experience as a teacher and as a head in primary
and middle schools was that stories were, indeed, associated with moral education
but usually in assemblies, where tales from such volumes as Bailey (1981) carried a
straigbtfolWard didactic message designed to illustrate that, for example, lying
could be dangerous, that humility was a virtue and that flatterers should not be
trusted. The traditional tales that could be found in such volumes tended to be
from religious sources, such as the Bible or the Qu'oran, or from books of fables,
such as those written by Aesop. What had been of interest in the story of The
Pied Piper, however, was the moral ambivalence of the piper and it was this
ambivalence, I was sure, that had made the drama possible. But the nature of this
ambivalence was surely different from that found in the fairy tales I had worked
with, where there were moral ambiguities implicit to the narrative often far richer
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than the moral lessons that the stories were apparently supposed to illustrate.
This provoked a number of associated questions. How common was this
ambivalence in literary versions of traditional tales? Where did it come from?
When these tales had been written, had their purpose been moral instruction or
fantasy entertainment? Were stories a good way to teach children to be moral
and, if so, in what sense? As drama seemed to work so effectively with traditional
tales, what theoretical grounds were there for seeing a special relationship between
them?
The second area which interested me, and about which I could find very
little theoretical analysis, was how drama and dramatic processes contribute to
moral learning. This was perhaps the more surprising as it is a common
assumption in schools and among drama teachers that drama has a place in the
personal, social and moral education of children. There were a number of
published examples of lessons in which teachers illustrated how they had used
drama for moral purposes but they were usually written in the spirit of advocacy
rather than of critical analysis and their intentions were often as didactic as those of
the school assembly+ Some of their claims struck me as dubious and their
interpretations open to challenge and I wondered if the same criticisms could be
leveled at my own reading of The Pied Piper drama. In a more sceptical frame of
mind, I speculated as to whether the drama had reduced the rich, moral
ambivalence of Browning's poem to humourless political correctness and I
considered afresh the final activity which had so impressed me at the time. I had
tried, indeed, to render both the Mayor and the Piper as morally ambiguous,
wanting the children to explore a moral situation which was not as straightforward
as it first appeared. On reflection, however, a decision which ought to have been
very difficult for the Piper had not proven at all difficult for the children in role.
After all, the Mayor had appeared as everything a child at school is taught to feel
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sorry for; old, infinn, pitiable, sad. It would have been heartless indeed for these
well-adjusted eight year-olds to do anything other than forgive him and, whatever
else it might have achieved, the drama did not seem to have deepened their
understanding of the Piper's feelings of injustice. Unintentionally, I had created a
dilemmawhich was not much of a dilemma at all. As a celebration, the end of the
drama might well have been successful; as a challenging, moral thought process,
perhaps somewhat less so. Here was a rich area for research into theory and
practice but one where there were dangers of making educational claims which
might be difficult to defend. And at the heart of it all were values - cultural,
moral, professional and personal.
* * * * * *
I have begun with this short summary not only because this particular
drama contributed to the genesis of the research project which follows but because
it also signals some of the more problematic elements within its scope. Its specific
focus is the relationship between drama and traditional stories and their potential
contribution, when used together, to the moral education of young children. By
traditional stories, I mean those literary versions of tales which originated from
oral sources. As I will show, this research has necessitated an inquiry into aspects
of narrative theory, cultural, literary and theatre history, moral theory, moral
developmental theory, the practice and theory of drama in education and issues
relating to reflective practitioner research. The outcome will therefore, I hope, be
of interest not only to practitioners and academics who specialise in educational
drama but also more broadly to all those who have a professional interest in how
stories, drama and the arts in general can contribute to the moral development of
young children.
Moral education has become a contentious and problematic area in
contemporary British society, characterised as it is by increasingly secular attitudes
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and cultural pluralism.j Within this climate, many teachers have become
uncomfortable with a traditional perspective which associates moral learning
closely with conventional Christianity. Influential academics have identified these
uncertainties and contlictual perspectives as characteristic of the postmodern
condition. Their argument is that, traditionally, belief in religion or philosophies
such as liberal humanism have provided western society with a form of coherent
agreement upon the values which should inform the moral guidance of its
members. Such an agreed values system is defined by Lyotard as a metanarrative,
"the principal way 0 culture or 0 collectivity legitimates itself' (Connor, 1989,
p.32) According to Lyotard, postmodern society has witnessed the weakening of
the metanarratives which define and attempt to uphold their dominant cultural
values at the centre of contemporary society. In contrast, marginal cultures have
proliferated and strengthened and we have consequently seen "0 shift from the
muffled majesty of grand narratives to the splintering autonomy of
micronarratives:" (Connor, op. cit, p.32) This state of affairs, characterised by
moral relativism and uncertainty, is one which many teachers will recognize and
the tensions this creates can only be exacerbated when political pressure is brought
to bear in an attempt to reassert dominant cultural and moral values.
Indeed, at the time of writing, the question of the role of schools in the
promotion of moral values has resurfaced at the forefront of political and media
attention in the wake of a debate in the House of Lords on July 5th, 1996, led by
Dr George Carey, the Archbishop of Canterbury. A brief look at the tone of the
debate and at its presentation in the press does, I believe, present us with a
snapshot of the complex tensions that underlie the area of moral education in
contemporary Britain and the resultant confusion over what form it should take.
Dr Carey's main concern was the climate of moral relativism which
pervades much of public and private life in what he described as "0world in which
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there are no rights and wrongs except what we individuals deem to be true for
ourselves. "6 He affinned his belief that most people wanted a fightback against
moral relativism and that, for this to happen, children needed to be taught rules and
a moral code, and held up the Ten Commandments as the best model we have of
such a code. He also emphasised the need for a shared, moral discourse to permit
people to talk publicly about religion and morality. In acknowledging the
importance of schools in the teaching of moral matters, he welcomed the
consultation initiative on moral values recently undertaken by the Schools
Curriculum and Assessment Authority (SCAA) and argued that an initiative was
needed in training teachers to bring out "the moral and spiritual aspects of many
different subjects. "
Carey's speech was heralded on the front page of The Daily Telegraph
under the headline "Carey crusade to teach children right from wrong'" and the
following day the "Morality Debate" was given a two page spread in The Times.
Here a similar headline: ''Man who wants schools to focus on right and wrong. '18
profiled Nicholas Tate, Chief Executive of SCAA. These headlines signal a
revealing, politically motivated simplification of the agenda. By emphasing right
and wrong, the implication is that there exist straightforward absolutes which
schools are failing to teach or pay sufficient attention to. The emotive use of the
word crusade and the presentation of Tate as a lone man taking on these faceless
and falling institutions was intended to cast in a heroic light those who would
apparently support such an absolutist agenda. The concept of right and wrong is
integral to a code of rules and those parts of Carey's speech which emphasise rules
were given prominence in the press. For example, the Telegraph explained
''Dr Carey will attack the modem assumption that, while trivial occupations like
football need rules, life does not. The young need to be taught these rules so that
they can handle moral dilemmas that will confront them through their lives. '19
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The strong implication here is that moral dilemmas result from a lack of knowledge
of moral rules and that the moral life would be relatively straightforward ifwe had
internalised them. The inteUectualweakness of such an argument is immediately
apparent. In the first place, knowing a rule will not automatically ensure that I
keep it, even if I believe that it is morally right to do so; in the second place, a
moral dilemma involves making a choice when it is difficult to know exactly what
is right. In such circumstances, a knowledge of moral rules might be justifiably
seen as making the choices more, not less, difficult for the individual involved.
Carey's speech in the Lords did, in fact, make this very point.
"We all know that the toughest moral decisions are not always between right and
wrong but between two rights which pull in different directions'w
Rules, states Carey, are not in themselves enough; children must learn "the
judgment to confront the constant dilemmas of life. "II which amounts to a firm
acknowledgment that moral education is more problematic than the learning of
rules and codes. This small example is indicative of an overall tension between a
political desire to order the process of moral education along absolutist and
straightforward principles in the face of a reality which refuses to be anything other
than complex and problematic. So, as part of this urge for absolutism and.
simplicity, the purpose of SCAA's investigation into moral values is reported as
"the production of a public statement of moral rules. ''12 and the place of moral
learning within the curriculum is seen as situated firmly within the dominant
traditions ofRE and the school assembly. This latter point was made evident by
Gillian Shepherd, the Secretary of State for Education and Employment, who
contributed to the debate by suggesting that, if the daily act of coUectiveworship
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enshrined in the 1988 Education Act were to be properly enforced, then moral
standards in schools would improve."
This desire for simplicity is detectable within Carey's own words but so,
too, is a recognition that morality persists in remaining an area of complexity
which continues to generate profound disagreement. When, for example, he
addresses directly the issue of moral values rather than moral rules, he is compelled
to ask the questions:
''Do we know what our shared values are? Do we have any? If we do, do we
have a vocabulary that people are comfortable in using in order to describe
them?''J4
Shared values, of course, are fundamental to any agreed rule system but they will
be difficult to codify, let alone teach, if it is open to debate as to whether there
exists even a language to describe them in contemporary society.
A close look at the substance of Carey's argument, therefore, reveals that,
despite his Christian stance, three tenets emerge: that the teaching of rules by
themselves is insufficient for a proper moral education; that we have a need to
develop a language by which we can explore what our shared moral values might
be; and that moral education has a place "in many different subjects", not simply
RE. Each of these tenets is of central concern to this thesis, which aims to
explore why and how stories which are secular in their nature and originate from
different cultural sources may be used to help children articulate moral values and
explore moral problems through the art form of extemporary drama. A premiss to
this study is that values are inescapable and pervasive: as Connor expresses it:
"We are claimed always and everywhere by the necessity of value in an active and
transactional sense." (1992, p.8)
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Values are present within the stories, within the children as members of family,
school and peer group communities and within myself as teacher and researcher.
To talk of values is to talk the language of feeling as well as reason, of
commitment and conviction as well as duty and obligation. It is in the area of
values where the various interests which inform the debate on moral education
meet: the political, the professional, the academic, the personal, the cultural,
creating the network of tensions and contradictions within which teachers find
themselves needing to operate and being called increasingly to account. The
research has been undertaken in a spirit of recognition and acceptance of this
complexity but also in the belief that, as political interest in moral education
becomes more intense, contributions from professionals based upon research and
reflective practice become more urgent. Sound professional knowledge is needed
to inform a contentious and emotive area and it is my hope that this inquiry will
contribute to such knowledge.
The interdisciplinary nature of the inquiry has meant that it has been
selective rather than comprehensive in the broad and distinctive areas of moral
education and drama education, looking for areas of overlap rather than attempting
an exhaustive coverage. Nor do I attempt to prove that participation in drama
practices will make children more moral in their behaviour. Experience has led me
to believe that, because of the very nature of drama, children who participate in
dramatic activities can learn to co-operate, gain a social identity, learn
responsibilityto others, understand the need for rules and self-disiplineand grow in
self esteem. All of these are important aspects of moral growth which lie outside
the specific interests of this inquiry. The focus here is on a particular form of
literary narrative and its potential for moral learning; on those moral theories which
best inform us how the moral life is expressed in this literary form; how it relates to
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the art fonn of drama; and how, within a dialogical relationship between drama and
traditional stories, children can interpret, negotiate and articulate moral meanings.
The research has proceeded along two connected fronts, theoretical inquiry
and practical fieldwork, the one influencingand informing the other. It has been a
major aim of mine to sustain a dialogical relationship between theory and practice
throughout the process and, in particular, to avoid approaching the fieldwork as a
test of a pre-ordained, theoretical agenda. To paraphrase Lorraine Code (1991),
my fear was that such an approach might close off more possibilities for
discernment and action than it might create. IS However, for the purposes of
logical argument, the finished thesis is presented in two halves. Part I consists of
a broadly theoretical argument for using drama and traditional stories for the moral
education of primary aged children. The fieldwork and related analyses are
presented in Part IT, which consists of a rationale for the pedagogy of process
drama and for the adopted research methodology; and a series of three detailed
case studies undertaken during 1993 and 1994.
Chapter I offers a brief examination and critique of cognitive
developmental theories of moral education, in particular those expounded by
Lawrence Koblberg. I suggest that, when analysed from the critical perspectives
of postmodem consciousness, the rational moral principles it proposes as universal
truths are open to question as are the rigid developomental categories it advocates.
I propose that, in the work of Carol Gilliganand, in particular, AlasdairMacIntyre,
we are presented with alternative models of the moral life which are more inclusive
of emotion, context and particularity and within which we can find the discourse
necessary to develop moral understanding. This discourse emphasises the role of
narrative understanding and the language of the virtues.
Chapter IT examines how literary narratives can educate for moral
understanding, drawing upon theories offered by Bruner, Goldberg and in
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particular Bakhtin, with subjuntivity and dialogism emerging as key relevant
concepts. It is evident, however, that traditional tales are resistant to these
concepts and that debate over their moral significance is characterised by profound
disagreements over their didactic purposes. I analyse these disagreements and
propose that the narrative form is inappropriate to moral teaching of a
straightforward, didactic nature.
In Chapter Ill, I pursue an argument which offers a perspective informed
by the mythic and oral origins of the tales as best disposed to help our
understanding of how they can be harnessed for the purposes of moral learning. I
explore historical and cultural reasons for understanding the fairy tale as myth and
the relationship between myth, dramatic performance and moral values at the
origins of western theatre practices and within the performative nature of the oral
tradition. This analysis emphasises the need to regard mythical tales as historical
and cultural constructs open to change rather than as carriers of universal truths.
I conclude that, for historical and artistic reasons, drama can be seen to be part of
a process of moral learning which takes the form of a dialogical engagement with
the values of traditional tales. By way of a case study to illustrate how myth is
still being reinterpreted and renewed for moral purposes in contemporary British
theatre, in Chapter IV I analyse Timberlake Wertenbaker's The Love of A
Nishringale as a feminist re-evaluation of the Phaedra myth. I propose that it
demonstrates how theatre can be used either to educate and empower or to
miseducate and oppress; and how a re-assessment of our shared mythology, as
enshrined in canonical texts, is a social and a moral necessity and one of the potent
functions of the communal art form of drama.
Neo-Aristotelian ideas have influenced the moral and methodological
theories underpinning this thesis yet, in the field of drama in education, Aristotle
continues to exert very little influence. Chapter V attempts a re-assessment of this
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situation and begins with a critique of the objections to Aristotelian theatre raised
by Brecht and Boal, two of the theorists who most influence educational drama.
It proceeds to focus upon the cognitive nature of emotion and, in particular, upon
how this relationship can inform our understanding of catharsis. Drawing upon
the work of Martha Nussbaum, I argue that catharsis is more accurately viewed as
a process of cognitive illumination through the emotions rather than as one of
purgation or political repression. Reflecting upon the significance of this for
drama teachers, I propose that Beckerman's theory of iconic and dialectic action
presents us with a perspective of moral engagement in drama which permits
teachers to be informed by Brecht, Boal and Aristotle.
Part ITbegins with a chapter in which I argue for the moral exploration of
fairy tales through participatory forms of educational drama. I find it necessary to
address the arguments of those critics who have questioned the value agendas and
universalist preoccupations of its more famous practitioners, notably Dorothy
Heathcote and Gavin Bolton. I reject the accusations that universalism is inherent
to the form but acknowledge that there is a danger in drama teachers unwittingly
imposing their own value agendas and hence making questionable assumptions
about their teaching.
In the light of the problems analysed in the previous chapter, I present in
Chapter vn a rationale for my fieldwork, rejecting positivist research paradigms
and arguing for an ethnographic approach through case study. This. I propose. is
a method of inquiry which makes possible the interpretation and analysis of value-
oriented actions in value-laden contexts. I detail the methodological practices
used to gather data, listing and explaining those specific to each case study.
Chapters vm. IX and X provide accounts of three case studies. Each is
centred around a drama using as pre-text different literary versions of traditional
tales taken from Indian, British and Native American sources. The mix of cultural
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origin was intended as a deliberate and positive response to the contemporary
challenges of pluralism and cultural diversity and the stories were chosen for the
dramas they suggested as well as the problems posed by their moral values. Each
case study consists of an analysis of the problematic value agenda of each tale; an
account of the drama lessons and the context within which each took place; and a
reflective analysis of the lessons, focussing on issues and themes emerging out of
the recorded data rather than from a pre-determined, theory-driven agenda. The
main thrust of the first case study is how two classes of eight and nine year-old
children were able to read the hidden values of a literary version of an Indian fable
tale and.how the process of drama enabled them to articulate new moral meanings
from it. The second case study looks at the tension between carnival folk humour
and didactic authorial intentions in versions of Jack and the Beanstalk and how a
drama with some six year-old children used carnivalesque humour to energise an
exploration of these moral tensions. The final case study explores issues
associated with the translation of moral and cultural values from one tradition into
another in narrative and representational forms.
Finally, the conclusion attempts to draw together the implications of the
study and, in recognizing what it has left unexplored, I make suggestions as to
what further research might usefully build upon its findings.
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NOTES
1. Freeze frame is a commonly used convention in classroom drama, also known as tableau or
still image. See Neelands (1992) p.57 for a brief description.
2. Another common drama strategy, where more than one person play one character
simultaneously. See Neelands, op. cit, p.60
3. The literature of primary school drama would appear to testify to the popularity of The Pied
Piper as a topic for primary school drama, particularly centred around moral issues of one
sort or another. See Fleming (1994) chapter 1, pp 28 -30), Davies (1986) and Tarlington
and Verriour (1991)
4. For an example, see Hall (1988)
S. Inan opinion poll conducted by Gallup and published in the Daily Telegraph on July 5th,
1996, less than lOOA, of those questioned answered that the church had had any influence on
their moral thinking and 49% felt that the church's moral guidance was inadequate.
6. The Times, July 6th, 1996, p.9
7. The Telegraph, July 5th, p.l
8. The Times, p.8
9. The Telegraph, p.I
10. The Times, p.9
II. The Times, p.9 - my emphasis
12. The Times, p.8
13. On the Today programme, July 6th, 1996
14. The Telegraph, p.29
IS. Code L (1991). This paraphrase is taken from her comments on feminist moral critiques on
moral theories. See p.107
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PART I
CHAPTER I
NARRATIVE AND THE MORAL
LIFE
Problematising moral cognitive developmental theory
In the winter of 1987 educationalists around the world were shocked to
learn that Lawrence Kohlberg, the most influential researcher into moral education
of his generation, had committed suicide. This act was a poignant and ambiguous
footnote to the life of an academic who had striven to establish the universal
principles of moral development. In his later years, the epistemological vision
which had under-pinned his research had come under increasingly vocal criticism.
His was a modernist project, founded upon a faith in grand theory and a belief in
the existence of rational, universal laws to explain human development and human
behaviour. In retrospect it is tempting to see his suicide as tragically symbolic, to
view it if not as an admission of failure then at least as a testimony to doubts in
what he had achieved.
Lawrence Kohlberg was foremost of a number of theorists and researchers
who attempted to apply cognitive developmental theories of learning to moral
growth. I Rejecting both the teaching of moral habits, which he dismissed as the
"bag of virtues" approach to moral education, and also the relativistic-emotional
approach, where children's moral health is believed to develop naturally from the
fulfilment of their emotions and needs, Kohlberg began his theory from a different
philosophical premise. His claim was that, at heart, morality represents a set of
rational principles of judgment and decision valid for every culture, the principles
of welfare and justice. In addition, he claimed that his research showed how
individuals acquire and refine their sense of justice by passing through a sequence
of six invariant developmental stages. These were divided into three levels which
he named the Pre-conventional, the Conventional and the Post-conventional.
Each stage, Kohlberg argued, is characterised by a particular structure of thinking
and he proposed that moral development should be understood as linear
progression, capable of arrestation at any level. What characterises this
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progression, according to Kohlberg, is an individual's increasing ability to reflect
autonomously and selflessly upon the moral principles which need to be applied to
specific moral dilemmas or problema> The highest stage of moral development is
reached when a person appreciates and is able to apply what he labelled as
universal ethical principles, those principles which he argued any human being
would agree to if able to view a situation quite impartially; in the words of the
philospher John Rawls, "from behind a veil of ignorance'",
Kant had first proposed with his categorical imperative a universal
principle of moral law based upon justice and reason; and that:
"moral imperatives exercise absolute or universal and not merely particular or
contingent authority." (Carr, 1991, p.81)
Kohlberg's understanding of morality was Kantian in its form but the source of his
cognitive developmental approach to the acquisition of moral knowledge was the
work of Jean Piaget. It was Piaget himself, in fact, who had first undertaken the
task of structuring a theory to explain the universal principles of children's moral
growth- Piaget saw rules as the basis of all moral action and suggested that his
research showed a growth in attitude to rules and rule-keeping from heteronomy,
where rules are given by external authority, to autonomy, where they are mutually
agreed, accepted and internalised. Kohlberg openly acknowledged his
indebtedness to Piaget and saw his own research as a continuation of the work he
had begun. But he was not the only cognitive developmental theorist to gain
credence during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s; Selman (1976) and Loevinger (1976)
both proposed stage theories to explain personal and moral growth but one of the
earliest to do so was Erikson (1950), who proposed eight levels of development
which he termed the Eight Ages of Man. 5 There is rather more Freud than Piaget
in Erikson's theory, but, like Kohlberg, his developmental stages are heirarchical,
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sequential and culminate in a universal model of fully developed, moral humanity;
in Erikson's case, this highest stage of moral being is characterised by Ego
Integrity, where, coupled with what he calls the basic virtue of wisdom:
"The style of integrity developed by his culture or civilization thus becomes the
'patrimony of the soul', the seal of his moral paternity of himself." (1977, p.242)
Aware as we now are of feminist theory, we may well wince at the pre-eminence
of male, patriarchal references in such a description of the moral universe. Of
course, Erikson was writing before contemporary sensibilities had been subjected
to a feminist critique of language usage; but it is this very need to judge it within
the context of its time which undermines the universalist claims it makes.
Cognitive, moral developmental theories sought to establish objective,
universal laws to account for the moral growth of the personality; however, it is far
from proven that the structural categories their creators proposed were the
fundamental laws they claimed them to be. The research of Margaret Donaldson,
for example, has revealed a deep flaw in the overarching structure of Piagetian
developmental stage theory which premissed both his and Kohlberg's moral
projects. Donaldson showed that the rigid heirarchy of cognitive progression
which Piaget claimed to have proven did not hold. For example, Piaget had
observed an inability in children under the age of six to decentre, but Donaldson
could describe tests which showed that, given situations which were contextualised
in such a way as to make human sense, children much younger than six and seven
could, indeed, see things from another's perspective.s Her stress on the
inadequacy of the research tasks set by Piaget, and his lack of recognition of the
importance of contextual details in children's thinking, were to have an important
echo later, in criticisms of Kohlberg's research methodology, as we shall see.
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There is, of course, much that is empirically logical in many of the
observations made by developmental theorists. So Kohlberg's vision of the moral
progression of the child which sees a movement from reliance on authority toward
a position where one can oneself assume those responsibilities which pertain to the
exercise of authority makes eminent and recognizable sense in our own,
democratic, western society. However, this does not mean that such a
progression is structurally implicit to moral growth for it assumes the human
universality of the moral principles it promotes. Both Erikson and Kohlberg use a
discourse which is notably modernist; rationalist, searching to provide an all-
embracing grand narrative to explain moral action, irrespective of such important
constituents of the human moral identity as culture and gender, and prescribing
universal moral precepts which are tacitly but notably congruent with the values of
western liberalism. Thus the perfect human being according to Kohlberg's and
Erikson's moral categories would be an impartial, unprejudiced, calm, considerate
philosopher, self-sufficient, autonomous and socially well-integrated, a perfect
citizen in a twentieth century western democracy but somewhat out of place in
Homeric Greece or, indeed, in a modem day, fundamentalist, Islamic community.
Their theories are susceptible to a post structuralist critique and to the criticisms,
summarised by Benhabib, which characterise postmodem thought:
''If there is one position which unites postmodemists from Foucault to Demda to
Lyotard it is the critique of western rationality as seenfrom the perspective of the
margins, from the standpoint of what and who it excludes, suppresses,
delegitimates, renders mad, imbecilic or chi/dish." (cited in Nicholson, 1993,
p.19)
This does not disprove per se either Kohlberg's or Erikson's views of what
constitutes the moral human being but it shows that the foundations of their
19
theories are far from the value-free, objective perspectives they claimed them to
be. In the postmodem world, grand theories are under seige from feminists,
cultural minorities and the many voices on the periphery. The whole concept of
morality argued by both theorists can be disputed from the perspective of any of
these voices.' It is unsurprising, therefore, that the most coherent critique of
Kohlberg's system has come from one of these voices, that of his one-time
collaborator, the feminist moral researcher, Carol Gilligan.
Gilligan's ethic of care and narrative moral theory
In her book In a Different Voice. published in 1982, Gilligan claimed that,
when developing his theories, Kohlberg's research was gender-biased; she argued
that both Piaget' s research into games and rules and her own subsequent
interviews with female respondents revealed that a developmental theory which
concentrated on the principle of impartial Justice was discriminatory toward the
way women approached moral dilemmas. Her overall thesis, developed in
subsequent research and publications, has been summarised by Flanagan and
Jackson thust:
"Gilligan describes a moral universe in which men, more often than women,
conceive of morality as substantively constituted by obligations and rights and as
procedurally constituted by the demands of fairness and impartiality, while
women, more often than men, see moral requirements as emerging from the
particular needs of others in the context of particular relationships." (1993, p.70)
This view of morality she defines as "an ethic of care" and although her research
saw it as expressed mainly by women, her intention was not to place men and
women within different moral universes but to challenge Kohlberg' s Kantian view
of the nature and origin of moral action.
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"For Gilligan each person is embedded in a web of ongoing relationships, and
morality importantly if not exclusively consists in attention to, understanding oj,
and emotional responsiveness toward the individuals with whom one stands in
these relationships. "(Blum, 1993, p.50)
Not surprisingly, Gilligan's work has found favour with postmodernists and
feminists, who see in it a powerful assault on the Enlightenment project. She has
had a profound impact on the perspectives of feminist researchers into moral
educations and on others who have sought to view moral growth as other than
linear in nature and heirarchical in structure. Instead, Gilligan and her followers
have sought to place narrative at the centre of the moral life. A look at what
Blum sees as the major differences between her own theories and those of
Kohlberg is a useful prelude to understanding why this should be.
According to Blum, there are seven such differences and I paraphrase them
below.w
1. For Gilligan, the moral self is thick rather than thin, defined by. historical
connections and relationships. Whereas Kohlberg defines the moral point of
view as totally impersonal and objective, for her it is anchored in particularity.
2. For Gilligan this radical particularization of the self extends to the other, whose
moral significance cannot be reduced, as Koblberg would have it, to general
categories such as 'friend' and 'person in need'. Moral action, therefore, is
irreducibly particular.
3. Gilligan sees the understanding of the other as a far more difficult and complex
moral task than does Kohlberg and one that necessitates a stance informed by
care, empathy, compassion and emotional sensitivity.
4. Whereas Koblberg proposes a rational, autonomous self subject to the laws of
abstract principle, Gilligan sees the self as "approaching the world of action
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bound by ties and relationships (friend, colleague, parent, child) which
confront her as, at least to some extent, givens." (ibid,p.52)
5. For Kohlberg, formal rationality generates moral action, whereas Gilligan sees
it as necessarily involving an inseparable intertwining of emotion, cognition and
action.
6. Gilligan rejects Kohlberg' s universalistic principles of right action in favour of
a notion of "appropriate response", appraisable by non-subjective standards of
care and responsibility.
7. For Gilligan, morality is founded in the caring connections between persons,
whereas Kohlberg sees right principle as the initial touchstone from which
moral action needs to be judged.
Gilligan, then, defines morality in terms of relatedness rather than autonomy and
embraces particularity, complexity, and emotional attachment as opposed to
Kohlberg's insistance on universality and rationality. In her vision, justice and
care co-inhabit morality and we need to listen to and explore a multiplicity of
moral voices ifwe are to understand its nature and its processes in different socio-
cultural contexts. Viewed in this light, moral knowledge is not apprehended and
understood through the exercise of reason alone; it is too disparate and complex a
form of knowledge to fit Kohlberg's developmental paradigm. She and her
followers argue that narrative story-telling is the form best suited to hold and
convey such knowledge. To understand why, we need to appreciate something of
the cognitive nature of narrative and its pervasiveness in our lives.
''Narrative, "wrote Roland Barthes, in a much quoted phrase,
"is present in every age, in every place, in every society ... narrative is
international, transhistorical, transcultural; it is simply there, like life itself.
(1977, p.79)
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In the words of Barbara Hardy (1977), narrative is a "primary act of mind", which
implies that it is one of the key ways by which we attempt to organize and make
sense of our experience. Jerome Bruner (1986) has argued that there are, in fact,
two modes of thought or ways of knowing, the one paradigmatic, the other
narrative, each of which provides a distinctive way of ordering experience and of
constructing reality. Bruner proposes that the concerns and parameters of the two
modes of thought are very different. We judge a story using criteria distinct from
those we use to judge a scientific hypothesis. Whereas the latter strives for well-
formed, logical argument, for universal truth conditions, the former aims for
verisimilitude. Inquiring more specifically into the narrative mode of thought, he
suggests that "Narrative deals with the vicissitudes of human intention" (ibid,
p.J6) and that the narrative imagination leads to: ''good stories, gripping drama,
believable (though not necessarily 'true') historical accounts." (ibid, p. J 3)
Arguing that we should regard the self as "deeply cultural in its nature" (ibid,
p.68), he draws the following conclusion:
"Insofar as we account for our actions and the human events that occur around us
principally in terms of narrative, story, drama, it is conceivable that our
sensitivity to narrative provides the major link between our own sense of self and
our sense of others in the social world around us. " (ibid, p.69)
Given Gilligan's emphasis upon the socio-cultural embeddedness of moral
knowledge, her belief that it is founded and constructed within particular
relationships of care and connection, then narrative discourse as defined by Bruner
becomes the natural fonn through which we make moral sense of our lives. Like
Gilligan, Bruner sees such knowledge as simultaneously rational and affective,
enabling us to "perceive, feel and think at once." (1986, p.69) Narrative,
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therefore, can convey the messiness of reality and the moral life and also something
of its thickness and complexity.
Theorists and researchers who have been influenced by Gilligan have
concluded that it is through the narrative mode of thought that the moral life can
be broached, understood and explained; and that it is through stories that our
ethical propensities develop." The focus of their attention tends toward people's
storying of their own moral experience, not their understanding of it through
works of narrative fiction. They concentrate upon narrative as a way of thinking,
not upon works of literature; upon the content of personal narratives as the way to
find and define an individual moral voice. This approach, mistrusting any
ideological imposition of moral values, seeing values as shifting and unstable,
respecting difference and choice, resonates strongly with the sentiments of
postmodernism and a climate of moral relativism.
AIasdair MacIntyre and the Aristotelian tradition
If Gilligan's theories emanate from her critique on Kohlberg, those of
Alasdair MacIntyre arise from a more direct attack on Kohlberg's philosophical
antecedent, Immanuel Kant, and upon the Enlightenment Project which he
instigated in an attempt to establish a basis for morality founded upon reason
alone. MacIntyre's aim is to refute the moral relativism and emotivist thinking
which permeates contemporary thinking and, from his historical and philosophical
investigations into the failure of the Enlightenment Project, he proposes an
alternative moral tradition as the best example we possess of a coherent moral
epistemology. In doing so, he places narrative at the heart of his concept of the
unity of the moral life and at how morality is learned.
Like a number of other recent ethical theorists (for example Nussbaum
[1986J. Taylor [1989J), MacIntyre sees the Aristotelian tradition as providing us
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with the best guide to the moral life. He argues that contemporary Western
society suffers from a lack of any coherent agreement around which moral debate
can take place and he explains this by pointing to how Emotivism, a philosophy
which recognizes no objective or impersonal moral standards, has become
embedded in our culture. According to emotivist thinking, if I say Arson is
wrong, Iam uniting a factual statement (that arson destroys property) with a moral
judgment that such destruction is wrong. Only the factual statement can be seen
as true or false, the moral judgment being no more than an expression of attitude
or feeling (MacIntyre, 1981, p.12) What characterises contemporary moral
debate is its tendency to argue from rival premisses so that it ceases to be
argument and descends into assertion and counter ..assertion; premisses that invoke
justice and equality, for example, are often at odds with those which evoke success
and liberty but we have no way of agreeing on what the correct initial premiss
should be. This lack of coherence he traces back to the breakdown of the
Aristotelian tradition and the subsequent and inevitable failure of the
Enlightenment Project to replace it with a new tradition based upon reason. The
book consists of a detailed re-examination and a re-affirmation of this tradition,
which lasted from early Classical Greece until the late Middle Ages.
Kant took as the prime, moral question "What rules ought we to follow?"
whereas Aristotle took it to be "What sort of person am I to become?" (ibid,
p.ll8) This shift in emphasis moves us away from universal maxims toward
central human purposes and a concept of man as a functional being.
"According to that tradition to be a man is tofill a set of roles each of which has
its own point and purpose: member of family, citizen, philosopher, servant of
God. It is only when man is thought of as an individual prior to and apart from
all roles that 'man' ceases to be afunctional concept." (ibid, p.59)
25
In this way, moral qualities can be seen to have factual value, inasmuch as we can
define the qualities of a good member of a family in much the same way as we can
define the qualities of a good watch. However, such an understanding disappears
when the notion of central human purposes is removed from concepts of morality;
for MacIntyre, this was one of the key errors of Kantian philosophy. Moral truth,
therefore, is not definable as an abstract, universal principle but is best understood
as locatable within the social roles that individuals inherit and create for
themselves, within their own particular telos which they either succeed or fail in
fulfilling. And in his explanation of how an individual life can come to be seen as
morally coherent, he argues that such coherence is captured in the form of a
narrative.
MacIntyre contends that the Aristotelian meaning of virtue is only
intelligible as a characteristic of the unitary life and that this unitary self is only
comprehensible through narrative, a narrative which is unavoidably historical and
social in its nature.
"We are never more (and sometimes less) than the co-authors of our own
narratives .... In life ... we are always under certain constraints. We enter upon a
stage which we did not design and we find ourselves part of an action that was not
of our making." (ibid, p.2l3)
(The fact that he is drawn toward using specifically dramatic imagery while
expressing this point is something I shall return to in a later chapter). The unity of
such a life is the unity of a narrative quest which seeks answers to the two related
questions, "What is good for me?" and "What is good for man?" And what is
good for me has to include what is good for someone who inhabits the social roles
I am a part of This narrative view of the self, therefore, brings together the
historical and social identities of the individual and emphasises community rather
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than autonomy. Individuals can move forward from their moral particularities in
search of the universal but cannot obliterate them and escape into a realm of
entirely universal maxims, as Kant suggested they could. When they try, they
usually behave worse than they otherwise would; (whether this maxim be
Socialism in one Nation or the Irresistibility of Market Forces, recent Western
experience would appear strongly to support this view).
MacIntyre's thesis gives central importance not only to the theory of
narrative as a moral life lived but to the importance of a canon of stories to shape
and inform the moral direction of this life. The reason lies in his concept of
tradition and the relationship between individuals and their social roles. As his
argument here deals with themes central to this particular thesis, I quote it at some
length.
''Man is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fiction, essentially a story-
telling animal. He is not essentially, but becomes through history, a teller of
stories that aspire to truth. But the key question for men is not about their own
authorship; I can only answer the question "Whatam I to do?" if I can answer the
prior question "Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?" We enter
human society, that is, with one or more imputed characters - roles into which we
have been drafted - and we have to learn what they are in order to be able to
understand how others respond to us and how our responses to them are apt to be
construed It is through hearing stories about wicked stepmothers, lost children,
good but misguided kings, wolves that suckle twin boys, youngest sons who
receive no inheritance but must make their own way in the world and eldest sons
who waste their inheritance on riotous living and go into exile to live with the
swine, that children learn or mislearn both what a child and what a parent is,
what the cast of characters may be in the drama into which they have been born
and what the ways of the world are. Deprive children of stories and you leave
them anxious stutterers in their actions and in their words. Hence there is no
way to give us an understanding of any society, including our own, except
through the stock of stories which constitute its initial dramatic resources. (ibid,
p.216)
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Our ability to author the moral self is therefore dependent upon our understanding
of the virtues embedded in the social roles we are born into and these are learned
in part from the stories which are part of our heritage. Like Oakeshott (1962),
MacIntyre understands a tradition as a living argument, not as a set of precepts to
enforce conformity. Stories, therefore, inform our choices in life, they do not
dictate them. It is perfectly consistent with his thesis that the examples he lists
come from legends, parables and fairy tales, from those stories generally grouped
under the portmanteau term 'traditional and it is upon such genres of tales that I
now wish to concentrate. Before proceeding, however, I shall attempt to
summarise and extend the implications of what has been argued so far and make
some tentative proposals of my own.
Moral cognitive developmental theory, with its stress upon the
autonomous, rational subject operating within a framework of universal values, has
been seriously challenged in the postmodern era by moral theories which place a
particular stress upon narrative ways of knowing. From this perspective, the
moral self is seen as intricately woven into social and historical networks of
relationships (Gilligan) and roles (MacIntyre). Gilligan and her followers see the
areas of affect - care, compassion, emotional sensitivity - as inextricablybound to
the rational intellect within the domain of moral experience and they view such
experience as unavoidably particular and resistant to generalization according to
abstract moral principles. They see the moral domain as multi-faceted; have a
shared interest in the narratives of lived moral experiences; see language and
culture as the fundamental constituents and mediators of moral meaning; and see
the problem of interpretation of moral meaning as a deep problem in post-
structuralist and postmodernist terms. They argue for a greater use of personal
narratives in education and educational research to enable students and researchers
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to understand better how the moral life finds expression. MacIntyre has a similar
view on the socio-historical particularity of the moral life and rejects the Kantian
quest for universal maxims. Whereas those moral theorists influenced by Gilligan
present their voices as adjuncts to or critiques of Kohlberg's paradigmatic theory,
MacIntyre locates his theories of narrative as part of an alternative, Aristotelian
tradition which, he argues, presents a coherent philosophy for living the moral life
according to virtues, not maxims, which are only expressible from within social
roles. These virtues, - courage, honesty, integrity, loyalty, practical wisdom and
kindness, to name some of the more obvious - conform largely to what Bernard
Williams describes as thick concepts, specific ethical notions which constitute a
system of ethics as opposed to a morality system. This is an important distinction
and one which, at this point, needs to be pursued.
Wtlliams describes morality as a peculiarly modern version of ethical
thought. 12 The thicker, ethical concepts are, he argues, vague by their very nature.
This is not a weakness, for:
"although evaluative and action-guiding, (they) are also 'world-guided' in the
sense that their proper application 'is determined by what the world is like.'"
(Scheffler, 1996, p.13)
In contrast, the morality system which pervades modem thought demands a sharp
boundary for itself and is dominated by restrictively abstract and 'thin' concepts
which seek to represent all ethical conclusions as statements of obligation.
Wtlliams argues that, unlike judgments within the morality system, those which use
thick concepts amount to a body of knowledge as they embrace both fact and
value and are based upon notions of the world as it actually is. He, too, is drawn
to narrative, to Homer, Sophocles and Thucydides, as they represent:
29
"human beings as dealing sensibly, foolishly, sometimes catastrophically,
sometimes nobly, with a world that is only partially intelligible to human agency
and in itself is not necessarily well adjusted to ethical aspirations." (cited in
Scheffler, op. cit, p. J3)
To advocate the centrality of narrative in the moral education of young
schoolchildren is, therefore, to propose that we concentrate on the broader,
"thicker" field of ethics rather than the narrower, "thinner" field of the morality
system.
Such advocacy does not imply an abandonment of institutional rules and
practices intended to develop a sense of community, responsibility and autonomy.
What I am proposing is that such practices are compatible with a view of moral
education akin to a system of ethics, as advocated by Wtlliams, MacIntyre and
Gilligan; and that stories have a particularly important role in enabling children to
explore the nature of the ethical life as it is experienced. One of the major
problems with the morality system at the centre of the Kohlberg/Kantian approach,
seeking as it does to bind together duty, practical necessity and logical consistency,
is that it presents morality as though it were a rational puzzle, a series of dilemmas
we preside over as impartial judges. It therefore fails to capture the feel of the
moral impulse, with its attendant urgency and commitment but also the confusion
and messiness of it all. The Aristotelian view, summarised here by Nussbaum, is
sensitive to this:
"what we find in practice is not a sharp contrast between absolute claims and
claims that can be avoided with ease but a messier continuum of claims judged to
have various degrees offorce and inevitability." (1986, p.30)
Kohlberg, although accepting the sharp reality of moral dilemmas, nevertheless
proposes that this continuum of claims can be rationally resolved into a heirarchy.
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By contrast, the ethical system, I would suggest, presents a model which willmake
sense to both teachers and children, recognizing as it does the existence of
conflicting moral feelings without suggesting that this conflict is solely due to our
own poor reasoning powers. Nor does it propose that all claims are relative and
therefore beyond judgment and evaluation.
Intrinsic to the argument of MacIntyre and to feminist moral theorists such
as Gilligan and Noddings is the location of morality within the social world; the
fact that the social world will provide different roles and relationships for each of
us to fulfill; and that these roles and relationships will bring different moral
pressures to bear on us, none of which may be any the less binding than another.
Hence ethical judgment is particular, problematic and dependent upon context; for
many of Gilligan's followers, irremediably so. Aristotle, however, insists that
generalizations are possible, but that they must be informed by observations and
experiences of the particular. A medical analogy may be helpful. Each case of
cancer a doctor may need to treat is specific, different but is of necessity informed
by other similar cases. The understanding the doctor gains from them is
dependent upon an appreciation of both difference and similarity. But what is
important is that the particular is not synonomous with the unique. Thus stories-
or, in a medical context, case studies - inform the doctor how to act. And so, too,
with the moral life. It may be difficult to argue for universal laws as Kohlberg
understood them, but that does not imply that we must avoid making moral
generalisations. Stories inform our capacity to make such generalisations.
Aristotle's concept of the virtues presents us with a moral vocabulary which
is at once precise and problematic, open to development and to debate. For
example, we may all agree that courage is a virtue; but what characterises it and
how it will be expressed in different circumstances and contexts will vary
according to individual perceptions shaped by personal, cultural and historical
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expenence. Hence its thickness as a concept, its ability to embrace fact and value,
and the role of stories in helping us to explore the depth and complexity of this
thickness. Whether we describe our present-day, British society as post-
structuralist, postmodem or just contemporary, there is little doubt that the
dominant ideas of the old grand narratives - religious, political, ideological - are
under question as we witness an increasingly pluralistic proliferation of culture and
belief As Fred Inglis argues:
"The individualizing of values which is the inevitable product of a global culture
made up of dozens of maps of local knowledge means that none of the old
structures of morality and the education they fathered can hold ... In these
circumstances, a moral education composed of relatively secure precepts and
maxims will not serve. Each individual must act morally but without maxims. "
(1993, p.2l2)
In such a world, he sees stories as the only resource we have left to provide
us with moral guidance.
"The guide (the) individual needs is the canon of the world's stories. The route
from impersonal morality to personal life is marked by the narrative. ... The
stories we tell ourselves about ourselves are not just a help to moral education;
they comprise the only education which can gain purchase on the modern world"
(ibid, pp. 2131214)
Inglis' assertion moves us into the specific areas of biography and literature and
thus raises further questions as to what kind of moral learning literature offers us
and whether this applies to the canon of the world's fairy stories; for,
notwithstanding the endorsement of MacIntyre, to argue the specific case for using
fairy stories in the moral education of young children must take into account their
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nature as fictional narratives and whether this is compatible with the moral
potential of narrative as defined within the human sciences.
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NOTES
1. For a full and readable account of the philosophical and educational principles underpinning
Koblberg's ideas, with selective details from his research findings. see Kohlberg, L. (1971)
2. In the appendices to the above article, Kohlberg provides definitions of the moral stages with
examples of the type of reasoning which illustrates their attainment, together with a list of
what he defines as the universal aspects of morality. See op. cit, pp 86 - 92
3. See Rawls, 1. (1977)
4. Piaget 1(1932) 1
5. Erikson, E. (1977), Chapter 7, pp 222 - 243
6. See Donaldson, M. (1978). The experiment referred to here is descnbed pp 19 - 24.
7. As an illuminating example, I quote from Erikson, (op.cit, p.239), where he describes bow,
in Stage 6, the healthy individual achieves the stage of Intimacy. One of the goals of this
stage is the Utopia of genitality. This, Erikson explains, should include:
1. mutuality of orgasm
2. with a loved partner
3. of the other sex
4. with whom one is able and willing to share a mutual trust
5. and with whom one is able and willing to regulate the cycles of
a. work
h. procreation
c. recreation
6. so as to secure the offspring, too, all the stages of a satisfactory development.
Homosexuals may well have criticised such, a perspective when Erikson wrote Childhood and
~ but their criticisms would be seen as far more mainstream than marginal today.
8. There has been a great deal written about Gilligan's theories in recent years and Gilligan
herself bas revised and developed them. See Heckman, S. (1995) for a comprehensive
overview of this development.
9. See, in particular, Noddings (1984, 1989) and Noddings & Witherell (1991)
10. See Blum (1993) pp50 .. 53
11. See Witherell (1991a, 1991b); Freeman (1991, 1993); Tappan (1991a, 1991b); Day (1991a,
1991b)
12. See Williams (1985) pp 6 - 7 for his discussion of the difference between an ethical system
and a morality system. See also Scheftler (1996) for an excellent summary of this and of
Williams' ideas on the nature of thick concepts.
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CHAPTER II
MORAL MEANINGS IN
LITERARY NARRATIVE AND IN
MYTHS AND FAIRY TALES
The recent depth of interest in narrative shown by the human sciences sees
in it a natural form for the human mind to apprehend reality as lived experience,
regarding it, as we have seen; as "a primary act of mind". Paul Ricoeur has
shown us how the principal property of a narrative is its sequentiality, its meaning
being constructed from the overall configuration of a sequence of events, whether
these events be real or imaginary.' Moreover, Hayden White has argued (1981)
that to create a narrative is inherently to make a plea for moral legitimacy. As
Bruner puts it:
"To tell a story is inescapably to take a moral stance, even if it is a moral stance
against moral stances. " (J990,p. 51)
Both real and imaginary narratives share these qualities and, according to Bruner,
good stories, whether real or imaginary, share additional intrinsic qualities; they
subjunctivise experience, inviting the reader to reconstruct what might have
happened, opening up rather than closing down possibilities:
"To make a story ggg4 it would seem, you must make it somewhat uncertain,
somehow open to variant readings, rather subject to the vagaries of intentional
states, undetermined" (ibid, p.54)
This subjunctivity constitutes what the Russian formalists called "literariness", the
literariness of printed stories, far more "artfully" shaped than the recounted
experiences or oral anecdotes which are equally narrative in their form. If all
-storiesmust hold a moral stance, then in a good, or effective, literary narrative, it
must be in such a way so as not to reduce the story's subjunctivity.
Sam Goldberg has explored the type of moral understanding to be gained
from literature and his argument is compatible with Bruner's emphasis on
subjunctivity. "Literature", he writes, "does its moral thinking in the particulars
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it imagines; and it has to." (1993, p.xv) This is because, whereas philosophy and
psychology concentrate on conduct-morality, viewing people as moral agents and
focusing on their voluntary, intentional actions, narrative literature fuses this vision
with a more elusive life-centred view of morality. Conduct morality, he argues,
deals with issues of how to live, while life morality is concerned with how to live.
If the former centres around matters of right and wrong in human actions, of how
the virtues and vices constitute moral character. then the latter characterises and
evaluates modes of living. It deals with:
"the value of manifold capacities, potentialities, wants and needs of human
beings; about what is 'truly' human, or what the 'perfection' or well-being' of a
life consists in, or what the finest and fullest modes of human Vitality." (ibid,
p.36)
What he means by this is best illustrated by his assessment of Jane Austen's
achievement inMansfield Park:
''Matters of sensibility, feeling, attraction, grace and ease, hoping and fearing,
and desiring, even some sense of fatedness, become inter-twined in each
character with matters of judgment, choice, principle and deliberate intentional
action; and responsibility is found (by those capable of caring about it and
finding it) to apply to the whole of what one is, to how and what one sees things to
be, to the life in one as one lives it out." (ibid, p.285)
Goldberg's emphasis on narrative as "irreducibly particular and individual" (ibid,
p.282) is coterminous with his view of the moral life as it is actually lived. It is
also very much in the same mode of thinking as Gilligan and MacIntyre, stressing
the need to understand the moral life in the particular historical, social and cultural
conditions which render its actions unitary rather than merely sequential:
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"it is such and such a life lived within these and those particular SOCial
institutions, practices, beliefs and attitudes, for example, and within these or
those personal, sexual andfamilial relationships." (ibid,p.43)
He argues that to approach a literary narrative as something embodying
preconceived ideas, thought out in the abstract and then illustrated within a text, is
erroneous because of "the inability of that kind of thinking by itself to make
moral sense of people. " (ibid, p.xvii) In other words, as this is not how people
think and act morally, it is not how stories should be morally constructed or
interpreted.
A theory which does much to explain the novel's potential for moral
subjunctivitywas developed by Mikhail Bakhtin in his reassessment of the work of
Dostoevsky.' Bakhtin argued that the early nineteenth century novel was
monological in its structure, with the omniscient author regulating the
interpretation of characters on behalf of the reader. Dostoevsky's novels, on the
other hand, are characterised by polyphony, where no single voice within a
narrative is the bearer of a definitive truth+ The perspective of the omniscient
author is muddied, the central characters are given a special kind of autonomy
through what he described as a dialogic penetration of their personalities.
Bakhtin's concept of dialogism, as Aileen Kelly explains, amounts to a
reinterpretation of the nature of the self
''He held selfhood to be intrinsically 'dialogical': the self cannot be understood or
expressed except in relation to an audience whose real or imagined responses
continually shape the way in which we define ourselves. "(Kelly, 1992, p.44)
The dialogical nature of the self contextualises it in specific social and historical
circumstances and any attempt to monologize it, through such authoritarian
discourses as we find in religious, political or moral dogma, are ultimately false
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attempts to finalize it, to resolve its struggle between competing values. Hence
Bakhtin's belief that it is through becoming increasingly responsive to the
particularities of individual cases that we become more moral, not through our
adoption of a set of pre-ordained moral maxims; and hence the real potential of the
novel as a source of moral education. What he termed the "prosaic wisdom" of
the novel was:
"its ability to convey the fundamental 'messiness' of the world, the flux of events
that cannot be reduced to any set of explanatory principles. " (Kelly, op. cit, p.46)
In such a novel, no view is incontestable and, as in the real world, people's moral
stature is expressed through their ability to respond meaningfully to the
ambivalence of ordinary existence.
Not surprisingly, Bakhtin's ideas have gained in influence with the advance
of postmodernist discourse and they re-emphasize the cultural and historical
specificity which other narrative theories of moral understanding hold as a central
tenet. The novel convinces by problematising morality, by countering any attempt
to render it dream-like in its facility. The theory of dialogism fits well with Iris
Murdoch's perspective on the moral function of literature, which she sees as
providing "a renewed sense of the difficulty and complexity of the moral life and
the opacity of persons:" (1983, p,49) The potential for moral learning inherent to
literary narratives can be understood, therefore, to rest in their ambiguity and
indeterminacy on the one hand and in their contextual particularity on the other.
However, such a view presents us with a problem when we turn to traditional tales
for it is immediately evident that they by-pass both subjunctivity and historical
specificity. They are populated by a range of instantly identifiable, stock
characters, such as wolves and witches, princesses and kings, heroes and fools, and
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are noticeably devoid of the dialogical open-endedness characteristic of the great
literary novels, as a delightful short story from Saki will remind us.
In The Story Teller, a beleaguered aunt on a train journey attempts to
quieten her unruly charges by telling them a story in which a virtuous girl is saved
from an enraged bull by neighbours, who run to her aid because they admire her
goodness so much. The tale is not a success; the children listen to it reluctantly
and criticise it unsparingly when the aunt has finished. A man sharing the
compartment then relates the tale of a girl called Bertha who was "horriblygood",
so good that she was awarded medals for her goodness and invited to walk in the
king's garden as a special reward. While there, however, she encountered a
vicious wolf Running to the safety of some nearby bushes she hid and almost
escaped; but her trembling caused her medals to clink one against the other,
betraying her presence to the wolf who promptly ate her. The aunt is outraged,
condemning the story as "improper"; the children, on the other hand, love it.
"That is the most beautiful story I have ever heard!" proclaims the eldest daughter,
wistfully. The tale is witty, cynical and very entertaining, debunking as it does the
tendency in some Victorian fairy tales for facile moralising, a pious representation
of conventional virtues and a sentimental view of childhood. The children's
preference for an improper story is presented as a liberating tonic to the oppressive
and tedious didacticism of the aunt's tale and helps explain the popularity of Roald
Dahl's stories among children today. Saki's point is that stories do not educate
when they are used as vehicles for preaching conventional morality; instead, they
bore their listeners and fail to convince.
Saki's parody, then, would appear to contest the enthusiastic endorsement
of MacIntyre for traditional tales, underlining instead their shortcomings as sources
of moral learning. However, if we are to appreciate more fully the moral
discourse of the fairy tale, we must first locate it not as a poor cousin of the
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literary novel but as a distinct genre in a tradition that includes mythic and folk
tales. Unlike the novel, which is a product of educated, literate, western society
and can be analysed as such, the literary fairy tale has roots which lie in oral, pre-
literate cultures and its cultural, historical and political links with myth and folk
tale are complex and disputed, mirroring contradictory claims for the ethical
potential of the tales in both historical and contemporary contexts. Significantly,
these claims fall into two camps and reflect the universality/particularity dichotomy
which characterises the contemporary debate in moral educational theory. For
there are those who see the tales as bearers of spiritual wisdom and universal,
eternal truths, embodied within their archetypes and symbolisms; and those who
examine their historical and cultural roots, seeing their moral meanings as
transient, political and open to change. Although the emphasis in this study is on
fairy tales, it is necessary to locate them within this tradition by first looking at
their more ancient relatives, myths and folktales.
Folk tales and Myth
There is no agreement among scholars on how to differentiate the genre of
myth from that of folk tale, and the term myth, in particular, has connotations so
broad, depending upon the context of its use, that a whole thesis could concentrate
on these connotations alone. For the purposes of this brief resume, I propose a
bald definition of myth as a fantastic, highly symbolic story, an intricate part of a
culture's belief system, expounding values significant to that culture, with central
characters who are heroic or God-like. Like myths, folktales are ancient and
contain similar patterns offantasy, symbol and magic, forming part of an oral, folk
tradition but with central protagonists who originate from humble backgrounds.
Thompson (1977) argues that there is some validity for seeing a distinction
between the two genres in the case of the Greek and Hindu tales but none
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whatsover with regard to the tales of the North American Indians. Propp (1984,
p.ixx) saw the folktale as a "desacralizedmyth"; and Benjamin (1991) saw them as
an oppressive, socialising agency in primitive societies, performing the same
political function as religion in contemporary society. Kirk (1970, pp 36-41), like
Benjamin, attempts to differentiate myth and folktale largely in terms of content
and both detect a distinctly lighter tone in the folktale. Myths, Kirk argues, have
serious underlying purposes, whereas folktales, although they might reflect upon
recurrent social dilemmas, such as how to circumvent a malicious stepmother or a
jealous sibling, are never profound in their intentions. He perceives the
persistence of magic in such tales as ''just a special type of ingenuity" (p.38)
whose purpose is primarily a functional one, to provide "afeeling of satisfaction
at the neatness and finality with which an awkward situation is resolved or an
enemy confounded" (p.38) He acknowledges, however, how both magic and
trickery serve to exemplify another major feature of European folktales, that of
wish-fulfilment fantasy, where great material rewards are gained by small but often
highly moral actions. ''Morality is one quality left open to the under-privileged"
(p.39) he quips. The fact that rewards for moral actions centre on wealth and
riches is, he argues, due to the material poverty of the tellers and listeners in the
folk tradition; as the aristocratic myths reflect a society and an audience with no
lack of wealth, wish-fulfilment does not take on such a materialistic form in many
such tales.
There is some agreement, therefore, that Eurasian folktales are optimistic
in their content and point to the possibility of material happiness achieved through
a mixture of good fortune and moral merit. Whether such rewards, or the nature
of the morality they portray, can be judged as moral by conventional contemporary
standards is, of course, another matter. North American Indian tales are very
different and, as Thompson points out, their mythical and folk traditions merge
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into eachother. As their cultures embody such an attachment to and appreciation
of the Earth, its beauty and resources, their stories express these values and have
attracted the attention of educators in recent years, particularly those concerned
with environmental issues in the USA. Musser and Freeman (1989) see the
stories of the Plains Indians in precisely these terms and Caduto and Bruchac
(1988) have developed an environmental teaching programme centred around a
collection of these stories Referring to Gilligan's ethic of care, they see the tales
as material for teaching: "a sense of being a part of the lives of other people and
the Earth, and ofwholism and interdependence." (1988b, p.7).
One of the great scholars of religion and myth was Mircea Eliade (1963).
He believed that myths related a sacred history set in primordial time, narrating the
deeds of supernatural beings in ways which set examples for humans to codify and
order their lives. Myths, he argues, provide religious experiences by being
enacted and hence incorporated into the present, which enactment enables humans
to be transported into sacred time. Campbell (1949) embraces all the mythologies
of the world in a grand, universal theory and sees no real distinction between the
function of mythology or folktale and, like Eliade, he sees this function as a deeply
spiritual one. Drawing freely on the theories of Freud and Jung, he proposes an
interpretation of mythical stories as spiritually therapeutic and health-giving. The
human subconscious he defines as "the basic, magic ring of myth." (p.3) and the
function of mythical symbolism is "to carry the human spirit forward" (p.ll).
The central, universal symbol of myth is the figure of the hero and Campbell
proposes a typology for the pattern of his heroic quest which is also universal in its
application. Every culture in every age needs its own heroes. but the universal
nature of their individual quests has been captured symbolically in myth, each of
which is a "local carrier of universal themes." (p.23l).
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"In myth, the problems and solutions shown are validfor all mankind" (p.19)
"The heroes of all time have gone before us; the labyrinth is thoroughly known;
we have only to follow the thread of the hero-path. " (p.25)
The hero's journey is a model for us all to follow, if we have the courage to
undertake it. Its reward is a gift of enlightenment, to be shared with a society, an
"ego-shattering, life-redeeming elixir" (p.216) but one which will often meet with
the harsh rejection by good people at a loss to comprehend its significance.
Campbell's perspective is openly religious and his emphasis on symbol is equalled
by his emphasis on mystery, revelation and salvation.
Campbell, like Levi-Strauss, attempts a universal theory of myth but Kirk
strongly contests such theories, believing that. "myths differ enormously in their
morphology and social junction. " (1970, p.7) He examines in detail not only
theories of mythological function and meaning - including the ideas of Levi-
Strauss, Jung and Freud - but he also draws evidence for his conclusions from a
systematic study of mythologies from a diversity of cultural sources. Some myths,
he suggests, originated from ritual and ceremonial use, others confirmed the
memory of and provided authority for tribal customs; still others had a speculative
or explanatory purpose, offering symbolic solutions to problems or asserting
visions of a Truth through evocative imagery (pp 252 - 259) He offers a very
different form of typology from Campbell and one which holds out no privileged
position for myth as a bearer of psychological or universal truth, moral or
otherwise. Instead, through analysis and example, he proposes that any moral
values propounded in myths were local in perspective and form. So, for example,
the pervasive presence of the Gods in Greek mythology: "provided a continuing
commentary on human aspirations and limitations and the absurd conflicts
between them. "(p.193). Hindu myth, on the other hand, tends to teach explicit
lessons from its own belief system:
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"that worldly affairs are unimportant in relation to the whole of time, that men
will be reborn, that reality is equivocal, that the gods are superior, that sex and
fertility are good, but that destruction is also necessary" (p.2J3)
Unlike Campbell (and Freud and Jung), who see the complex, dream-like
symbolism of myth as central to its significance, Kirk sees its narrative story-telling
as the primary point of focus. He holds an evolutionary view of myth which lays
stress on:
"the gradual development of narrative structures, of stories, with complex
symbolic implications coming in almost incidentally." (p.280)
Whereas Campbell sees mythology primarily in symbolic and psychological terms,
Kirk scrutinises it from a perspective which concentrates on cultural and historical
meaning, a contrast in approach and emphasis mirrored by different theorists in the
field of the fairy story.
Fairy Stories
The term fairy tale is nebulous and often used to embrace myth and folk
tale: and, Whereas MacIntyre equates all traditional tales as important to a child's
moral education, Benjamin would apparantly dispute such an assertion, evoking
the fairy tale and its special kind of "liberating magic" as the direct opponent of
the oppressive teachings of myth. (1992, p.JOJ) Moreover, the contextual
referencing of Benjamin, in fact, shows that he clearly had in mind folk tales as
well as fairy tales and the differences between the two genres are significant.
Jack Zipes, among others, has documented how the fairy tale is, in fact, a
literary phenomenon, emerging in the seventeenth century, when writers began to
use oral folk tales as source material for stories, transforming their meanings and
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their functions in the process of writing them down. Furthermore, neither the
original western fairy stories, nor the folk tales from which they were derived,
were intended exclusively for' an audience of children. When writers such as
Charles Perrault and the Brothers Grimm began to collect oral folk tales and
publish them in collections, it became evident that a new reading public, that of
literate children and their parents, enjoyed such tales and thus began a debate
which has continued to this day on their moral suitability. Alison Lurie has
commented on how this concern has continued to be the prerogative of
"highminded; progressive people" for over two hundred years. She points to how
in the eighteenth century, for example, a tale such as Cinderella was condemned
for painting "some of the worst passions that can enter a human breast ... such as
emry.r,jealousy... vanity, a love of dress etc. " (J990, p.17) A more recent attack
on the tale finds different values to criticise:
"Why is the stepmother shown to be wicked and not the father? Why is
Cinderella essentially passive? ... Why do girls have to quarrel over a man? ...
Are all men handsome? Is marriage the end goal of life? Is it important to
marry rich men?" (Zipes, 1979, p.173)
However, as much as the fairy tale has had its detractors on moral grounds, it has
had its moral apologists. G.K. Chesterton saw them as "spiritual explorations"
(cited in Bettelheim, 1976, p.24) and Eliade as expressions of psychodramas "that
answer a deep need in the human being" (ibid, p.35) There are, in fact, two
camps which I shall term the revisionists and the traditionalists. By exploring
their theories and by looking at how they have influenced writers and educators,
we can begin to map out the moral maze which the field of the fairy tale has
become.
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The revisionist case.
By revisionists, I refer to those writers and critics who are suspicious of the
moral values within the narrative of fairy tales and therefore propose that the
stories need to be revised, or sanitised for an audience of children. Such views are
particularly prevalent today and, as Lurie indicates, their moral objections may
have changed their nature over the years but they form part of a long tradition;
paradoxically, perhaps, it is the work of earlier revisionists that today's revisionists
often object to.
Jack Zipes is one of the major contemporary theorists who openly
advocates the need to revise fairy tales. In a number of books, he traces their
roots back to the peasant oral folk tradition, where their role, he suggests, was a
subversive one. As part of the peasants' communal property, they embodied the
people's needs and wishes, bridging a gap in their understanding of social
problems, projecting a possible fulfilment of utopian longings within the fantastic
imagery of a familiar narrative mode. However, when the tales began to be
written down, their previous malleability became fixed. Whereas they had
formerly been adapted by tellers to the needs and desires of specific communities,
writers of the tales, in obliterating the original folk perspective, endowed the
contents of the tales with a new ideology. To illustrate what he means by this, it
is worth referring to his comments on the history of the Red Riding Hood story.
This was first turned into a literary tale by Perrault, who endowed it with "an
earnest moral purpose." (1993, p.27) Such a moral purpose needs to be viewed
not only in terms of Perrault's own personal preferences but as shaped by French
social history and the aristocratic taste of the time. Stringent codes of class and
behaviour were being developed into which children needed to fit. Consequently,
the forthright, brave and shrewd heroine of t~ original folk narrative was changed
into a pretty, passive, innocently gullible little girl. Perrault's tale became a
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warning to all little girls to beware of strangers, to obey their parents and, within
its imagery, it suggests that if they were ever seduced and raped, it would be
through their own negligence and compliance. Having created such a powerfully
symbolic tale, the numerous versions which succeeded it throughout the nineteenth
century built upon its potential to socialise little girls in a particular direction.
This potential is succinctly summarised by Tatar:
''Foucault has taught us the extent to which socialization produces 'docile bodies'
that subject themselves to self-discipline and productive labors (sic). By
internalising a disciplinary regime in each subject, socialization staves off the
needfor coercive action or repressive measures." (1992, p.235)
What Zipes objects to is precisely the tale's ability to introject a moral code so
successfully; for this moral code he sees as ideologically oppressive. He draws on
the writings of numerous feminists, who have a particular interest in the fairy tale
due to the type of female images it tends to perpetuate and summarises their
objections thus:
''Not only are the tales considered to be too sexist, racist and authoritarian, but
the general contents are said to reflect the concerns of semi-feudal, patriarchal
societies. (1983, p.170)
Zipes points with approval to the work of recent writers who deliberately set out
to challenge and reverse some of the expectations in the genre, thus restoring to it
its "emancipatory" and "liberating" potential. (1983, p.191) In the tale Prince
Amilec, for example (Zipes, 1986), the archetypal male figures of the king and the
prince are portrayed as unintelligent and incompetent, the beautiful princess as
bad-tempered and ultimately undesirable and the witch as pro-active, generous and
sexually attractive enough to win the prince's hand.
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In her analysis of the historical evolution of fairy tales, Maria Tatar points
to negative female role models and to a proliferation of images of cruelty and
violence, particularly toward women, typifying an outmoded pedagogy of fear.
The violent images fairy tales use were taken from a folktale tradition where they
were an instrument for anarchic humour, before later writers attempted to pervert
them into the service of behavioural socialisation. In the spirit of Foucault, she
makes the point that:
"the entire project of childrearing, including the telling of tales, is invested in a
micro-physics of power and is therefore never really in the best interest of the
child AlQ'attempt to pass on stories becomes a disciplinary tactic aimed at the
child. " (1992, p.236)
Such a blanket statement would appear to leave no-one, not even the most radical
revisionist, with any room for manoeuvre except, perhaps, to shut up and leave the
child be. However, she declares herself in favour of: "breaking the magic spell
that traditional tales weave around their listeners." (ibid, p.237)
"Despite the stabilizing power of print, " she writes, ''fairy tales can still be told
and retold so that they challenge and resist, rather than simply reproduce, the
constructs of a culture. Through playful disruptions, it is possible to begin
transforming canonical texts into tales that empower and entertain children at the
some time that they interrogate and take the measure of their own participation in
a project to socialize the child. " (ibid, p.236)
The tale of Prince Amilec would evidently fall into this category, as would
publications by Jon Sciezska who, in The Frog Prince (continued), for example,
uses parody, ironic humour and shock to subvert the traditional tale.
Tatar's historical analysis is thorough and she quotes instances of
nineteenth century writers, revisionists themselves, such as George Cruikshank,
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who had felt compelled to rewrite Puss-in-Boots for, as it stood, the tale was a
clever lesson in lying! What she does not note, however, is that the result of such
a layering of moral discourse is bound to be unsatisfactory: deceit and trickery
have to remain intrinsic to the tale because of their strong and persistent narrative
function, a point recognized by both Kirk (1970, p.38) and Bruner (1986, p.20)
Consequently, and paradoxically, such tampering often succeeds in enhancing the
ambivalentmorality of the tale rather than diminishingit.
Both Tatar and Zipes, therefore, are distinctly post-structuralist in their
perspectives. They attack the oppressive moralising of the literary fairy tale and
the outmoded values they embody, advocating new, more radical tales to restore
the original role of the folk tale, one whose moral force lies in its drive toward
social and cultural liberation.
The traditionalist case.
The traditionalist case argues that the canon of the great fairy tales has a
central place in the social and moral education of children and its most influential
exponent of recent times has been Bruno Bettelheim whose book, The Uses of
Enchantment, has been described as ''profound and illuminating" by Mary
Warnock, well-known for her active interest in moral education.
Bettelheim argues that the importance of these tales goes deeper than
issues of role models and moral didacticism.
"The paramount importance of fairy tales for the growing individual, " he writes,
"resides in something other than teachings about correct ways of behaving in the
world ... The fairy tale's concern is not useful information about the external
world, but the inner processes taking place in the individual." (1976, p.25)
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These inner processes are the workings of the pre-conscious and subconscious, as
propounded by Freud. The most popular fairy tales are ''purveyors of deep
insights that have sustained mankind through the long vicissitudes of its
existence. " (ibid, p.26) They have come to address, in symbolic form, what he
calls "the eternal questions":
"What is the world really like? How am I to live my life in it? How can I truly
be myself?" (ibid, p.45)
For this reason, they should not be revised or tampered with. Furthermore, within
the parameters of these bigger questions, the symbolic portrayal of good and evil,
has a fundamental place.
"Contrary to what takes place in many modern children's stories, in fairy tales
evil is as omnipresent as virtue. In practically every fairy tale good and evil are
given body in the form of some figures and their actions, as good and evil are
omnipresent in life and the propensities for both are present in every man. It is
this duality which poses the moral problem, and requires the struggle to solve it. "
(ibid,p.9)
There is no ambivalence in the classic fairy tales favoured by Bettelheirn; the good
win, the bad lose. The use of unambiguous characters and the lack of psychology
are important features of this process. As the good figure is straightforwardly and
obviously the hero or heroine, the childwill identify with it.
"The question for the child is not 'Do I want to be good?' but 'Who do I want to
be like?' The child decides on the basis of projecting himself wholeheartedly
into one character. If this fairy-tale figure is a very good person, then the child
decides that he wants to be good, too." (ibid,p.10)
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Much of the power within fairy tales, he argues, resides in the way they enable a
child to work through anti-social urges in symbolic form, He gives the example of
a young boy who enjoyed the exploits of Jack the Giant Killer because his
subconscious saw the Giants as symbolically representative of grown-ups (ibid,
p.27). Rather than this leading to a desire to commit violence, it purged him of
any frustrations and rages that adults, in their role as agents of social control,
might have provoked within him. The story showed him that one day he, too,
would be like the giant and acquire the same powers. We should not, therefore,
worry about the violence in the tales; its purpose is intended and responded to as
symbolic rather than literal. What matters is that the figure who represents the
force of good is eventually triumphant.
Bettelheim's case for the traditional fairy tale is based upon an orthodox
Freudian perspective and his view of the moral development of children is very
different from Kohlberg's but similar in its tacit acceptance of social hegemony and
the dominant moral discourse. Behind the quasi-mystical regard he holds for fairy
tales, his moral perspective is conventional in its intended outcomes, namely the
socialization of the child into the necessary givens of dominant, western culture.
As such, there is an assumption in his work that the social and moral values within
the tales are favourable. Such an outlook, on the surface at least, would appear to
be closer to MacIntyre than to Benjamin. For MacIntyre, what matters are the
symbolic roles represented in the tales which present children with the kind of
moral choices and decisions which they can expect to face as they grow.
Benjamin, too, stresses the types found in fairy tales but for very different reasons;
each reveals symbolically how man can escape from the oppressive force of myth;
the fool shows how we can act dumb towards it, the wiseacre how the questions
myth poses are simple-minded, and so on. By analogy, he implies that a myth is
any regulatory socio-religious system of thought used to order the individual
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against his best interests. In this he shows himself to have more in common with
Zipes and Tatar, seeing the moral force of the fairy tale in essentially political
terms.
In the field of the human sciences, then, narrative is seen as the form best
suited to capture the contextual particularity that characterises moral action in the
contemporary world. Although narrative literature as is exemplified in the canon
of great novels can be seen to mirror the particularity of the moral life, the
narrative structures of myths and of fairy stories do not appear to do so. Nor are
they characterised by the subjunctivity and dialogical form which has been
recognized as the other essential attribute to the moral force of the novel. Instead,
the tales are either regarded as moral narratives in universal, essentialist terms,
quite inappropriate to contemporary cultural perspectives, or as purveyors of an
oppressive morality, which is itself equally inappropriate. The conclusion might
be to abandon the narrative form of the fairy story altogether, at least for the
purposes of moral education, and such conclusions are not unusual in educational
circles.'
ABa first step to refuting this conclusion, I would suggest that either/or
thinking of this type is not our only option and can be replaced by a more inclusive
perspective which rejects the quasi-religious universalism of Campbell and
Bettelheim whilst respecting their sensitivity to the power of the symbolisms and
narrative structures of the tales; and which seeks to combine this respect with a
critical mistrust of distortedly inappropriate moral values that may have been
layered into them. However, this does not address the apparent inability of the
tales to portray the complexity and particularity of the moral life in an appropriate,
dialogical form. To do this, we need to examine more fundamentally the
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relationship of fairy tales to the two distinct traditions from which its early literary
form emerged, namely the mythic tradition and the oral tradition. As a crucial and
integral part of this relationship we find the narrative form of drama, which has,
from its very origin, a tradition of engaging with and questioning the moral
meanings of tales in the mythic tradition.
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NOTES
1. Cited in Bruner (1990), pp 43-44
2. This summary of Bakhtin's theory draws heavily from the excellent summary provided in
Kelly (1992).
3. Lucaks (1968) argues, in effect, that dialogism is characteristic of any great novel which, in
his phrase, "contains within itself the seeds of its own criticism."
4. See, for example, Baird Saenger (1993)
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CHAPTER III
MYTH, MORALITY AND DRAMA
In an early essay, Bruner explored the pedagogical power of myth and its
situation in contemporary society. The form of myth, he argued, is principally that
of drama, a fact which lies at the heart of its significance as a source of instruction.
Myth has a dramatic shape because that, too is the shape of the personality. To
explain this he refers to Freud, who likened the personality to a cast of characters,
which a playwright has the ability to decompose and project into the dramatis
personae of the stage. The genius of the Greek dramatists lay precisely in their
power to do this, to enter vividly into the feelings of the opposing parties in a
conflict and to present them on stage in a fashion that was at once both mythic and
realistic; that is, through the representation of preternatural forces and characters,
they could describe a society which the audience could recognize as its own. But
at the heart of the instructive power of myth Bruner locates the dramatic nature of
the multiple self, within which our discordant impulses are bound and structured in
a set of identities.
''Here myth becomes the tutor, the shaper of identities; it is here that personality
imitates myth in as deep a sense as myth is an externalisation of the vicissitudes
of personality. " (1960, p.280)
Referring to Campbell's concept of the "mythologically instructed community", he
continues:
"the mythologically instructed community provides its members with a library of
scripts upon which the individual may judge the internal drama of his multiple
identities. For myth ... serves not only as a pattern to which one aspires but also
as a criterionfor the self-critic. "(ibid, p.281)
Myth and identity, therefore, exist in a symbiotic relationship, the one with the
other. Myths reflect the conflictual and various identities of the psyche which, in
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tum, finds explanations and models of behaviour from among the corpus of images
and identities that myths provide.
"What is ultimately clear is that ... myth must be a model for imitating, a
programmatic drama to be tried onfor afit. " (ibid, p.284)
As drama is not only the principal form of myth but is also a priori the shape of the
human personality, myths have particular significance; they form "the treasure of
an instructed community" (ibid p.286) as they enable individuals to understand
the inner conflicts caused by their internal cast of identities. The implication is
that we should view our lives not only as narrative but as enacted narrative, where
the models we imitate are in enactive form and where much of the drama takes
place within the psyche. Ifdrama imitates life, it is because life is experienced not
only as narrative but, more particularly, as dramatic narrative.
That is not all that Bruner is implying. Myths provide us not only with
models to aspire to but with criteria for self-criticism. The psyche has a dialogical
relationship with the myths which influence it, a critical awareness, a sense of
judgment and choice of identity. And the prevailing myths need to be such that
they fit the varieties of our plight and our aspirations so that choices are indeed
viable; and this Bruner doubted to be the case in contemporary society.
''All that is certain is that we live in a period of mythic confusion that may
provide the occasionfor a new growth of myth, myth more suitable for our times. "
(ibid,p.285)
Mythic confusion leads to frustration and "a lonely search for internal identity"
One might conclude from Bruner's thesis that myths which provide a dramatic fit
are crucial to the moral health of a society as they provide individuals with an
intelligible dramatic narrative and with roles with which they can identify. In
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MacIntyre's terms: ''Mythology, in its original sense, is at the heart of things."
(1981, p.2l6) Although his conclusions are expressed through the discourse of
psychology, they resonate with MacIntyre's argument on how we learn the virtues
through stories.
Bruner's particular usage of the term myth is vague and undefined,
embracing not only traditional mythological subject matter but also any idealized
life patterns which control a community's visions. It is a definition influenced by
Eliade and Campbell, which sees the pervasive influence of myth on the psyche as
necessary and beneficial, a view contested, as we shall see, most notably by Roland
Barthes. Bruner also has a very broad definition of drama which he contlates
rather too easily with myth. Williams has contested this tendency:
"Drama is now so often associated with what are called myth and ritual that the
general point is easily made. But the relation cannot be reduced to the usual
loose association. Drama ... is neither ritual which discloses the God, nor myth
which requires and sustains repetition." (1975, p.ll)
In other words, where myths aspire to permanence, repeatability and Truth, drama
deals in particularity and specificity. These are significant distinctions, which will
be returned to later. Nevertheless, Bruner's three areas of interest - the close
relationship between myth and drama; how this affects the moral identities of
individuals in particular societies; and how myths need to change - will be central
to this chapter, where I will argue for a concept of myths which accepts their social
necessity but also the necessity for them to change; which recognizes their power
to educate but also their power to distort; and which views their apparent
universality as a potent stimulus to the imagination but, in the final analysis, as
illusory and dependent upon mutability and translatability rather than any real state
of permanence. Within these tensions, I believe, lies their potential for moral
57
regeneration, a potential which needs to be tapped. For, if the quest for identity,
the search for the good life, is at the heart of the moral process, when it is lonely
and inward looking, when the' communal narratives and the myths which inform
them fail to make connections with individuals, then, to borrow MacIntyre's
phrase, these individualswill become alienated, "anxious stutterers in their actions
as in their words". (op. cit, p.216) And where we read myth in an adult context,
so we should read fairy tale in a child's context, for fairy tales themselves are
mythic constructs, collectively presenting models for children to "judge the drama
of their internal identities", dramatic roles embodying concepts of virtue for them
to identify with and to imitate. But this latter claim - that, within these
parameters, we can conflate fairy tale with myth - needs some arguing first.
Fairy Tale as Myth
If Bruner approaches the field of myth from a psychological perspective
informed by Freudian theory, so too does Bettelheim; but, when comparing fairy
tale with myth, Bettelheim's conclusions are typically orthodox and clear-cut.
''Mythical heroes offer excellent images for the development of the superego, but
the demands they embody are so rigorous as to discourage the child in his
fledgling strivings to achieve personality integration. While the mythical hero
experiences a transfiguration into eternal life in heaven, the central figure of the
fairy tale lives happily ever after on earth, right among the rest of us. Thus a
happy though ordinary existence is projected by fairy tales as the outcome of the
trials and tribulations involved in the normal growing-up process." (1976, p.39)
According to Bettelheim, children know they can only emulate the virtues of the
mythical hero to some small degree. These heroes, in fact, are there to fashion the
conscience, to impose an idealistic set of goals for children to live up to - a view
not unlike Walter Benjamin's, although Bettelheim sees the function of myth as
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healthy, not oppressive. For Bettelheim, then, fairy tales and not myths are the
stories which offer role models "with a dramatic fit", promising the possibility of
future happiness on earth.
"Whatever strange events the fairy tale hero experiences they do not make him
superhuman, as is truefor the mythical hero. This real humanity suggests to the
child that, whatever the content of the fairy tale, it is but fanciful elaborations
and exaggerations of the tasks he has to meet, and of his hopes and fears. (ibid,
p.40)
Bettelheim's distinction between myth and fairy tale suggests, paradoxically, that,
in Bruner's sense of the term, fairy tale is myth. Jack Zipes has no doubts that the
fairy tale is indeed myth, although his definition is more complex, his use of the
word myth more expansive and the implications he draws more circumspect. His
theories are drawn from an ideological standpoint which has a broad, social vision
of myth but which mistrusts its political purposes. If Bettelheim sees myths as
essentially pessimistic and Bruner sees them as mirroring the conflictual identities
of the psyche, then Zipes sees them as deceptively oppressive.
What interests Zipes is how myths and fairy tales continue to exercise a
hold over the western imagination. They appear to be natural, eternal, to contain
universal truths; but this is, in fact, an illusion.
"These myths and fairy tales are historically and culturally coded, and their
ideological impact is great. Somehow they have become codified, authoritative
and canonical. ... They seem to have been with us for centuries, for eternity,
but we neglect the manner in which we created gods and magic to hold our
experiences and lives intact. " (1994, p.4)
This illusion is the result of an ideological mythicization of the tales and to describe
how this has been effected, Zipes refers to the theories of Roland Barthes.
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''Myth consists in overturning culture into nature or, at least, the social, the
cultural, the ideological, the historical into the 'natural'." (Barthes, 1977, p.165)
Ifmyth, according to Barthes, is "a type of speech ... frozen, purified, eternalized,
made absent ...{Barthes, 1971, p.123), then myths assume the look of generality
but are laden with hidden, ideologically weighted values. That fairy tales appear
to be natural, universal, ahistorical and therapeutic in faet disguises their historical
origins as literary versions of tales which originated in oral peasant communities
but which were appropriated in literary forms first of all by the eighteenth century
French aristocracy and later, in the service of domesticating the imaginations of
children, by the nineteenth century bourgeoisie. Zipes believes that perspectives
such as Bettelheim's, which insist on regarding the tales as quasi-religious, sacred
texts, serve only to perpetuate a bourgeois hegemony.
"Worship of the fairy tale as holy scripture is more of a petrification of the fairy
tale that is connected to the establishment of correct speech, values, and power
more than anything else" (Zipes, op.cit, p.15)
Fairy tale is myth because none of this oppressiveness is immediately evident. The
tales are revered as eternal and universal, when they are, in faet, ideologically
construeted, historically situated, cultural artefaets that continue to fascinate; but
the important point is that they are open to revision. Revisionist fairy tales are
written to disturb the values of the classic tale in an attempt to demythicise the
genre, "to alter the reader's views of traditional patterns, images and codes."
(ibid, p.9).
Zipes' perception of the educative inadequacy of traditional fairy tales and
his promotion of new, revised versions contrasts with Bettelheim's aggressive
conservatism but is compatible with Bruner's call for a new growth of myth more
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suitable for our times. The revisions Zipes refers to, both here and in other works,
are literary revisions - that is, ideologically motivated, individually authored, new,
printed versions of fairy stories. Such versions tend to be monological,
prioritising the author's moral vision. What is more interesting for this study is his
analysis of the oral folk tale, the historical precedent of the literary fairy tale, which
was very different in its form and function. From this analysis we can begin to
appreciate that there is another, more dialogical approach to revising fairy stories;
for once the stories are re-addressed in a communal, performative manner rather
than as a private, printed endeavour, there can result a significant and
transformative effect on their inherent values, approaching what Williams has
called:
"a complex opening up of ritual to public and variable action; a moving beyond
myth to dramatic versions of myth and of history. " (1975, p. J J)
Oral folktales were told by gifted tellers, intended to explain natural
occurences such as the change in seasons, to celebrate the rites of harvesting or
hunting, to amuse, and to offer possibilities of fantasy wish-fulfilment. Their
social function, according to Zipes, was to bring members of a tribe or community
closer together, to provide them with a sense of purpose or telos. It was a
communal, not a private experience.
"The tale came directly from common experiences and beliefs. Told in person,
directly, face to face, they were altered as the beliefs and behaviours of the
members of a particular group changed" (op.cit, p. JOy
There are three highly significant points here. First of all, the tales were related in
versions which were locally determined, not universal in Bettelheim's sense,
dealing with themes which were relevant to a particular community at a particular
61
time; claims for the ephemeral, universal and timeless wisdom of fairy tales are
very difficult to sustain when we appreciate that there was never anyone, original,
sacred version, acting as the bearer of psychic truths. Secondly the tales were part
of a shared, public process, more akin to a dramatic performance than a private,
literary reading; and finally they were adaptable to change, historically and
geographically, to address the needs and concerns of particular communities which
constituted the audience. It is evident that herein lies a way of re-appropriating
the literary fairy tale; for the oral tradition offers, within its very form, a means
whereby the literary tale can be communally redefined, repossessed or, as Zipes
would have it, demythicised. Demythicization might be understood as a process
akin to the raising of political awareness, its intention being to enable the members
of a community to become critically aware of the stories as myth, to rehistoricize
them and thus create a critical distance between the listeners and the tales in order
to break their oppressive hold.! But such a communal sharing of a mythic story
might also be deployed as the beginning of a process of mythic renewal, by which I
mean the presentation of the story from a moral perspective which renders it
problematic, brings conflictual elements to the fore and allows for the construction
of new meanings relevant to a particular community. Such an approach might
encourage, in turn, new perspectives to be shared on how the tale represents thick
ethical concepts, thus working against the reifying tendency of myth, defined by
Slotkin as:
"a ..process through which metaphorical descriptions of reality come to substitute
for an apprehension of reality. "(1992, p.73)
In this way the tale could become demythicised in Zipes' sense whilst reclaiming
something of its mythic function in Bruner's sense.
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Such an approach to myth is not, in fact, new. In classical Athens, the
tragic dramatists incorporated a variety of contemporary elements into their shared
mythology in order publicly to problematise and play out the ethical and political
issues of the time. By turning our attention briefly to these early dramatisations of
Greek mythic tales, we find some illuminating analogies. For in the very origins of
western drama one of its crucial functions was the process of mythic questioning
and rejuvenation, a process which has always been fundamentally concerned with
the moral health of a society, which, as we shall see, continues to be active in
contemporary British theatre and which I will propose can and should be active in
today's primary school classrooms.
Myth and Morality in classical Greek Drama.
"The same mythology was a language which served different masters long and
well as the dynamics of thought. Its use in each period, however, was different
and with each social advance its previous service was already done. The tribal
kings used mythology to support their dynasties, the aristocracy to enhance their
prestige, the tyrant perhaps to reconcile and appease, the democracy to express
its conflicts. " (Little, 1967, p.9)
Little's description of the historically transient meanings derived from mythology
within the ancient Greek world is succinct. He stresses the significance of the
stories as bearers of shared meanings which were adapted, or rather translated,
from era to era in order to legitimise the prevailing power structures. There is a
danger, however, that the picture presented by the above quotation may appear
rather too clear-cut and simplistic. For the stories were not simply re-
appropriated by the new controllers of each succeeding social structure; rather was
there a confusing period of transition, where the language of the virtues, contained
and defined within the Homeric myths, became no longer sufficient to provide
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understanding and guidance for social action. By the time democracy had been
established in Athens, this language had become a source of debate and the tales a
means for exploring the ethicaland political values of thepolis.
MacIntyre (1967, 1981) has described this moral transition at length. For
Homer, there was no distinction between social role and individualvirtue. A man
was deemed to be good if he possessed (i.e. performed) the virtue of his allotted
social function; for the king, the ability to command, for a wife, fidelity and so on.
There was no way of being good which lay outside the performance of one's role
and shame was felt by the person who failed to perform it successfully. Moral
concepts were social facts but could only be applied to those for whom the social
system had provided a vocabulary; slaves, for example, lay outside the moral order
and were thus given the status of chattel rather than person. The poems of Homer
presented an idealization of a particular kind of social life which became
problematic as soon as the idea of a single moral order broke down. One of the
results of this breakdown was a change in the concept of the nature of virtue,
which came to signify certain human qualities which could be divorced altogether
from social function. As post-Homeric Greece became more widely aware of
radically different social orders - through the impact of the Persian invasion,
colonization, increase in trade and travel - those philosophers who came to be
known as sophists began to debate the relativity of certain moral concepts; for
example, as different cities observed differerent customs and laws, was justice itself
a relative concept, definable only within those laws and customs which differed
from city to city? By the fifth century BC moral and political conservatives were
still trying to retain the fixed, Homeric meanings of the received vocabulary which
had defined the different virtues of friendship, courage, self-restraint, wisdom,
justice and so on. A failure to achieve this stability of language and myth was
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seen by some as a major cause of moral degeneracy. Thucydides, for example,
made the following indictment of revolutionaries in Corfu:
"The meaning of words no longer had the same relation to things, but was
changed by them as they thought fit. Reckless doing was held to be loyal
courage; prudent delay was the excuse of a coward; moderation was the disguise
of manly weakness; to know everything was to do nothing. " (cited in MacIntyre,
1967,p.12)
These causes of moral confusion in pre-classical Greece are reminiscent of
the postmodem condition which characterises western society in our own age, a
similar era of growing moral relativism where the prevailing myths are clung to by
conservatives but have nonetheless, for many people, lost their moral cogency';
and where there is wide-scale disagreement over the meanings held within the
vocabulary of moral precepts. MacIntyre describes how, within this context, the
philosophers of classical Athens attempted to redefine the virtues, not out of any
clear sense of agreement but, in his words, "as a response to incoherence" (1981,
p.135) And the dramatists, in a similar response to incoherence, reworked the
stories which were the heritage of their mythologically instructed community and
represented the conflicting views of political and moral virtue that existed within
their democratic society. A brief look at how two of the great tragedians treated
the same Homeric myth will provide an illustration of how new versions of the
same myth could be presented to carry differing moral emphases.
In the Ore§teia of Aeschylus, the story of Agamemnon's return from the
Trojan Wars, his murder at the hands of his wife and lover and the subsequent trail
of matricide and revenge this engenders, is presented as a conflict of loyalties,
between those demanded by kinship and those owed to the laws of state.
Although no secure or facile solution to the conflict can be offered, the drama ends
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on a note of civil concord, emphasising the rational power of justice embodied
within the civil legislature of Athens. The final play of the cycle, The Euminedes,
uses myth to extoll the necessity of this new moral code, that embodied within
civic law, as opposed to the pre-democratic and tribalistic code of family vendetta
and vengeance, which still persisted in playing a disastrous role in Athenian
society. The purification of Orestes' matricide at the conclusion of the play is an
offer of hope and an affirmation of the rationality of the democratic legal system of
the city. By contrast, the Electra of Euripides, dealing with the same act of
vengeance, portrays it as conceived and committed through fear and weakness.
Whereas the command of the Oracle, that Orestes murder Clytemnestra and
Aegisthus, is treated with sympathy by Aeschylus, it is portrayed by Euripides as a
challenge which, if Orestes had the moral strength, he would resist. His
compliance with the command is presented as an act of moral cowardice, the act of
someone who prefers to obey authority, despite the wickedness of its orders,
rather than face up to moral independence. Both plays use the myth to explore
the same social evil but, whereas Aeschylus celebrates a political solution,
Euripides condemns the moral weakness of individuals. As Williams comments in
his own, brief commentary on the plays:
"it is not just detail that is altered; it is the dramatic meaning of the experience. "
(1968, p.22])
And, as a result, the moral meaning of the experience.'
Why did drama become the medium for the interrogation and revision of
myth in classical Athens? Bruner of course would see the explanation partially in
psychological terms - drama being the natural shape of myth because drama
reflects the shape of the personality. But more convincing are those arguments
which take into account the public, political function of drama and its direct
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linkage with earlier communal forms of storytelling in what was still essentially an
oral culture. Green (1994), in tracing the emergence of Greek theatre, sees as
seminal the fact that Attic society was in a state of transition from an oral to a
literate society, where storytelling had the important social function argued by
Zipes.
"It is typical of many societies that story-telling ... has the effect of binding these
societies or communites together. The common experience these stories
represent reinforces the communal aspects of their life.... Theatre developed in a
context where a level of 'public' performance was the norm, and where stories
were heard rather than read" (1994, pp 5&6)
Storytelling in verse developed during shared ritual practices, where the people
met as a community during important times of the year and critical times of life.
Theatre, therefore, was Itaproduct and an aim of community activity. " (ibid, p.6)
"Theperformances belonged to the community. They were theirs. " (ibid, p.9)
Moreover, Green emphasises that, although the Chorus came to act on behalf of
the audience, the dividing line between performers and audience was never fully
evolved and that consequently there was a much greater sense of audience
involvement than is current in contemporary western theatre.
This sense of general involvement Rush Reim (1994) locates within a
broader analysis of what he describes as the "performance culture" which existed
in Athens. He sees at its heart the participatory democratic process itself: where
up to four times a month the freeborn citizens of Athens could meet to join in
directly with the governance of their city, having the right to speak and to vote.
This culture he defines as one which:
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''played out its political and ethical concerns in an aggressively public and
performative fashion. n (1994, p.74)
The Greeks' was a theatre with a powerful social function, for theirs was a society,
as MacIntyre points out, where the categories political, dramatic and philosophical
were much more intimately related than is generally accepted in our society today.
''Politics and philosophy were shaped by dramatic form, the preoccupations of
drama were philosophical and political, philosophy had to make its claims in the
arena of the dramatic.... We lack, as they did not, any public, generally shared
communal mode either for representing political conflict or for putting our
politics to thephilosophical question. " (1981, p.138)
This lack identified by MacIntyre has been criticised by contemporary practitioners
such as Edward Bond and Peter Brook who see a central, moral role for theatre in
any healthy, democratic society.
''It is precisely here (in the theatre) that we find our need for justice and not
merely for food and clothing - it is our need for the meaning to our life. " (Bond,
1995)
MacIntyre sees the communal and political centrality of drama as inseparable from
the particular vision it embodies of ethical action in general. To adopt a stance on
the virtues is to adopt a stance on the narrative character of human life:
"the difference between the heroic account of the virtues and the Sophoclean
amounts preasely to a difference over what narrative form captures best the
characteristics of human life and agency. " (op. cit p.144)
He provides an important clue as to what characterises the dramatic narrative as
opposed to other narrative forms when he describes as ItaSophoclean insight":
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"that it is through conflict and sometimes only through conflict that we learn what
our ends and purposes are. " (ibid, p.164)
This understanding brings us full-circle, for both he and Bruner see the conflicts at
the centre of mythic drama as educative of life as it is lived and experienced. In
other words, just as morality is expressed through social action, drama is the
artform that mirrors and is shaped from social action. In Athens, drama, the most
performative and public of art forms, was an integral part of the democratic
process; and the publicly shared, re-interpretation of myth allowed for an open
interrogation of moral and political values which could be manifestly celebrated,
revealed as conflictual, challenged or re-assessed.
Myth, morality and drama today.
when comparing drama with myth, Williams makes some crucial
distinctions. Drama, he insists, is:
"specific, active, interactive composition ... an open practice ... a complex
opening of ritual to public and variable action; a moving beyond myth to
dramatic versions of myth .... " (1975, p.ll)
Williams chooses his words carefully and, as usual, they are dense with meaning.
The fact that drama is specific emphasises its particularity; it is an active, not a
passive experience; it is interactive - social, perhaps participatory; and it is a
composition, constructed consciously with some specific meaning or function.
Drama is an open practice, not closed and private but public and open-ended so
that, through it, the closed narratives of myth and ritual become variable through
action, action which mirrors the social and moral life. So, through drama, we
move beyond the presentation of myths as narratives which aspire to carry
universal meanings irrespective of time and culture to versions of these narratives,
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each exploring meanings dependent upon the contexts within which they were
created. In other words, if myth demands assent, drama implies dissent and thus
exposes myth to public re-intepretation and change.'
I am proposing that, historically, in western theatre, there has been an
association between drama and myth which has been one of interrogation, revision
and renewal and that this process has traditionally had a moral as well as a cultural
function. O'Neill is surely right when she states:
"These ancient motifs and relationships are played out again and again through
the ages and still speak freshly to us." (1995, p.33)
Often these motifs have permeated what appeared to be new stories, as the
Phaedra myth permeated Zola's Therese Raquin, for example; but often the myth
has been addressed directly through a re-interpretation of previous dramatic
versions of the myths. Gilbert Highet's theory to account for the persistence of
mythic drama is blunter than most but characteristic of many:
"The central answer is that myths are permanent. They deal with the greatest of
all problems, the problems which do not change, because men and women do not
change. " (1957, p.540)
Dickinson (1969) accepts Highet's hypothesis and quotes Hawthorne m the
introduction to his study.
''No epoch of time can claim a copyright on these immortal fables. They seem
never to have been made; and certainly, so long as man exists, they can never
perish; but, by their indestructibility itself, they are legitimate subjects for every
age to clothe with its own garniture of manners and sentiments, and to imbue with
its own morality. " (cited in Dickinson, 1969, p.1)
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Permanent, indestructible, immortal. Such hyperbole will no longer hold. It
implies that somewhere there lurks an ideal version of myth, whose meanings are
universal, adaptations of which can only "garnish" this thing of sacred significance
which carries its own kernel of indestructible truth. An unhelpful nostalgia can be
detected, the reverance for a gorgeous and thickly peopled past which
overshadows the present. Kirk offers a more convincing argument for their
endurance when he points to: "the extraordinary literary qualities of the classical
works they pervade." (1974, p.ll0) It is the quality and age of the literary
versions, so many of which are in dramatic form, that provides their awesome
sense of permanence and which has led some critics to draw no distinction
between myth and dramatised versions of myth. The fact is that there are no
permanent versions.
"It is ... not possible to abstract a single 'orthodox' meaning of'the myth'" (1968,
p.221)
Williams'comment on the Electra myth is broadly applicable. But with literature,
as Kirk has pointed out, comes "the concept of thefixed text" and, with that, "the
concept of the correct text." (op.cit, p. 110). It is only one step further to the
concept of the culturally sacred text.
"In the purely literary sources .. the myths tend to be treated as something
special, as a kind of self-contained wisdom received from the past. " (Kirk, op.cit,
p.l08)6
However, such reverence does not reflect the approach adopted by those twentieth
century European playwrights who have chosen to rework the Greek myths,
writers such as Giraudoux (1935), Anouilh (1951) and Sartre (1947) and more
recent British theatre practitioners such as Edward Bond (1979) Caryl Churchill
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(1990) and Maureen Duffy (1988). Here there has been a renewed and vigorous
interest in openly interrogating the classic versions of the myths. Feminist
playwrights, in particular, have been willing to challenge directly the idea of the
culturally sacred text and I have chosen to analyse a recent example of this -
Timberlake Wertenbaker's play The Love of the Nightingale. as it highlights a
number of issues of central concern to this study. Formally, it inter-relates to
myth through an adventurous inter-textuality that offers a radical alternative to a
more straightforward re-working of the story. Thematically, it has at its heart the
same concerns argued by Zipes, that literary versions of myths, being
predominantly part of a male discourse, hold and hide patriarchal values which
need to be challenged and demythicised. And. within its reflection on the cultural
transmission of myth, it provides a critique of the social and moral functions of
drama, with implications which are highly significant for the practice of drama in
education.
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N9TES
1. Kirk says vety much the same thing as Zipes when he writes: "... tales told by story-tellers,
or in less formal ways, have no absolutely fixed outline in a non-literate culture. The
central themes remain fairly constant but the details and emphases change with the interests
of teller and audience." (J974, p.30) See also Green (1994), pp 5 & 6.
2. See Zipes (1996) which details projects carried out with classes of children where this is has
stated aim.
3. See, in particular, Bloom (1987) and Bennett (1993). These arguments were, of course,
rehearsed in some detail inmy introduction.
4. This perspective is supported by scholars of Greek Tragedy. See Kitto (1939) pp. 104 - 106
where he argues that tragic dramatists "manhandled" the myths, stating that "Aeschylus
made the myth convey what he meant. "(p. 106) See also Taplin (1985) p. 165, who
emphasises that "Greek tragedy is entirely topical and the mirror of its own times. It was
composed for the audience offifth century Athenians, not for a Bronze Age audience; and its
general preoccupations, moral, social and emotional are those of its age. "
5. I am, of course, writing from the perspective of western drama here. Asian theatre practices,
on the contnuy, allow for no such challenge or variation, as was graphically illustrated in the
case of Beijing Opera by the recent film FareweU. My Concubine.
6. The resonances here with Bettelheim's approach to the classic fairy tale texts are telling.
Although he proposes that fairy tales are better told than read to allow for greater flexibility,
his comments upon which versions should be related and why reveal that this flexibility is
indeed limited. See 1976, pp. ISO - 156 on the tellins offairy tales; and pp. 166 - 183 on
why, according to Bettelheim, the Grimms' Little Red Cap is preferable to Perrault's Little
Red Riding Hood.
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CHAPTER IV
RE-CASTING THE PHAEDRA
SYNDROME:
Myth and Morality in Timberlake
Wertenbaker's The Love of the
Nightingale
In a recently published study, Albert S. Gerard examines what he calls
The Phaedra Syndrome in four major theatrical texts: Hippolytos by Euripides;
Phaedra by Seneca; Lope de Vega's El Castigo sin Venganza; and Phedre by
Racine. The subtitle of his book - Of Shame and Guilt in Drama - indicates the
nature of the preoccupations of his inquiry; not only is it an analysis which
contrasts the way that several important playwrights have presented the
character of Phaedra but, more interestingly, it is an investigation into how their
treatment of her relates to the moral and intellectual climate of their times. The
story of Phaedra's incestuous love for her stepson is, he argues, "an archetypal
situation of transgression" and his explanation of its persistent fascination as a
source for drama is worth quoting in full.
"In the nutshell of the nuclear family the emergence of a sexual relationship
between the husband's son and his stepmother offers a fascinating diversity of
subversive trends, especially where the "natural" phallocratic authority of the
pater familias is sanctioned by public opinion and religious dogma. Such a
situation compounds adultery with incest. It brings into play the fundamental
psychological motivations of love and honour, sex and vengeance. It
exemplifies the utter disruption of natural order and moral heirarchies. It
almost inevitably compels author and reader alike to pass moral judgement and
to take sides in the contest between natural impulses and ethical precepts. "
(1993, p.3)
He concludes his essay with some interesting observations on postwar treatments
of the Phaedra syndrome, which he sees as having resurfaced in films such as
Ingmar Bergman's Smiles of a Summer Night (1956), Louis Malle's Le Souffle
au Coeur (1971) and Bertolucci' s La Luna (1979). What characterises these
treatments is their lack of moral outrage and even cheerful violation of one of
the ultimate social taboos, direct mother-son incest. Such a "trivialisauon of
sex in an" he sees as directly spawned by the "postwar permissive society, one
of whose most conspicuous characteristics is the liberation of sex from ethical
considerations" (ibid, p.134) and he doubts whether the Phaedra syndrome can
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be regarded as a relevant topic for serious aesthetic treatment in contemporary
society.
Gerard is no doubt right to speculate that Phaedra' s agony of sexual guilt
does not speak directly to the preoccupations of a contemporary audience but his
diatribe against western society's "so-called 'liberalism' and hedonistic laxity"
(ibid. p.135) is critically unhelpful. Issues of sex and ethics remain very much
at the heart of contemporary moral concern but there are now competing
philosophical frames of experience through which they are viewed. In
particular, Feminism has challenged the very phallocratic authority within which
the Phaedra myth is firmly rooted. Whereas a stepmother's lust for her stepson
may formerly have proved to be powerfully symbolic of a threat to the moral
and social order, from a feminist perspective this order is one defined and
described by men. This is particularly significant when the themes explored -
sex, shame and guilt - are represented within the person of a female. In fact,
Phaedra is one of many "guilty" stepmothers within the western mythic
tradition, stretching from Pharoah' s wife in Genesis to the Queen in Disney's
Snow White. As a part of this male discourse, the Phaedra syndrome can be
seen as one of a number of potent cultural myths embodying hidden attitudes
and values with regard to male and female sexuality which need to be exposed
and challenged, as they distort social reality at the same time as they help shape
social assumptions; for, enshrined as it is within major works of western
theatre, the myth may be muted in our times but is by no means silent. I wish
to suggest that such a challenge has, in fact, been raised in Timberlake
Wertenbaker's play The Love of the Nightingale.
In order to interrogate the values of the Phaedra syndrome, Wertenbaker
has chosen an alternative myth as the plot for her play, that of Philomele. It is
a myth in which the incestuous lust is experienced by a King for his sister-in-
law rather than by a Queen for her son-in-law and where the lust is-
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consummated through rape rather than denied and repressed. It is a complex
play which David Ian Rabey sees as:
"the culmination of Wertenbaker's questionings of the terms and conditions of
using language, making moral judgements and being human. " (1990, p.527)
From this perspective its themes are indeed broad but it is through the play's
dialogic relationship with the Phaedra myth that some of its more important
meanings emerge. This relationship is engaged on more than one dramatic
level and, through investigating it, we can see how Wertenbaker deprivileges
the dominant discourse of the Phaedra syndrome by having it interanimate with
a relatively unknown myth which treats the same themes of sex, guilt, shame
and vengeance but with crucial underlying gender differences.' At the same
time, it raises questions concerning the moral and educational function of
mythic drama and, in particular, the ethical need for female voices. to engage
dialogically with the tradition in order to bring to it new moral understandings.
As Adrienne Rich has written:
We need to know the writing of the past, and know it differently than we have
ever known it; not to pass on a tradition but to break its hold over us. " (cited in
Hersh, 1992, p.409)
The play itself is an adaptation of the myth of Philomele' and is set in three
distinct places; in a civilized Athens with its theatre and philosophy, in the
darker northern Kingdom of Thrace, with its Dionysic rituals and secrecy; and
on the sea voyage between the two. It tells of how the Thracian king, Tereus,
as a reward for saving Athens, marries an Athenian princess, Procne. Lonely
within the very different cultural surroundings of Thrace, Procne asks Tereus to
bring her younger sister, Philomele, to be her companion. While in Athens
and later on the return voyage, Tereus lusts after Philomele and, when she
rejects his advances, deceives her into believing that her sister is dead. In a fit
of jealous rage, he kills the Captain of the ship whom she has chosen to be her
lover and later, he rapes her. As Philomele threatens to shame him in public
for his deed, he cuts out her tongue and keeps her secretly a prisoner. Years
later, Philomele is recognized in a Bacchic festival by her sister as she performs
a grotesque re-enactment of her rape and mutilation. Together they kill Itys,
the son of Procne and Tereus, and during their flight from him, all three are
transformed into birds; Procne into a swallow, Tereus into a hoopoe and
Philomele into a nightingale.
The Phaedra myth interanimates the text of the play at two levels; by
direct allusion and through a subtler form of intertexuality. The former occurs
in two central scenes, the first in Athens when we are presented with fragments
of Euripides' Hippolytos as a play within a play, watched by the king's court
with Tereus as guest. Later, during the rape scene, Tereus explains and
excuses his lust and his rape by direct reference to the play. But it is the more
subtle structural interplay I wish to investigate first, by looking at how the
moral values normally represented through the actions of the two protagonists,
Hippolytos and Phaedra, are displaced and redistributed from within the frame
of female experience. Although Wertenbaker's textual referencing is to
Euripides, she is not only contesting his representational authority but the
cultural centrality of the myth itself which, as Gerard correctly points out, is
dependent upon a public sanctioning of phallocratic authority.
Hippolytos and Philomele, the victims of incestuous lust and violence,
are represented as virginal and virtuous. Virtue in Hippolytos is characterised
largely by his chastity, autonomy and disinterest in sexuality; he is among:
H•••• those whom modesty enters at birth
the instinctively good" (126)3
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Philomele's virtues are very different. She warmly embraces her own
sensuality and thrives on the warm companionship with her sister, whom she
shocks with her frank description of sexual desire:
"He's so handsome I want to wrap my legs around him "(p.2)4
This positive, albeit comic presentation of female sexuality contrasts not only
with Hippolytos' cold asceticism but also with its representation by Euripides as
something both destructive and shameful. This is signalled by the
vindictiveness of Aphrodite and the haggard, spiritually broken image of
Phaedra on her first entrance and, significantly, Wertenbaker includes extracts
from both of these scenes within her condensed presentation of the Euripidean
text. The contest between natural impulses and ethical precepts, seen by
Gerard to be at the heart of the moral dilemma posed by the Pbaedra syndrome,
is not cast by Wertenbaker within the person of the female. Pbilomele feels no
such contest, no sense of guilt associated with her sexuality and is openly
capable of enjoying and discussing it. By shifting the contest from within the
female to within the person of Tereus, she refocuses it to include issues of
gendered power relationships.
The Pbaedra-S¥Ddrome, in.fact..when. viewed from the perspective of
female experience, is a distortion of social reality; sexually motivated violence
and incestuous abuse are largely perpetrated by males against females through
the act of rape. Wertenbaker's play immediately identifies the destructive
forces within society as emanating not from expressions of female sexuality but
from acts of male violence and the warped sexuality it engenders. The opening
scene, which establishes the companionship of Pbilomele with her sister, is
framed by one of graphic male violence as two soldiers exchange insults,
notably of a sexual nature, before killing each other. If, in the Euripidean text,
female jealousy and lust are identified as manipulative causes of violence and
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disorder in the world, in Wertenbaker's play, these conditions already underpin
the very authoritarian, male world inhabited by Tereus. To quote Rene Girard:
..Violence is characteristically initiated and controlled by men - it is
gendered power. aligned with the male. which is typically used to reify the
stability of patriarchal structures. " (cited in Hersh, op. cit, p.416)
Social order is not synonymous with moral order within such a power system.
Despite the moralistic contempt for Phaedra uttered by Tereus as he watches the
play within a play, this moralising is exposed as hypocrisy when, asked by
Procne to explain his rape of her sister, the answer he gives presents a true
picture of his moral vision: "There are no rules" (p.47)
In the Euripidean drama, Phaedra is never in any doubt of her guilt and
her overriding concern is for her passion to remain undisclosed. The fragility
of her honour is heightened by the fact that she is a woman:
../ knew that my passion, indulged or not,
would make me repulsive to others, especially since
I am a woman - our sex is a very disgrace. " (625)
Her honourable reputation (eukleia) is everything and she fears shame (aidos)
above all else. Of course, whether it is morally healthy for a society to control
the ethical behaviour of its members in this way is one of the major themes of
the Euripidean play. As Charles Segal has written:
"Through Phaedra's concern with appearance, reputation, the outside world,
Euripides raises questions beginning to be asked in his time about the
inadequacy of an ethic based entirely upon external, social sanctions. " (cited in
Gerard. op. cit, p.16)
But whether they be internally felt or externally feared, shame and guilt go hand
in hand in the person of Phaedra, despite the fact that she commits neither incest
nor adultery. In The Love of the Nightingale the same elements of honour,
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shame and guilt are in play but they are structured differently into the text.
Tereus' crimes include murder, mutilation, incest, adultery and rape and yet
when asked by his wife if it was shame that kept him silent his answer is
straightforward "No" (p.46). If Phaedra's response to her passion is to
become consumed by guilt, Tereus has no response other than violence. As
Philomele says:
"There's nothing inside you. You're only full when you're filled with violence. "
(p.35)
Tereus' lack of shame is dramatically illustrated in the scene immediately after
the rape when, with the blood of Philomele's ruptured virginity still on his
hands, he returns home to embrace his wife. This is in notable ironic contrast
to the words of Phaedra when she says:
"My hands are clean
The stain is in my heart" (477)
and later when she utters her contempt for the dissimulation of unfaithful wives:
"How can such frauds .....
Look quietly into the eyes of their husbands?" (636)
The social reality of rape in a patriarchal society is that the stigma of shame will
be attached to the woman. Niobe, Philomele's nurse, as the voice of
conventional social attitudes, understands this:
.~ cool cloth. On her cheeks first. That's where it hurts most. The shame. "
(p.3l)
Philomele too, has to confront the assumption that not only must she feel the
shame but also accept the guilt.
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"I was the cause, wasn't I? Was I? I said something. What did I do?" (p.34)
Her strength and her tragedy. is to refuse to accept either and to demand that
Tereus accept both:
"It was your act. It was you. I caused nothing It (p.34)
She pledges to publicly shame him by shouting out the truth to the people of
Thrace. Like Phaedra, Tereus cannot tolerate the truth to be voiced; but,
unlike her, he is a moral hypocrite and the silence of his accuser will suffice.
So he cuts out Philomele's tongue.
Speech and silence are central issues in both plays. Speech will betray
Phaedra's aidos, silence may preserve her eukleia.:
"How could I trust my tongue - which can set
others right, but cannot even sense
the damage it does to itself! It (612)
From a feminist perspective, Phaedra's desire for silence may be construed as
resulting from her unquestioning acceptance of a patriarchal moral order which
uses shame as a means to oppress her; and we can interpret it as indicative of a
political tendency throughout much of history for the voices of women to be
silenced. Such an interpretation, however, can only be argued through a
deconstruction of the Euripidean text. Wertenbaker's decision to make the
silencing of Pbilomele dramatically the most shocking scene in the play, more
shocking even than the rape, brings the whole issue of the silencing of women
literally to the forefront of the action. It cannot be ignored and its political
significance is stressed by the words of the Female Chorus which overtly link
the silencing of Philomele with the silencing of oppressed people both today and
throughout history.
HELEN: Why are races exterminated?
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HERO:
IRIS:
Why do white people cut off the words of blacks?
Why do people disappear? The ultimate silence.
Deprived of a voice, people will react with violence and this is true of both
Philomele and Phaedra. The scene depicting Philomele's killing of Itys is
preluded by the following words:
IRIS:
ECHO:
HERO:
Imprison the mind that asks.
Cut out its tongue
You will have this.
Allison Hersh's description of the representation of female violence in two other
female re-workings of Euripides, Caryl Churchill's A Mouthful of Birds and
Maureen Duffy's Rites, is equally applicable to The Love of the Nightingale.
These plays, she writes:
'dislodge the conventional belief in women's non-violence to propose a model of
female violence which is grounded in political resistance. " (op. cit, p.416)
Both Phaedra and Philomele are responsible for the deaths of young males but,
whereas Phaedra deceives and manipulates the male power structure to mete out
an act of personal revenge, Philomele is her own agent and her act, committed
while she is surrounded by her sister and the female Bacchantes, is a
representation of bloody political rebellion. It is, furthermore, a darkly
ironical reflection of Phaedra' s fear that the shame of the mother will be
transmitted to the children (640-650); the violence which Tereus has inflicted
with no sense of shame is transmitted back to his son and Procne forces him to
confront his own guilt:
"You, Tereus. You bloodied the future. For all of us. " (p.47)
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Phaedra's vengeance is achieved through a false accusation of rape.
The assumption that women make such accusations when they are rejected by a
man is a persistent one in male discourse and has recently resurfaced in Michael
Crichton's film Disclosure. Philomele's rape, however, is horrifically real and
she achieves revenge through publicly communicating this. In order to manage
it, she who has been deprived of a voice finds one through theatre. The form
and content of Philomele's theatrical language, with its grotesque manipulation
of life-sized puppets, is reminiscent of Artaud's Theatre of Cruelty.' It
communicates the Truth through shock but for her, as for Boal, theatre has
become a necessary and political act, having as its aim the engenderment of
social action to remove oppression. This is a very different theatre from the
one she knew in Athens, whose values indulged her preoccupations with the
vicissitudes of the human heart but tragically failed to prepare her for life, as an
analysis of the scene of the play within a play will show.
The whole scene is highly ironic as Wertenbaker toys with different
audience responses to the Euripidean text in a fashion which is at once playful
and serious in its intent. In fact, the characters of the Queen, the King,
Philomele and Tereus present us with four contrasting responses to theatre.
For the Queen, Euripides' drama is like an episode from a popular soap and she
comments throughout only on issues of plot, on who loves whom and what
happens next. The King has a more sophisticated view; for hint the play shows
"the uncomfortablefolds of the human heart". (p.lO) and he believes that it can
help him reach a decision on whether to allow Philomele to make the journey to
Thrace in order to be with her sister. However, his approach is that of the
pedant who sees art as a source of mystical understanding, as a substitute
religion. He reacts superstitiously to the words of the chorus as they lament
Hippolytos' death and interprets them as a warning not to send Philomele away
from her father's lands. Ironically, this decision would have saved Philomele.
But such a view of theatre as a pseudo-religious touchstone rather than as a
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stimulus for enlightened action and choice, is shown to be inadequate. It is
easily dismissed by Philomele and the king finds no words to rationally argue
his decision when it meets with her objection.
"We have no theatre or even philosophers in Thrace." says Tereus
(p.ll) He expresses dislike for the theatre, ironically on moral grounds "These
plays condone vice. " (p.lO) and yet he reacts strongly and directly to the play's
moral discourse. He approves of Aphrodite's determination to bring low "the
proud heart which dares defy me. " (p.9); he pronounces Phaedra's passion as
"wrong" and her act of vengence as "vile" (pp. 10 & 12) But the heady
mixture of the play's poetry, his growing attraction for Philomele and her
justification of Phaedra's love has a profound effect on him. He is seduced by
its sensorial potency and its fatalistic discourse and, not unlike King Pandion, he
will use it to disclaim responsibility for his own actions.
Philomele reacts to the play in the manner of the culturally educated and
artistically sensitised young girl. She understands the tragic injustice of
Phaedra's passion and weeps at the end:
"It's the play. I am so sorry for them all. " (p.l3)
She condones Phaedra's. passion.by. blaming it on forces beyond her control;
"you must obey the gods," she tells Tereus (p.lO) and excuses Phaedra's
vengence in fatalistic terms: "Why destroy what you love? It's the god" (p.l2)
More than this, Phaedra embodies for her a romantic view of intense female
passion to which she aspires. "How beautiful to love like that!" (p.lO) is her
naive but ironic response to Phaedra's suffering. Her confused but intense
emotional reactions remind us of the dangers which Brecht objected to in what
he called "Aristotelian" drama; Philomele sees the theatre as a place to indulge
her emotions but fails to see how it is influencing her own life.
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"But, Father, I'm not Hippolytos. You haven't cursed me. And Tereus isn't
Phaedra. " (p.12)
Its discourse has taught her a fatalistic view of action into which she educates
Tereus. What she sees as Art - beautiful and moving but distant and unreal -
he absorbs as a set of values which will, at one and the same time, guide his
actions and excuse his hypocrisy. The gods are presented as the
personnification of these values. Whereas the Phaedra of Hippolytos is an
oppressed figure, suffering moral torment because she feels their force so
strongly, Tereus the male oppressor, can manipulate them to excuse his
violence. During the rape scene he says as much, quoting Philomele's words
to imply her own complicity:
"Who can resist the gods? Those words are your words, Philomele. They
convinced me, your words. " (p.29)
But - and this is the point - they are not really her words. They are the words
which reflect, albeit distortedly, the values embedded within the fundamentally
male discourse of the play. It is significant that Tereus finds within them a
philosophy to justify his violence. In this sense, Philomele is betrayed by her
upbringing.and her education; hence the quote from Sophocles' lost tragedy
which prologues The Love of the Nightingale:
"We (women) are nothing,·who in ourfathers' house
live, I suppose, the happiest, while young,
Of all mankind,· for everpleasantly
Does Folly nurture all. " (p.xi)
This completes the irony within the words spoken to her father, quoted above:
"You haven't cursed me. " Deprived of the knowledge that will help her
understand social reality by being exposed to stories which do not adequately
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reflect female experience, she has, indeed, been figuratively cursed by her
father and the institutionalised discourse he is a part of.
Greek theatre, as much as any other theatre in western history, had an
essentially moral purpose. In choosing Greek mythology as source material to
treat the subject of rape and the silence imposed on the voices of its victims,
Wertenbaker is overtly signalling that her drama, too, is a moral one. But if
Greek tragic theatre, as Bakhtin would have it, was fundamentally an
authoritarian discourse which "monologized" moral experience,s hers is
dialogic in the sense argued by Helene Keyssar:
"(here) we find the most deliberate and conscious assertions of polyphony, of
refusals to assert or finalise dominant ideologies, of resistances to patriarchal
authority and to a unified field of vision. " (op. cit, p. 95)
It is a play in which more questions are posed than answers given and which has
at its moral centre the dialogical interplay of two myths, the one voiced from
within a tradition of male discourse, the other chosen to interrogate that myth in
the different voice of a woman.s The ambivalence and non-resolution of the
action at the end of the play gives further dramatic form to this dialogism.
Itys wants Philomele, now a nightingale, to sing but she will do so only
if he will ask her questions. The scene concludes as follows:
PHILOMELE:
ITYS:
PHILOMELE.~
ITYS: (Bored)
PHILOMELE:
ITYS:
PHILOMELE:
ITYS:
Do you understand why it was wrong of Tereus to cut out
my tongue?
It hurt.
Yes, but why was it wrong?
I don't know. Why was it wrong?
It was wrong because -
What does wrong mean?
It is what isn't right.
What is right?
(The Nighingale sings)
Didn't you want me to ask questions?
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(Fade)
(p.49)
The elusiveness of moral certainty only emphasises the need to keep asking the
fundamental moral questions. The dramatic image is of a female encouraging a
young male to keep asking them of her, to gain a female perspective on moral
experience. But her voice utters no useful answers; rather do they reflect the
circularity and inpenetrability of myth, and eventually it is transformed into the
song of the Nightingale, aesthetically beautiful but devoid of all rational moral
content. Earlier in the play, the Male Chorus presented us with three
definitions of myth, which resonate with the theories of Barthes; myth as
"public speech"; myth as "the content of that speech"; myth as "the oblique
image of an unwanted truth, reverberating through time. "(p.19) Here we
have a dramatic image which highlights the need to achieve moral understanding
by interrogating the cultural values that resonate through time from the mythic
dramas which help shape our actions. At the same time, it represents the
historical absence of the voices of women in giving dramatic expression to their
moraI interpretations of these myths. By re-working and re-evaluating the
Phaedra syndrome, Wertenbaker has sought to find such a voice and present us
with 8 model for doing so that is as artistically innovative as it is socially
necessary.
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NOTES
1. Cf Helen Keyssar's comments: "The spectacle and dialogue of theatre mediate but do not
resolve differences: the essential strategy.... is to bring together diverse discourses in such a
way that they interanimate each other and avoid any overarching authorial point of view. "
(1991, p.95)
2. See Graves (1960), p.165.
3. This and all subsequent quotes from the Euripidean text are from Hippolytos, translated by
Robert Bagg, (1974). References provided are from the numbered lines of verse.
4. This and subsequent quotes from The Love of the Nightingale are from the Faber & Faber
edition (1989). Quotes are provided with numbered page references.
5. "L 'action du theatre .. est bienfaisante car poussant les hommes a se voir tels qu'ils sont,
elle fait tomber le masque, elle decouvre le mensonge, la veulerie. la bassesse, la
tartuferie." Artaud (1964), p.44.
6. See Kelly, op. cit, p.44
7. er Gilligan: "In the different voice of women lies the truth of an ethic of care, the tie
between relationship and responsibility and the origins of aggression in the failure of
connection. " (1982, p.173)
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CHAPTER V
EMOTION, REASON AND
MORAL ENGAGEMENT IN
DRAMA
Wertenbaker's play is intended to have a strong emotional impact. Like
Philomele, watching the fate of Phaedra, we may well be moved to tears by her
suffering. We will almost certainly be horrified and outraged by her rape and
mutilation, angry at Tereus' violence and hypocrisy but perhaps shocked and
confused at the form her vengeance takes. At the end of the play, we are left with
questions which need to be addressed, not only with regard to our own emotional
reactions to the events we have witnessed but also to issues of cruelty, injustice
and revenge pertaining to our contemporary world, in particular concerning acts of
violence committed by men against w~men. The emotions are aroused to
stimulate debate and argument; they are meant to disturb and provoke discord
among the audience, so that the issues raised by the play do not disappear from
consciousness once the audience leaves the auditorium.
The place of emotion and reason in the moral process, and the relationship
between the two, have been at the heart of philosophical debate over the nature of
morality since the time of Plato and Aristotle. Unsurprisingly, this relationship has
also preoccupied those theorists and practitioners who believe that drama has a
moral function, the most influential twentieth century exponent being Bertolt
Brecht.
"We need a type of theatre which not only releases the feelings, insights and
impulses possible within the particular historical field of human relations in
which the action takes place, but employs and encourages those thoughts and
feelings which help transform thefield itself." (Brecht, in Willett, 1974, p.190)
For Brecht, theatre was a forum to promote a socialist worldview, where
moral questions were of paramount consideration but seen as inextricably linked to
political and economic processes. "Iwould like to be good but how can I pay my
rent?" Shen-Te's plea to the Gods in The Good Person of Setzuan is indicative of
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Brecht's belief that goodness is natural to human kind but social structures, when
unjust, militate against it. Brecht, particularly in his early writings, saw emotion
as the potential enemy of reason in the theatre; and he objected to what he termed
non-epic, Aristotelian drama because of the way it used emotion to draw the
audience into a total identification with the sufferings of a protagonist. InBrecht's
mind, this kind of abandonment to sensation led an audience to ignore the moral
decisions which motivated the action1, to learn nothing about how human forces
produce injustice and how this can be remedied. More damningly, it led them to
pity such suffering but to sense it as inevitable. His own epic theatre was
intended, therefore, to address primariliy the intellect rather than the emotions in
order to encourage transformative, political action.
''For the epic theatre is a process of 'demystification' of those hitherto nameless,
anonymous forces: To give them name and place, remove from them their
inscrutable 'mythology', de-Satamze them and de-mythologize them. The essence
of the new theatre is to de-alienate man, restore him to a consciousness of active
power .., to provoke him into seeing that change is possible. " (Ewen, 1970, p.222)
It has been strongly argued that, to an extent, Brecht's best plays work
despite rather than because of his theories': that, in a play such as The Life of
Galileo, he allowed the sensuousness of the man to predominate, for emotions to
playa much larger part in his practice than was argued in his theory. But Brecht
never in fact objected to emotion per se, rather to its potentially numbing effect on
the intellect. Wertenbaker's play is Brechtian in its emotional effect because the
victim of the action is clearly identifiable as representative of a social group of
victims, not as an isolated, unique case; and the suffering is seen as the effect of
male violence, not the divine hand of Fate or of some unavoidable, uncontrollable
force. Brecht's theories emphasise that emotions can be harnessed in the service
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of moral action but that they must challenge, arouse and provoke the audience, not
simplymove them to pity.
A more recent and influential critique of Aristotle has been mounted by
Augusto Boal. Boal's argument is long and complex and draws not only upon the
Poetics but also the Nichomachean Ethics and the Politics.' In brief, Boal argues
that Aristotle, equating the virtues with the good life, concluded that the highest
virtue of all was justice and that justice was enshrined within the constitution of the
polis. Laws are therefore, according to Aristotle, the maximum expression of
justice; and, as happiness is achieved through being virtuous, the necessary
conclusion is that happiness consists in obeying those laws. Such a vision is
elitist, being all very well for those who have framed the laws to sustain their
power, argues Boal - in the case of ancient Greece, the free, male, aristocratic
classes - but only for those classes. As a population cannot be uniformly content
or satisfied, it must be rendered uniformly passive through repression. One of the
most effective means of oppression, according to Boal, is Greek tragedy which
"exists as a junction of the effect it seeks, catharsis." (1979, p.27) Catharsis is
defined by Boat as a form of correction and purification; pity and fear are the
means, not the ends of this process. What tragedy seeks to do - and succeeds in
doing most effectively - is to purge the spectator of any anti-social elements, any
urge to disobey or overthrow the laws; for Aristotle, such urges are vices, errors
or weaknesses which need to be destroyed.
"This system (of tragedy)functions toplacate, satisfy, eliminate all that can break
the balance - all, including the revolutionary transforming impetus ... it is
designed to bridle the individual, to adjust him to what pre-exists." (ibid,p.47)
Boal argues that this poetic-political system for intimidating the spectator, for
eliminating bad or illegal tendencies, is still in operation today in such popular
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cultural forms as westerns and soaps.' InBaal's own Theatre of the Oppressed,
emotion has the opposite function; rather than acting as the means by which
revolutionary impulses are purged, it is the means by which they are aroused. By
becoming involved in the action, by experiencing an oppression through dramatic
participation and attempting to resolve it, spect-actors are provoked, cajoled and
hopefully empowered into an understanding of the nature of a particular
oppression and the ways it might be redressed
"It is not the place of the theatre to show the correct path, but only to offer the
means by which all possible paths may be examined" (ibid, p.141)
Individuals themselves must be free to choose the path they see as appropriate.
Boal's theatre, in many ways, is the heir to Brecht's, where emotion is supposed to
serve reason in a theatre which is designed to act as a rehearsal for the revolution;
and where moral and political action are inseparable.
The influence of Boal has been marked on British drama teachers, both at
Primary and Secondary level, and forum theatre is now a standard strategy in the
classroom. S With this influence, and the influence of Brecht, has come an
accompanying neglect of Aristotle among established theorists, most of whom
identify themselves with the political 1eft6 This strikes a discordant note with
those areas of moral philosophy and research theory which have had a strong
influence on this study, elaborated in other chapters, by no means dominated by
figures on the right and where there has been a marked, resurgent interest in
.
Aristotle's ethical theories.' It also jars with theories of the democratic function of
theatre in Athens, described in Chapter Ill, and smacks of a simplistic attempt to
judge the politics and culture of Ancient Greece from a contemporary left/right
perspective. In fact, to accept the theories of Brecht and Boal without closer
scrutiny is to close our eyes to other possible understandings of Aristotle's theory
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of the moral purposes of the emotions, understandings which, Iwould argue, can
assist us in the planning of dramatic experiences for children and which are not at
odds with the empowennent to action urged by both his antagonists.
Aristotelian theatre stands condemned for its oppressive or coercive use of
emotion, principally through the process of catharsis, because it prevents rational
thinking and obfuscates moral understanding. This conclusion, however, binges
upon two assumptions, both of which are debatable: that there is a stable, agreed
definition of catharsis, despite the fact that this has eluded scholars for centuries;
and that there is a strong dichotomy between emotion and rationality, with rational
cognition being the qualitatively superior of the two. To approach the latter
point, it is evident that the rationalist position embraced by Brecht in his early
writings is the philosophical heir to a perspective pervasive in western thought
since the Enlightenment. When David Hume, for example, concluded that
morality needed to be explained and justified with reference to the passions, he did
so after having first concluded that it could not be the work of reason. In
response, Kant based morality firmly within the domain of reason, as he concluded
the converse - that it could not be placed within the emotions.' Such either/or
conceptual paradigms which are the legacy of the Enlightenment are, however,
inadequate to describe the complex interactions of cognition, emotion, sensory
feeling and rationality which characterise much of human activity. The concept of
"irrational fear", for example, is voiced often enough. Such a concept implies that
the emotion of fear can, and at times ought to be, rational. It is also clear that
children can learn fear - of strangers, for example, or of unsafe sex. The
important thing is that the emotion, in this case fear, has an object in relation to
which it is suitable; and that fear is understood as rational when felt in appropriate
contexts. As Inglis has written:
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''Feelings themselves are ... intimate and central to cognition and recognition of
the social and public world" (J987, p. 73)9
And Scheftler has commented:
"The life of reason ...requires suitable emotional dispositions. It demands, for
example, a love of truth and a contempt for lying ... revulsion at distortion,
disgust at evasion, admiration at theoretical achievement ...Thewonder is not that
rational character is related to the emotions but that anyone should ever have
supposed it to be the exception to the general rule. " (J99J, pp 4&5)
This argument over the nature of the relationship between reason and
emotion was at the heart of the debate in moral educational theory discussed in
Chapter I, where Koblberg's Kantian rationalism was seen to be wanting in
comparison to those theories which recognize the fusion of emotional and rational
cognition in the moral life. A theory which emphasises the paramount importance
of one over the other for the purposes of moral learning in the theatre must be
similarly suspect and Brecht's most widely admired plays - The Caucasian Chalk
Circle, Mother Courage and Her Childrm The Life of Galileo - all work by
negating such a dichotomy rather than by illustrating it. So, for example, when
Grusha hears the cry of the child, this is narrated by the storyteller in a way
supposed to keep our emotions in check; yet it can be a moment of great and
focussed emotion in a way which illuminates how emotion and cognition are
inseparable. For to understand her plight is to feel it; we know it in terms of the
emotions, not in spite of them.
David Best's arguments in support of the rationality of feeling within the
Arts add further weight to this claim; that:
"emotional feelings are not separate from or opposed to cognition and
understanding, but, on the contrary, emotional feelings are cognitive in kind, in
94
that they are expressions of a certain understanding of their objects. " (Best, 1992,
p.9)
He is particularly at pains to denounce the subjectivist conception of emotional
feeling, which construes emotions on the model of sensations, as "radically
oversimple" (ibid, p.6) Sensorial response - pain if I am hit with a hammer,
irritation if I am stung by a nettle - is independent of cognition, as we feel it
whether we know about the source or not. Emotional response, by contrast - fear
of the stick, annoyance with the nettles - is dependent upon cognition. As Best
points out:
"it is precisely the crucial role of cognition which distinguishes emotional-
feelings from sensation-feelings. " (ibid,p.6)
Boal, by contrast, makes no distinction between the two when he describes art as
"a sensorial way of transmitting knowledge." (op. cit, p.53) This failure is a
theoretical flaw in both artistic and educational terms, for it is the very cognitive
aspect of the emotions which renders them susceptible to growth, development
and change.
The cognitive function of emotion IS of equal importance when
investigating the other, related .objection.to Aristotle, the nature and purpose of
catharsis. Both Brecht and Boal accept the definition of catharsis based upon
medical analogy, as a purgative process intended to maintain the emotional balance
of the individual. Thus, while Brecht emphasises its obfuscatory qualities, Boal
stresses the oppressive function of the feelings it arouses. Neither refers to
sources or theorists to support their understanding of the term, arguing it from
within their own interpretations of Aristotle's intentions. However, Martha
Nussbaum, a classical scholar and philosopher, has recently challenged this
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definition of catharsis through an analysis of its linguistic roots. Examining its
word family, she argues that:
"the primary, ongoing, central meaning is roughly one of 'clearing up' or
'clarification' i.e. of the removal of some obstacle .. that makes the item in
question less clear than it is in its proper state." (1986, p.389)
Analysing various contexts within which it is used in pre-Platonic texts, she
explains how catharsis often signifies speech that is not marred by some obscurity.
She sees the medical context, used to designate purgation and, by analogy,
spiritual purification as a special application of this more general sense. For Plato,
cognition which is katharos is obtainable when the soul is not impeded by bodily
obstacles.
"Catharsis is the clearing up of the vision of the soul by the removal of these
obstacles; thus the katharon becomes associated with the true or truly knowable,
the being who has achieved catharsis with the truly or correctly knowing. " (ibid,
p.389)
This was the meaning of catharsis which Aristotle inherited from his mentor.
Nussbaum argues that his use of the term in the Poetics describes a particular type
of clarification provoked by the emotions of pity and fear, which act, in this case,
as sources of illumination.
"Emotions can sometimes mislead and distort judgment '" But they can also ..
give us access to a truer and deeper level of ourselves, to values and commitments
that have been concealed beneath defensive ambition and rationalization. " (ibid,
p.390)
Far from obfuscation, then, the aim of catharsis is clarification, learning through
emotion about those things that matter most to us. This interpretation is in line
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with Best's argument, inasmuch as it recognizes emotion as having a cognitive
energy, and with accepted interpretations of Aristotle's ethical theory:
"For Aristotle, feelings themselves can be the embodiment of reason. It is not
just a matter of reason controlling and guiding thefeelings. Rather, thefeelings
can themselves be more or less rational. Reason can be present in them."
(Norman, 1983, p.52)
The reason for the popularity of the theories of Brecht and Boal among
those who have written about drama in education are partially, I would argue,
pedagogical and partially political. Politically, many theorists and drama
practitioners are on the left and feel sympathy toward Brechtian values and
admiration for the extraordinary and innovative work of'Boal.w Pedagically, both
theorists are attractive as they see the purposes of drama as instructive and
empowering, validating a particular type of content for the drama lesson often
popular with those who lean toward the left; topics such as male violence,
unemployment, homelessness, documented by David Hornbrook and evidenced
within the pages of 2D. 11 The idea of catharsis, on the other hand, in its more
traditional interpretation as a purgative process, has been associated in drama
teaching with the now discarded vision of drama as the lesson where emotional
energy is channeled and discharged in an orgy of noisy, ill-disciplined self-
expression.P Catharsis as intepreted by Nussbaum, however, has much more in
common with what has for a long time been seen as a mainstream function of
drama teaching; it stresses the cognitive aspect of emotion and suggests that
drama's educational potential centres around its capacity for illumination, thus
calling to mind Heathcote's famous maxim that drama is about revealing to
children what they already know but don't yet know they know. This function of
drama in education has been succinctly expressed by Robinson:
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"The use of drama in schools to engage the expressive actions of children is one
of the ways of enabling them to confirm (their) personal responsibilities by
investigating what their beliefs, ideas, attitudes and feelings actually are."
(Robinson, 1980, p.161)
Aristotle specified that, in tragedy, this clarification should be actualised through
pity and fear but, following Nussbaum's definition, it is hard to see why other
emotions should not have such potential in a broader schema of educational drama;
anger, indignation, repulsion, admiration, sympathy, or the "fruits of the spirit",
such as joy and communal well-being; all might be harnessed for educational
purposes, to clarify our understandings of the virtues as thick concepts and thus
inform ourmoral values.
Nussbaum's conclusions would doubtless be criticised by some Feminists
for assuming the existence of an essentialist self and for ignoring the issue of the
power and the hegemony of moral discourse." In this light, the clarification might
serve only to reaffirm as true the ideologically dominant values we have culturally
absorbed. We would do well, for example, to remember the fate of Philomele,
who saw in the figure of Phaedra a confirmation of her vision of romantic love.
These are Boal's objections voiced from a different critical perspective but, in
response, we may postulate that not all ideologically dominant values are
necessarily wrong or malevolent; and that cathartic experience in itself is non-
ideological. For, whatever my ideology - Christian, liberal humanist, Feminist,
Marxist or a hybrid of these or of others - there can be little doubt that, in the hum-
drum, petty irritations and messy confusions of everyday life, values, including
moral values, can become confused, clouded, contradictory, not to say inarticulate
or ill-informed. This is particularly the case in contemporary western society, in
what David Hornbrook has described as "the densely textured political
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ethnography of post-imperial liberal democracy." (1989, p.50) When we clarify
this confusion in some small way, we become better able to articulate and
understand what our values actually are. In this sense, the insights we acquire
through cathartic clarification are equivalent to the acquisition of emotional
knowledge; They are:
"..sources of illumination or clarification, as the agent, responding or attending
to his or her responses, develops a richer self-understanding concerning the
attachments and values that support the responses. " (Nussbaum, op. cit, p.388)
But they are potentially more than this. With emotional knowledge can come
moral knowledge for to learn the virtues is to learn particular feelings and
particular emotional responses.
"Virtues are dispositions not only to act in particular ways but to feel in
particular ways.... Moral education is an 'education sentimentale' (MacIntyre,
1981, p.149)
In the final analysis, catharsis itself is non-ideological and amoral. Moral
responsibility lies with dramatists and teachers, with those who harness its energy
to explore or explain or create particular cathartic experiences in particular
dramatic contexts. What matters is the wisdom and appropriateness of what is
learned through catharsis, sadly lacking in Philomele's case and serving to remind
us of these very responsibilities.
Nussbaum's interpretation of catharsis is not dependent upon the existence
or otherwise of universal values or an essentialist self There can be no one,
universal clarification or emotional response within a drama, of course; it is
patently evident to any teacher or practitioner that a drama has no single effect,
predictable or otherwise, upon an audience or a group of children. Responses can
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depend upon a number of variations within the individuals watching or
participating: their personal cultural baggage, their past narratives and future
aspirations; the social nature of the group who share the drama; or, as Robinson
insists, whichever "self' happens to be prominent at this moment in time.
"None of us consists of a unique sense of self ...Personal consciousness is a
maelstrom of competing self-images which shuffle and blend continuously
according to past experiences, immediate events and the subject states they
produce." (Robinson, 1980,p.155)
However, to concentrate our educational argument on the self, as critics of drama-
in-education have tended to do>, would be rather to miss the point, for the
emphasis in drama is never primarily on the self but on the self in relation to
others. As an audience in drama, we watch other people; as participants, we role
play or interact with or act as other people and it is for or as someone else that we
feel. The emotions stirred in drama, some of which are listed above, are other-
regardingv» and stimulated by our potential for human attachment. This is what
Aristotle described as our orectic potential, our innate capacity to reach out to
others, one of the givens of our social nature, particularly evident in childhood and
similarly emphasised by feminist moral theorists such as Carol Gilligan and Nell
Noddings.« We learn about the moral actions of others and speculate upon why
they do as they do; about possibilities and alternatives where we are engaged to
draw from our own moral resources but which stretch us and make us reflect
precisely because they are not our personal stories but situated in a world of
otherness. Clarification of why others might act as they do, and the effect of these
actions, is our primary focus of attention. Of course, such clarification is
inextricably bound up with our own moral identities, as these actions are viewed
and apprehended through the perspective of our own values. But these values,
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culturally and ideologically shaped though they may be, are, as Robinson
emphasises "capable of change" (ibid, p.160).
The nature of moral response to drama has been approached from a
different theoretical perspective, one which takes account of ideology but which,
unlike the theories of Brecht and Boal, is not driven by ideological commitment.
The conceptual framework provided by Bernard Beckerman provides a model to
explain how drama can either reinforce or challenge our values.
Beckerman argues that there are two types of performance, the iconic and
the dialectic. The iconic performance celebrates and confirms audience values by
concentrating and embodying social values and images, its point being to "prove"
what the audience already believes. He points to pageants and parades as the
most extreme examples of iconic action and describes how, in the field of drama,
both comedy and melodrama are essentially iconic as they leave the audience's
values undisturbed. Interestingly, he comments that most political theatre, such as
agit-prop, can be categorised as iconic as "it does not change people's minds.
Rather does it confirm the opinion of believers." (1990, p.81) In contrast to this,
Beckerman proposes that dialectic action subjects values to challenge. It works
through subversion, by creating an appealing but oppositional claim on an
audience's allegiances, and is thus able to disturb its moral sensibilities through
tugging at its emotions in oppositional directions simultaneously and thus forcing it
into reflection. As a clear example of this, he refers to the final scene of Gavin
Richards' London production of Dario Fo's Accidental Death of an Anarchist,
where the audience is shown two alternative endings. In the first, the journalist
leaves the corrupt police officers to be blown up. But this, Beckerman comments,
affronts the liberal sensitivities of the western theatre-going public; so another
ending is staged, only to show how it leads to her murder at the hands of these
officers. In both cases, the consequences are devastating.
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"Through this device the production sets different sides of our liberal sensitivity
into conflict with one another. We have to confront our own allegiances. It is in
this way, through dialectic action, that Fo achieves what Brecht advocated:
simultaneous engagement and detachment that force the audience to resolve
emotional disjunction through thinking about the implications of the play. " (ibid,
p.87)
But dialectic action is not just the prerogative of Brechtian theatre. In the case of
Shakespeare's Macbeth, we are confronted with a man who commits actions which
are abhorrent to us but who is presented as a finely sensitized human being
"To the extent that the actor seduces us into sharing his mental action and
allowing our empathic nerves to vibrate with his emotions, we are on his side.
One set of values, our horror of murder and tyranny, is juxtaposed against
another set of values, our sympathy for an anguished human being. " (ibid, p.86)
Beckerman argues that all western drama will be either iconic or dialectic as it is
practically impossible for it to unfold in a value-free context. This is the result of
two processes unique to drama; the fact that drama is a human medium, where the
audience cannot fail to make human attachments; and through the actualisation of
conflict, or, in Beckerman's terms, the "interaction and contrast with one person
straining against another. " (ibid, p.83) As he comments:
"The human attachment we have for one or another person calls upon us to make
choices, which in tum involve a context of values. " (ibid, p.83)
This, I believe, is a concept which serves to connect the theories of Brecht, Boal
and Aristotle and its implications for educational drama are worth examining.
Dramatic action, whether iconic or dialectic, works by stimulating our innate sense
of human attachment, our orectic potential, and it does this through the immediacy
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of human representation. In other words, for drama to work, we have to be
morally engaged, to care in either a positive or negative sense about the people
being fictionally represented and what is happening to them. This is the case for
both iconic and dialectic action. In this sense, consciously or unconsciously, we
make choices, deciding where our attachments lie and these choices are value-
related. The emotions we feel and the moral choices they lead us into making are
other-regarding and happen during the dramatic action. Beckerman points out
that in iconic action the alignment of values is between characters - between the
stock heroes and villains of comedy and melodrama, for example; in dialectic
action, however, this alignment is divided within characters, as with Macbeth.
This is what is largely responsible for what he describes as a moral risk for the
audience, a process which has been commented upon indirectly by Goldberg in
relation to Shakespeare's Antony and Cleopatra:
" ..it explores and questions, in the very process of preseming him (Antony), what
nobleness of life might appear to be as he is seen by this and that character's eyes
... and what it might be to us, who see the life in this and that way of seeing. "
(1993, p.41)
These considerations of drama's moral educational potential emphasise the twin
elements of observation and response to actual human representation. For young
children, this underlines the value of appropriate Theatre in Education programmes
and offers strong support for the inclusion of Responding to Drama as a key
element within the drama curriculum'? It also points to the potential within the
concept of the actor-teacher, where the teacher not only takes on a dramatic role
but, in addition, consciously uses other theatrical conventions and sign-systems
open to the actor - such as gesture, costume, gait, tone of voice, symbolic objects -
as resources to engage the children's value attachments. IS In this way, the actor-
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teacher can harness the moral cognitive energy integral to other-regarding
emotions and dispositions such as pity, sympathy, indignation, solidarity,
gentleness and charity, not to mention their darker companions such as contempt,
antipathy and guilt. But the onus is not entirely on the teacher in role, of course.
Beckerman writes from the perspective of conventional, western theatre, which
has evolved clear boundaries to demarcate the roles of performer and audience,
whereas in process drama these roles become far more fluid. At first, it might
appear that this form of participatory drama promotes the role of the active
participant at the expense of the reflective audience. However, O'Neill, in
particular, has argued that ''participants in process drama can be changed into
observers without abandoning involvement" (1995, p.120). Her understanding is
that:
"where the participants' sense of being both actors and audience is actively
promoted, the dramatic world will be built on a powerful and effective
combination of dramatic action and active contemplation. " (ibid,p. 130)
Hence the children's responses, which are integral to the moral learning, can
become both active and pro-active through the participatory form of process
drama.
We can now speculate on how such classroom practices might relate to
work with fairy stories, in the light of the theoretical points discussed so far. It is
clear that Zipes' project has much in common with Brecht's. Brecht's mistrust of
Aristotelian drama and Zipes' critical stance toward classic fairy tales are similar in
concern, and Brecht's theory of distancing, the Verjremdungseffekt, had a similar
purpose to Zipes' own theory of disturbance. Both Brecht and Zipes, influenced
by Marxist theory, wish for empowerment through knowledge of the historical and
political forces which shape our lives. Both tend toward seeing emotion and
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reason as distinct, mistrusting the potential of the one to render the other blind;
and Boal's revolutionary theatre, seeking to identify and empower people to
overcome oppression, has a similar political agenda. The theatre of Brecht and
Boal seeks to challenge and provoke, to contextualise and historicise action and
Boal, in particular, wishes to open up problems, suggest possibilities but leave
resolutions open-ended so that participants can decide upon them for themselves.
Their approaches would suggest a use of dramatic action dialectic in its intention,
perhaps playful, certainly subversive, challengingor openly interrogating the values
within a tale by introducing an oppositional empathic alignment. An approach
which sought the kind of clarification which Nussbaum sees as characteristic of
catharsis could, on the other hand, lead to either iconic or dialectic action. The
difference here for the teacher will, I suggest, lie in the intensity, the sustained
seriousness of the drama, less playful than the former approach; perhaps more
subtle in its structure and more poetic in its form.
Such hypotheses need to be explored in the light of the points argued here
and in the previous chapters. I have argued that stories best convey the nature of
the moral life to children but that those in the mythic tradition pose problems
within the area of values. These problems emerge from the lack of subjunctivity
and particularity in their narrative structures and from the historical, literary
tamperings which have often provided a monological, didactic overlay to their
story lines. If, as I have argued, there is historical evidence for regarding drama as
an art form capable of actively interrogating, re-interpreting and renewing the
values in mythic tales, then it does so through establishing a level of personal
engagement with these values which is at once emotional and cognitive in nature
and moral in its focus. The challenge now - and it is a substantial one - is to see
how such theory can enlighten our understanding of classroom practice in this
area. This I propose to do through case studies, where any generalizations can be
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argued, as Aristotle would have prefered it, from within the context of particular
cases, which are themselves the determining factors of experience." It is to a
fuller consideration of the form such classroom practice and such research
methodology should take that I now tum.
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NOTES
1. See A Dialogue about Acting (Willett, op.cit, pp 26-29) in which Brecht comments upon the
performance of Helene Weigel as Jocasta's servant in Oedipus Rex He saw her performance
as a conscious but unsuccessful attempt to involve the audience, to get them "to take part in
the moral decisions of which the plot is made up" (ibid, p.28) Her failure was not due to her
ability as an actress but to the audience's mindset, who saw drama as "an opportunity for new
sensation" (ibid, p.28) "For this audience hangs its brains up in the cloakroom along with
its coat. n (ibid, p.27)
2. See, for example, Esslin, (1984); Ewen, (1970); and Gray (1976). The accepted wisdom of
these critics has more recently come under attack. See Brooker (1988). Brooker argues
that Brecht saw The Life of Galileo as "a big step backwards" (p.185) and points to his last
play Days of the Commune as mainstream Marxist, epic, dialectic theatre. Brecht had never
betrayed or revised his project, he concludes.
3. See Boal (1979), Part I, Aristotle's coercive system of tragedy
4. Brecht's comments on the film Gunga Din are an interesting complement to Boal's
argument. He explains how the film touched him, how he laughed at all the right places;
but how, fundamentally, he knew that the worldview presented by the film was distorted,
despite its artistic success. See Willett, p.151
5. See Hornbrook (1989) pp47-51. Two of the latest drama manuals for primary teachers each
present d.epoliticised forms offorum theatre as drama strategies, alongside freeze frame,
teacher-in-role et al. See Readman and Lamont (1994) and Woolland, (1993)
6. See Hornbrook, op cit, p.50. Sometimes this neglect is replaced by open disapproval. See
Neelands (1994), in particular, n16, p.14. For an example of how closely and openly
influential figures within drama in education identify with the political left, see Lawrence
(ed.) (1993). Here, articles by Heathcote, Bolton and Neelands are accompanied by extracts
from, among others, Brecht.
7. See, in particular, Carr and Kemmis (1986); Macintyre (1981); Taylor (1989); Nussbaum
(1986) - full details in bibliography. Carr (1986, 1987) draws heavily upon Aristotle's
ethics, both directly and indirectly viaMacintyre, when proposing that education be viewed
specifically as a professional practice and when describing a critical paradigm for
educational action research.
8. See MacIntyre, op.cit, p.49
9. I am indebted to this article for much of the previous analysis of fear
10. See once again Hornbrook (1989) pp 47-51 for a brief sociology of this alliance between the
educational drama establishment and the left
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11. See, for example, Joyce (1987); Hall: (1988); and Edmiston: (1995)' where the author details
a drama about social prejudice. See also Hornbrook, (1989), n.38, p173
12. See Robinson (1981), in particular the section in his essay entitled Chaos, Anarchy and Self-
expression, pp 152-155.
13. See Heckman, (1995), p.40. She notes such objections to Nussbaum's overall ReO-
Aristotelian stance.
14. See Hornbrook (1989), Chapter 5, and Nicholson (1995), p.28
IS. Interestingly, Carr suggests that the virtues might be seen as belonging to one of two
categories: those of self-control and those of attachment. The virtues of attachment he
defines as "other-regarding attitudes" (1991, p.200), including sympathy, benevolence,
generosity etc. These are explored in more detail in a subsequent case study.
16. See Nussbaum, (op. cit, p. 264). Also Gilligan (1981) and Noddings (1984).
17. Arts Cowtcil of Great Britain, (1992).
18. See Oddie (1994) for a detailed elaboration of this concept. See also Lawrence, C. (1981)
19. cfNussbaum (op.cit, p.317) on the relationship in Aristotelian philosophy between the
particular and the general. "The situation is a source of illumination; the illumination
becomes the source of a new general account. "
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PART II
CHAPTER VI
DRAMA FOR MORAL
EDUCATION: POTENTIAL
FEATURES AND PROBLEMATIC
ASPECTS
Drama, to quote the words of Raymond Williams again, moves "beyond
myth to dramatic versions of myth". In proposing a historical relationship
between drama and myth where drama interrogates, revises and renews the moral
values within the myth, I analysed Wertenbaker's play principally to illustrate how
this relationship is still vigorous in contemporary theatre rather than to propound
her particular feministvision. It is evident that Wertenbaker sees that the form of
drama is as crucial to its moral purpose as is its content and that this form should
aim to empower rather than to emotionally indulge its audience. I will now argue
that, if fairy stories are to undergo a similar process of moral exploration in the
classroom, then the form of drama we use for this purpose is crucial to the project;
and that this form should be dialogical in nature, harnessing the performative
characterisitics of the oral tradition from which the tales originate but enhancing
them to become participatory in nature. Such a form of drama, in fact, as exists
within the current traditions of drama in education.
There is a rich and complex history to educational drama within Britain,
spanning the length of the twentieth century. This has been well-documented by
Cox (1970) and Robinson (1981) and usefully critiqued and summarisedby Bolton
(1984) and more recently by O'Hara (1996). From early pioneers such as Harriet
Finlay-Johnson and Caldwell Cook, writers and practitioners within the field -
Peter Slade, Brian Way, Richard Courtney and John Allen, for example - have
emphasised drama as a practice and as a process for learning rather than as a body
of texts for passive reception. This approach, of course, shares much in common
with the child-centred, progressive philosophies inspired by the writings of
Rousseau and Froebel; but opinions as to what exactly constitutes the nature of
learning through drama have always been fluid and open to argument, as have any
specific views on the moral benefits of drama for children. In the case of Peter
Slade, for example, (1954) the form of Child Drama was in itself a source for good
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in an essentially therapeutic sense, characterised as it was by intense activity,
spontaneous play and the qualities of Absorption and Sincerity.' Issues of content
were practically irrelevant for' Slade, who saw dramatic meaning as inherently
symbolicand private to the children involved.
"The child creates theatre in its own way, own form, own kind. It is original art
of high creative quality. Most adults are stubbornly blind to the loveliness they
will not see. " (op. cit, p.183)
Elsewhere he writes:
"The constant repetitions and use of symbols in the realm of child behaviour, also
the acting out of situations before they can have been experienced, is entirely in
line with the Jungian conception of the collective unconscious." (ibid, p.48)
Such language and sentiments are reminiscent of Bettelheim, stressing as they do
the importance of the subconscious, the autonomy and preciousness of a child's
experience, and portraying adult interference as an unwelcome intrusion.
Slade's influence was considerable but its emphasis on form as opposed to
content was radically challenged in the 1970s by the work of Dorothy Heathcote,
arguably the most influential exponent of educational drama this century.2 Like
Harriet Finlay-Johnson, Heathcote was interested primarily in how drama could be
harnessed as a learning medium for subjects across the curriculum such as history
and literature; but unlike her predecessor, she was not interested in how it could
assist children in the learning of facts so much as how it could facilitate an
understanding of what Bolton calls "the universal implications of any particular
topic". {l984, p.52) Heathcote's work was characterised by a number of
revolutionary features, most prominent being her use of teacher-in-role, a strategy
which enabled her to influence the dramatic action, and hence the children's
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learning, from within, as a fellow participant. 3 Although her own writings have
been few, those of Gavin Bolton (1979, 1984, 1992) did much to spread the
philosophy and practices of her particular style of drama, as did the numerous
workshops and demonstration lessons taught by herself and Bolton throughout the
UK, Australia and North America. It was in North America, with articles by
Wolfe (1978) and Colby (1982) that theoretical studies into the area of moral
education through drama began to advocate the practices of Bolton and
Heathcote.
Wolfe focused directly on the work of Kohlberg, suggesting that significant
moral dilemmas, approached through drama, could stimulate moral development
according to the Kohlberg taxonomy. Colby - whose work constitutes the most
thorough and focussed examination published to date of drama's potential for
moral learning - built on Wolfe's ideas but took them further. Embracing
Kohlberg's stage theory, Colby (1982) constructed an argument which proposed
that drama of the type taught by Heathcote and Bolton could encourage moral
growth by pressing children into reasoning one stage above their current level. He
cited unpublished research by Johnson and Bauer' which, although failing to prove
that drama could achieve such growth, nevertheless drew conclusions which Colby
found to be significant. With detailed reference to two Heathcote-style dramas,
Colby argued that, when such dramas are clearly focussed on moral developmental
objectives, significant growth in moral reasoning becomes possible due to drama's
ability to yoke the realms of the affective, the visual and the kinesthetic to the
moral reasoning process. He proposed that this style of drama provided room for
rational reflection, in line with Kohlberg's stage theory, to work alongside the
emotional ethic of care and responsibility developed by Gilligan, which
combination could move children's moral reasoning up a stage.' In a later article,
Colby (1987) developed his argument further, concentrating on published research
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which illustrated the shortcomings of developmental analysis and classroom role
plays when used to encourage moral growth. He was particularly struck by the
work of Oliver and Bane (1971) and their argument for teachers to recognize the
importance of those non-rational, moral sensitivities which remain unaddressed
when the concentration is upon the processes of moral reasoning alone. They
asserted that moral controversy is:
" ... more powerfully described through the metaphors of the dramatist which
transcendpublic language. " (Oliver and Bane, cited in Colby, 1987, p.73)
Particularly in Gilligan - but also in the later Kohlberg (1981) - Colby saw support
for such a broader and more ambivalent understanding of moral development.
The strength of drama, Colby concluded, lies in its potential to encourage children
to think metaphorically as well as analytically, and in the opportunities it offers for
children to experience and reflect upon the "truth of metaphor".
It is significant, I think, that Kohlberg's stage theory and the pedagogy of
dilemma analysis are muted in the later article, indicating a shift in Colby's
perspective to one which more closely matches the argument developed in Chapter
II of this thesis. Even if we reject his earlier theoretical dependence upon
Kohlberg, however, Colby's work remains lucid and informative and I refer to it in
further detail to help illuminate my own practice in Chapter VllI. This practice
belongs to the tradition fostered by Heathcote and advocated by Colby, but in a
form developed, altered and disseminated by other practitioners such as Cecily
O'Neill, (1976, 1982, 1995) David Booth (1995) and Jonothan Neelands (1984,
1992) The term P,.ocess drallUl is used currently to describe this type of
educational, improvisatory drama, emphasising its concern with significant,
dramatic learning experiences sought through the creative processes rather than
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from within received and distant dramatic products. Its features have been
usefully listed by Taylor as follows:"
• "Separate scenic units linked in an organic manner
• Thematic exploration rather than isolated or random skit or sketch
• A happening and an experience which does not depend upon a written script
• A concern with participants' change in outlook
• Improvisational activity
• Outcomes not pre-determined but discovered in process
• A script generated through action
• The leader actively working both within and outside the drama"
These characteristics are indicative of its open-ended, participatory nature and
would appear to be ideally suited to the communal storybuilding which is integral
to the fieldwork of this research project. However, since the late 1980s, the
validity of this form of educational drama has come under vociferous attack from
various academic theorists within the field of drama education. The ensuing
debate has raised important issues about aesthetic and cultural practices beyond
the parameters of this thesis, but some of their criticisms are central to its concerns
and need to be addressed before proceeding further.
Myth, values and universals: responding to the critics.
Foremost among these critics is David Hornbrook. His influential book,
Education and Dramatic Art is a strong, often vitriolic attack directed against the
epistemological claims made by Heathcote, Bolton and their followers for the type
of drama they practice. One of his key criticisms is that they locate learning in
drama within the area of psychology rather than culture, having as their major aim
the apprehension of certain absolutes or universals, which, on analysis, turn out to
be nothing more than bland, liberal humanist platitudes. Thus Gavin Bolton's list
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of the universals revealed through drama - "protecting one's family, journeying
home, facing death, recording for posterity, passing on Wisdom, making tools
etc." (cited in Hornbrook, 1989, p.66) are quoted only to be subjected to ridicule.'
Significantly, Hornbrook points disparagingly to Heathcote's predilection for
"primitivism" in many of her dramas, where students are requested to ''play out the
inter-cultural dilemmas of tribal communities" He goes on to comment:
"Underlying this simple, noble savage view of primitive societies are the
phenomological assumptions .. that there are certain realities, or essences, which
form the common features of all human consciousness. " (ibid, p.66)
Hornbrook rejects this universalist view of the self and favours an education in
dramatic art, by which he means, in etfect, the traditional cultural practices of the
western theatre. Heathcote's form of drama, he argues, has dislocated drama from
its roots within the arts and, through this, from its cultural history and moral and
political purposes. The result he sees is a moral vacuum:
"(an) existential and narcissistic wilderness in which we circle in search of truth,
value and meaning but in which all the so-called social learning of the drama
class, however conscientiously engineered, must in the end be condemned to
wander aimlessly. " (ibid, p.67)
Only through a re-engagement with the historical, performance practices of drama
and the political and social meanings within our heritage of playtexts does
Hornbrook believe that drama can leave this wilderness and re-enter the world of
collective, critical judgment.
An earlier critic of Heathcote was, in fact, a Marxist practitioner from
within this theatrical tradition. Nicholas Wright saw her preoccupation with
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"dropping from the particular into the univesal" as in direct opposition to the
nature and purpose of theatre.
"The argument of the play is not ideal; it might be true only in the specific set of
social, economic and cultural circumstances revealed and implied in the play ... .It
is, ifyou like, particular. But it is not universal." (Robinson (ed), 1981,p.104)
The danger he saw in Heathcote's practice was:
"the temptation of inventing pseudo-facts, statements generally of a moral nature,
which, though mere matters of opinion, products of a particular ideological
context, are presented as though they were of absolute and permanent value."
(ibid, p.100)
For Wright, Heathcote's universal truths are neither true nor universal. His
Marxist critique of her practice, equating the moral with the political,
foreshadowed that of Hornbrook and raised squarely the problem of value
hegemonywithin the person and power of the drama teacher:
''At what point may (the student) decide that what is universal, say, for the teacher
is not universal for him?" (ibid, p.102)
These are precisely the concerns which have found an echo in the feminist voices
which have recently been raised against the aims and practices of process drama.!
Helen Nicholson also uses Heathcote's beliefs in universal truths and an
essentialist, authentic self as the base from which to launch her assault, arguing
that: "the notion of universality is exclusive, and reveals through deconstruction,
the dominant concerns of a hegemonic culture." (1995, p.28). She lambasts the
same universals listed by Bolton and criticised by Hornbrook for their phallocentric
preoccupations and moves on to attack what Bolton has described as the
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"essential goal in drama teaching", namely "that the central learning ... involves
some kind of change in subjective meaning, a change in felt value ... " (Bolton,
cited by Nicholson, ibid, p.31) Nicholson comments:
''My question is concerned with whose values are they? and why are they better
than the students' own? Here we see in operation the will-to-power of the
practitioner, who has eliminated diversity infavour of the perceived rationality or
wisdom of his or her own moral code. " (ibid, p.31)
At the heart of these criticisms there is a shared mistrust of hegemonic
values masquerading as universal truths. The objections to Heathcote's
primitivism and to her belief that drama is ultimately concerned with universals
emanates from this mistrust. Such concerns have been pre-eminent throughout
this thesis and echo my own within the fields of moral theory, theories of meaning
in traditional stories and the relationship between myth and drama. To put
forward process drama as the form able to deal with precisely what it has been
accused of fostering might therefore appear at best misguided, at worst perverse.
So to what extent are these criticimsvalid?
A cursory look at the literature on or by Heathcote supports to some
extent the view propounded by Hornbrook regarding her fascination for
primitivism. Whether in a tomb drama with 12 year-olds or in a drama based on
the Hawaiian goddess Pele, Heathcote was evidently taken not only with
primitivism but, more especially, with the springboard it presented to explore the
concept of myth as a bearer of a special kind of truth." In her essay Drama and
theMentally Handicapped, she writes:
"/ have evidence of some rather earth-shattering explorations which seem almost
Jungian in their manifestation. As if myth were tapped and universals perceived
during the action. " (Johnson and O'Neill, 1990, p.150)
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Her belief in the relationship between myth and universal truth is similar to that
expressed by Joseph Campbell and Mircea Eliade, who believed that the purpose
of all myth was to re-establish the "creative era":
"..magical, in a sense, since by reconstituting that era one can revive some of its
unique, creative power." (Kirk, 1974, p.63)
In flirting with such sentiment Heathcote was in danger of investing the form of
myth with a special kind of mystical truth, which could serve both to mystify the
nature of learning through drama and, mistakenly, to conflate drama with myth.
For example, in an essay entitledDrama as Challenge she writes:
"When the Greeks on the hillsides watched the stories they knew, 'lived through',
yet again, who knows what strength was given to them by this re-acquaintance
with their myths?" (Johnson and O'Neill, op. cit, p.83)
The quote from Williams which opened this chapter reminds us that each
dramatization of a myth changed its moral and political significance and effectively
contextualised it, politically and historically, hence opening it up to argument.
Neither Aeschylus, Sophocles nor Euripides regarded the myths as mystical
sources of strength for the population of Athens but used them to convey
particular meanings relevant to the society of the time. What the Greeks gained
from a re-acquaintance with their myths is a question more fruitfully approached
by critical and historical analysis rather than mere wonderment. We know, for
example, that in The Trojan Women Euripides was using the myth to expose the
political and moral hypocrisy of those conducting the war with Sparta, using the
Greeks' treatment of the vanquished women of Troy as a direct analogy for the
brutal treatment meted out to the inhabitants of Melos for having refused to side
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with Athens. His dramatic intention was to move away from the unchanging
remoteness of myth into the particularity of history, not vice-versa, and is a clear
illustration of Nicholas Wright's proposition.
Criticisms of Heathcote, in this respect at least, may be seen as valid; and
there is no doubt that her perspective on primitivism and myth has had some
influence on the work of subsequent practitioners." However, Hornbrook
appears to conflate the work of Heathcote and Bolton with all practice in the field
of drama in education; for he has in his sights not only these influential
practitioners but the very form of process drama itself II Nicholson, too, extends
her criticism to a number of prominent practitioners of process drama and
postulates an alternative model for the drama curriculum, much in line with
Hornbrook's definition of dramatic art." Paradoxically, while criticising
essentialist and exclusive practices, she expounds a view of drama-in-education
which is itself essentialist in nature and, whilst exhorting the necessity to embrace
difference and diversitywithin our practice, she refuses to recognize that difference
can exist between the aims and values of particular practitioners of process
drama." It is as if all Greek dramatists were to be equated with Aeschylus. In
order to respond to the critics, the central questions that need to be addressed
within the parameters of this thesis are to do with whether, as a practitioner of
process drama, I am necessarily condemned to mythic primitivismwhen working
with mythic stories; to a misguided quest for universal truths when working within
the field of moral education; and to be always an unwitting agent of hegemony
within the field of values.
The first two questions are much easier to dismiss than the third. My own
approach to and use of myth in drama lessons is self-evidently very different from
those attacked by Hornbrook. Myth, for me, is not a dramatic form to harness for
the purposes of primitivism or spiritual enlightenment; it is a story from which to
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begin a drama. To use Cecily O'Neill's term, it is a pre-text for drama, which
operates:
"byframing theparticipants effectively and economically in afirm relationship to
the potential action." (O'Neill, op.cit, p.22)
This potential action is strongly contextualised and made particular through role
and frame. The use of mythic stories catalogued in the work of David Booth and
O'Neill herself give ample evidence of how this can be done. Furthermore, it is
again quite clear from the literature on process drama that, for quite some time,
universal truths have not been on the agenda. For Heathcote, these universals
were not, in fact, moral absolutes but common human experiences, emotions
linked to examples of when they are typically felt. Indeed, her practice as
described inWagner (1979) illustrates how able she was at problematizing moral
assumptions. Despite Hornbrook's accusations, the search for universals does not
preoccupy the recent work of O'Neill, Booth or Neelands." As I trust my case
studies will illustrate, it is quite possible to work through process drama in order to
dwell within and explore the particularity of a situation just as it is possible to write
stories or poems which mayor may not aspire directly to the universal. If the
particular situation is reflected upon to seek analogies or make evaluations, this is
not the same as "dropping to the universal". As I have previously argued,
particularity is not the semantic equivalent of unique and a generalisation need not
aspire to the universal. Furthermore, if all generalisations are necessarily
influenced by the dominant concerns of a hegemonic culture, then this must be the
case for those who critique this culture as well as those who are supposedly duped
by it. To frame our arguments in this way is to fall victim to the fruitless
circularity of assertion and counter-assertion which MacIntyre sees as so harmful
to contemporary moral debate.
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Nevertheless, the question of how values and ideology shape our teaching,
whether in drama or in any other academic discipline, is a difficult one to negotiate.
It is important to admit that; within the conventions of process drama, and
particularly through the use of teacher in role, teachers have the option to operate
from within the drama, which provides them with a great opportunity to
manipulate its value agenda in ways that they may be only partially aware of
Furthermore, the literature of drama-in-education does contain some grandiose and
dubious claims made by practitioners about the efficacy of their dramas for
bringing about change in children's values. A brief analysis of a recent article by
Brian Edmiston (1995), I believe, can usefully illustrate both of these dangers, thus
shedding some light on the problematic nature not only of moral education through
process drama but also the difficultiesof evaluating one's own practice in the field.
When reflective practice fails to be reflective enough: an example
Although Edmiston is not one of the more prominent practitioners of
process drama, he has recently had a number of articles published and has
contributed a chapter to a book on research in drama education. His work is of
particular relevance to my own interests as it consists largely of reflective accounts
of his own practice and is concerned with moral education through drama. In
fact, he is one of the very few practitioner researchers to have attempted a
comprehensive theory for understanding the moral dimensions of process drama,
drawing specifically upon Bakhtin's theory of dialogism to suggest a model for
developing such understandings. However, problems occur in the way he relates
this theory to his own practice and in the claims he makes for a drama referred to
as the Space Traders Drama, which had as its educational agenda the theme of
prejudice. In his initial contact with a class of thirteen year-olds, Edmiston
informs us that he detected widespread prejudice against people on welfare. He
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thus adapted a story for drama which, in effect, was intended to challenge and
change the children's attitudes. The drama evolved around a futuristic scenario in
which aliens visit an America on the verge of bankruptcy and offer the government
all the gold they need in exchange for all Americans in receipt of welfare. By the
end of the drama, Edmiston believes that children who had previously been
dismissingthose on welfare as lazy and worthless have changed their attitudes and
this he puts down to the way the drama helped the children dialogize their
experience. By this he means that, built into the structure of the work, there were
opportunities for the children to listen to, evaluate and internalise a variety of
perspectives which led them to revise their initial ethical standpoints. He
concludes:
''As a drama teacher I have come to recognize the awe-ful power which we have
to enter into deep and significant conversations with students which change the
ways they view the world and their selves. " (ibid, p.123)
I perceive several problems with Edmiston's overall argument. First of all,
the generalised claims he makes for the class's change of attitude are backed up by
reference to written and spoken evidence taken from only two or three pupils. As
such, these claims fail to convince. Nor must the children's changed attitudes
necessarily be interpreted in the ways Edmiston suggests. For example, in his
conclusion, he decribes how the classteacher asked the children to write about
whether there had been anything fair or unfair within the drama. One girl, Jenny,
who had previously argued that if people on welfare were unemployed then it was
their own fault, now wrote with far more sensitivity and compassion. "You can't
put a price on someone's life. ... Maybe they couldn't help not getting a job.
Wewere all being too selfish." (ibid, p.123) Edmiston argues that this change of
heart came about due to Jenny's own work within the drama. ''In the drama
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work," he writes, "Jenny had not only constructed ethical positions, she critiqued
them." There is a simpler interpretation, however. Children can be very adept at
detecting what it is that the teacher wants to hear and the socially well-adjusted
among them are often happy to respond accordingly. It is difficult to see the
teacher being satisfied with such a drama without soliciting and consequently
finding responses such as this from sensitive children who might soon grasp the
message of the drama without having to construct and critique their own ethical
positions within it. From the article, we have no indication as to how, exactly, the
final writing session was introduced by the teacher, whether there were, for
example, any leading questions or nuances of expression which might have further
indicated to the children the type of written response which would earn his praise.
For the teacher's value agenda is crucial here. It is clear that this drama
had an overarching intention, to achieve a specific and pre-determined change of
understanding which the teacher saw as morally desirable. This essentially
monological approach is at odds with his dialogical intentions. . And Bakhtin
himself was aware of this tendency in drama, seeing it as a monological artform, an
anomaly which Edmiston fails to engage with. IS There is therefore something of a
theoretical muddle in Edmiston's position, or at best a paradox at its heart. He
presents his own ethical understandings as in no need of the kind of dialogical
critique he has urged upon the children's. Although advocating, with Bakhtin, that
"eachperson, adult or child, has a unique perspective on the world and on every
interaction" (ibid, p.116) he has devised a drama in which only one perspective is
ethically tenable; namely, the one he has decided upon in advance."
Although I have proposed that Edmiston's intention was to change
children's attitudes, his stated agenda was more open-ended, namely "to enable
them to explore such ethical concerns as justice, fairness, prejudice and
tolerance." (ibid, p.114) Elsewhere he states that process drama can "enable
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students to create their own ethical understandings about issues of importance to
them." (ibid, p.ll5) The warm, child-centred language of enablement and
exploration, together with verbs such as construct and critique also used in the
opening sentences, suggest an open-ended teaching agenda which places the
emphasis on the students' autonomy. Yet all the specific examples from the drama
which Edmiston refers to suggest a more precise and closed agenda, namely that of
radically changing their perspectives, notably from prejudiced to unpreiudiced."
This is hinted at in his understanding of the advantages of dialogic as opposed to
mono logic thinking:
"If we resist dialogue then we tend to minimize our sense of responsibility and
ossify our thinking. Our morality becomes more 'monologic', static, fixed and
judgemental rather than dynamic and open to change. " (ibid,p.ll7)
The problem here is twofold; there appears to be a contradiction between
Edmiston's stated and actual intentions; and the concept of "change in
understanding" as radical and observable, which he advocates through his deeds as
opposed to in his words, is open to challenge. Edmiston is, not surprisingly, most
pleased with those children whom he interprets as having changed from one state
of mind (prejudiced) to another (unprejudiced). But there is more than a hint in
this article that change per se is morally more desirable than resistance to change,
whereas the obverse might well be true in, say, a drama set in 1930s Germany,
where a doctor was being pressurised to no longer treat a Jewish patient.
Moreover, "change in understanding" need not mean coming to a different position
but could involve the deepening of an existing position. It might take the form of
a deepening of compassion, or of a deepening of one's commitment to
egalitarianism which had recently begun to waver.
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I have critiqued Edmiston's article at some length to show that the
scepticism of critics such as Hornbrook and Nicholson within the area of values
and process drama does have some justification in observable practice; and to
illustrate some of the dangers which need to be negotiated by a project such as
mine, similar as it is to Edmiston's. To illustrate the dangers is not to be defeated
by them, however. As I argued in Chapter V, values are brought to drama lessons
by teachers and students and no particular values are inherent to the form of
process drama itself As in every classroom, drama teachers are in a position of
authority, which means their values matter. They choose the pretext for the
drama and make choices as to what form learning through drama will take. Even
the most progressive will choose how the pretext is to be chosen and how the
decisions which will shape the drama are to be made, as clear an imposition of a
value agenda as any other. This is really the point. As a teacher, it is misguided,
even irresponsible of me, to suggest that my value agenda is either as neutral or as
significant or insignificant as that of anyone else in the classroom. However, if we
are conscious and aware of our values; are willing to be open about them and
justify them; and - most importantly - critically scrutinise them in practice, then we
approach our teaching reflectively, maturely and with intellectual integrity.
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NOTES
1. Slade wrote as recently as 1993 advocating the moral worth of the drama he practised with
delinquents in Binningham during the 1960's. "I believed children ought to go through the
cathartic spitting out of'fears and experiences, "he commented and described how "wewould
set them jumping from rostrum block to rostrum block to the sound of hot jazz and, when
they were exhausted, we would deal with them. ".
2. Writings by Heathcote are included by Drain (1995) alongside those by such eminent
pratitioners as Brecht, Dario Fo, Craig and Artaud.
3. For extensive theoretical analysis of aspects of Teacher in role, see Morgan N. and Saxton 1.
(1987), Chapter 3
4. For details, see Colby (1982) p.26
5. Colby makes brief mention here of the work of Courtney (1980, pp.39~) and Martin L.
Hoffman (1976) whose work is worth a little closer examination within the context of this
thesis. Courtney's theory of Dramatic Age Stages, drew heavily upon Piaget, Erikson and
Kohlberg but was also influenced by Hoffman's list of "Empathic Stages" of moral growth in
terms which, although dissimilar to those proposed by Gilligan, nevertheless stress, as she
did, the importance of connectedness and sympathy. Courtney sees in Hoffman's stage
theory "the kernel elements of dramatic growth. " (ibid, pA3) and writes: "moral growth
hinges upon the ability to experience the inner state of others, and this relates directly to
impersonation." (ibid, p.sl). Hoffman's stage theory can be criticised for the same reasons
as those of Kohlberg and Erikson (see Chapter I) but his description of the characteristics of
an "Empathic Sympathy" stage resonates interestingly with the self-other continuum I
argued to be at the core of moral engagement through drama in Chapter V. "He (sic) can
act out in his own mind the emotions and experiences of others, while all the time
maintaining that the other is a separate person from himself." (Courtney, op. cit, pA3)
6. From Taylor, P. (1995). The term process drama is generally attributed to O'Neill. See
O'Neill (1995) and also O'Toole, 1. (1993)
7. Hornbrook comments: "This simple primitivism is always mysti./Ying because it denies
contemporary experience. How often.T wonder, do we make tools? Would a visit to a DIY
hypermarket be counted as a 'universal'for today's young people?" (op.cit, p.175)
8. Inaddition, see Fletcher (1995).
9. For accounts of the Egyptian drama see Wagner, op.cit, p.206 - 208. For the Goddess Pele
drama. see Johnson and O'Neill (eds), 1990, p.91 Primitivism was also a characteristic
feature of many of Bolton's dramas. Bolton provides details of one example when a group of
children were playing the members of a primitive tribe and found two sweatbands which
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belonged to boys absent from the class. He describes how they were "..ceremoniously
carried back to the cave ... we sat round them and ... deciding our fellow tribesmen had met
their deaths, we buried the bands. " (Quoted in OToole, 1992, p.221)
10. Interesting examples ofprimitivtsm pepper Morgan N., and Saxton, 1. (1987) Here is their
example of symbolization: "The empty bowl in the centre of the circle signifies the hunger of
the tribe. And for one it represents suffering for her children; for another it represents his
failure as a provider; for another it represents the anger of the Gods... " (p.5)
11. See Hornbrook, (1995)
12. See Nicholson, op. cit, p.35.
13. I would agree with her proposition that: "..difference is to be celebrated and valued, and
oppressive categorisations are to be binned forever as ownership of a negative will-to-
power." (1995, p.30) However, her argument seems geared to exclude practitioners of
process drama. It is also worth noting that the practice of Heathcote and Bolton was never
static and primitivism was only one aspect of it. In their latest, joint publication, there is
nothing mythic or Jungian about any of the work analysed. See Heathcote D. and Bolton G.
(1995)
14. See O'Neill (1995); Booth (1995); Neelands (1994, 1995)
15. See Pechey (1989) pp 57 - 62.
16. See Edmiston (1994) for an example of a drama in which he avoids this trap by not
approaching it with such a predetermined agenda.
17. For example, he opens his article with two sentences uttered by the same boy, one at the
beginning of the drama, one towards its conclusion: "What should we do with the prisoners?
Should they go off in the spaceship? It doesn't matter if they die, they're worthless
anyway." "I've changed my mind. You can't decide for people. Even if we need the
money we can't make them go - they're people too. n (op.cit, 1995, p.ll4) This is a similar
transformation to Jenny's. A further problem, of course, is how to equate children's
utterances in role with their actual beliefs. Edmiston blurs this distinction.
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CHAPTER VII
RESEARCH MODEL AND
METHODOLOGY
The case studies which form the bulk of Part II of this inquiry explore in
practice how classroom drama with fairy tales as pre-text can engage children in
moral processes and encourage them to explore and articulate ethical concepts. I
have taken as my starting point that, historically, one of the cultural functions of
drama in western civilization has been to open moral debate by problematising
accepted social and moral values expressed within a society's shared mythology;
and have chosen to focus on my own teaching to explore the issues involved.
However, in my critique of Edmiston's account, I focused upon issues of value
bias, indicative of the dangers inherent to such reflexive analyses of one's own
practice. There are other research models available, of course, and my reasons for
rejecting them are founded upon fundamental principles concerning the nature of
educational research and of education itself
A recent, large-scale project led by John Somers of Exeter University is an
example of research in educational drama which has consciously adopted
procedures to ensure value-neutrality and provide objective proof of its findings.
It took as its starting point the implicit belief of many drama teachers that learning
in drama lessons can effect substantial change in children's social and moral
attitudes. In Somers' words, the research attempted:
"..to discover whether exposure to particular circumstances experienced by
students in drama affects their attitudes to issues embedded in those
circumstances. " (1996, p.l 09)
This is a position argued by Edmiston, of course, but, significantly, Somers adds
that his research report is written:
"..in the knowledge that there is little supporting evidence in the field that would
stand up to rigorous scrutiny by psychologists or sociologists. " (op. cit, p.l 09)
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On reading the report, this qualification can be seen to have shaped the entire
project design for, unlike Edmiston's account, it seeks to provide evidence in the
form of quantifiable, statistical data as well as documentary, qualitative comment.
A drama entitled Simon, at the centre of the report, exemplifiesthis. It was aimed
at encouraging children to feel greater empathy for children with Down's
Syndrome by creating a drama, set in a youth club, in which a boy with Down's
Syndrome called Simon becomes a member.I The research was undertaken in
thirty schools across the UK and teachers were asked to apply a six-point Lickert
scale to measure children's attitudes as demonstrated in a questionnaire
administered before and after the drama; and to apply a social distance scale to
quantify children's attitudes towards Simon at different points in the drama. These
figures were computed and compared to the attitudes of children in a control
group who did the same topic with no drama input. Somers claims that the
statistical evidence points to significantly increased attitudinal change in children
who took part in the drama sessions.
It is evident from Somers' reference above to "rigorous scrutiny" that he
has planned this research partly in response to perceived shortcomings in reflective
accounts such as Edmiston's; and partly in response to the current political climate
and the resultant pressures it has placed upon educationalists and educational
researchers. Taylor has recently described this climate as an era of neo-
positivism, which seeks to provide "the secure framework upon which curriculum
action must flow." (1996. p.4p It is an era, as argued in the introduction, in
search of certainty and quantifiable results, mistrustful and dismissiveof those who
would see education as complex and problematic and characterised by the
language of testing, performance indicators and measurable outcomes. Somers'
research design is an understandable response to the current educational climate
and is one which would have been supported by Troyna (1994) who argued
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against "soft " (i.e. reflective) research precisely because it will always be
marginalised in the current political climate. But it is nonetheless a response
which brings with it its own problems.
There is a tendency within positivist research design to conflate objectivity
with measurement and to equate both with Truth; to view objectivity as impersonal
and subjectivity as only personal. Yet the distinction between subjective and
objective observations is as false a dichotomy as that between emotion and
cognition, examined in Chapter V. A more accurate understanding of objective
statements would see them as interpersonal, where two or more observers of the
same event come to similar conclusions. Such statements are, of necessity,
interpretations of events, based upon evidence, but still open to disagreement and
misunderstanding. And underlying value positions inform such observations, even
in the scientific world, where, we must remember, evidence pointed
incontrovertibly to the earth circling the sun for many centuries. If scientists can -
and do - disagree over their interpretations of evidence, this must be even more the
case with regard to those who would investigate the social and the moral world.
As Guba and Lincoln have pointed out, research paradigms:
"...are all inventions of the human mind and hence subject to human error. No
construction is or can be incontrovertibly right." (cited in Taylor, op. cit, p.18)
Positivist research design does not ensure the triumph of value-neutrality and
objectivity. As Bernstein has asserted, the replacement of political theory by
scientific empiricism in the social world would only ensure that:
"..primary questions about what men are would no Jonger be seriously asked;
instead, there would be the uncritical acceptance of ideological biases." (1976,
p.62)
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One of the dangers, then, in researchers playing by the current rules is that they
may be uncritically accepting the ideological biases of those who have made the
rules. The values are still there but they are at best obfuscated and at worst
denied.'
Positivist research models such as that adopted by Somers attempt to
remove values from the research equation but fail to do so. They also aspire to a
modernist vision of truth, one which is, perhaps, congruent with a worldview such
as we find in Koblberg's theories of moral development but not with the
postmodem perspective adopted in this thesis' Furthermore, it must of necessity
conform to an objectives model of rational curriculum planning, described by
Elliott as:
"..guided by quite clear and specific statements of intended learning outcomes,
defined in terms of measurable changes in student behaviour. " (1991, p.135)
According to such a model, drama's effectiveness will be determined by measurable
and objective performance indicators, even when operating within the most elusive
areas of learning. However, in his critique of this model of curriculum design,
Stenhouse saw its uses as situated within the areas of skills and information and
not within those of knowledge and understanding. He proposed that there are, in
fact, four educational processes which include not only training and instruction
but also initiation and induction. S While initiation is concerned with securing
commitment and conformity to certain social norms and values, often embodied in
the ethos of the school, induction is the most elusive and, in many ways, the most
crucial process, for it is concerned with giving access to real knowledge, defined
by Stenhouse as "a structure to sustain creative thought and provide frameworks
for judgment." He goes on to add:
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"Education as jnduction to knowledge is successful to the extent that it makes the
behavioural outcomes of the students unpredictable." (op. cit, p.85, author's
emphasis)
Stenhouse's distinctions are broadly similar to those proposed by Eisner (1986),
who distinguished between instructional and expressive objectives, the former
referring to skills and content, the latter to questions in need of exploration and
issues to be engaged with. Expressive objectives, by their nature, cannot be
specified in advance. Both Somers and Edmiston, in searching to measure
predictable outcomes, tacitly accept a curriculum based upon instructional
objectives, with the consequence that drama is presented as a means of training
and initiating children into certain moral attitudes. My own research, I would
argue, focuses on a use of drama with expressive objectives, for the purposes of
induction into moral knowledge, hence aspiring to Stenhouse's alternative to the
objectives curriculum model, namely the process model. This recognizes that:
"..the key procedures, concepts and criteria in any subject - cause, form,
experiment, tragedy - are, and are important precisely because they are,
problematic within the subject. They are thefocus of speculation, not the object
of mastery," (1975, p.85)
I would argue that the thick concepts through which we grasp and understand the
virtues which constitute ethical behaviour, and the moral dilemmas which
inevitably permeate social life, form the substance of moral knowledge in a process
curriculum model. Here, teachers will not set out to measure whether attitudes
have been changed or to gauge whether children have been turned into morally
better people in a simple cause and effect continuum. Rather will they attempt to
induct them into an understanding of the moral life; to use Stenhouse's words
again, they will seek to provide them with frameworks for judgment and structures
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to sustain creative thought. My research focus sets out to illuminate how drama
engages children in significant moral processes of thought, feeling and
representation; for even if Somers is right in his conclusions, his research does little
to elucidate what the processes are which engage children in order to bring about
the statistically recorded changes noted in the lessons. Technical rational or
positivist research procedures are unsuitable for evaluating or researching into
such areas which, as Stenhouse points out, are problematic by definition and
whose outcomes are necessarilyunpredictable; and yet it is precisely in these areas
where practical deliberation is most needed, for they are what make education a
social practice rather than a technical process.
This view of education as a social practice is central to Schon's concept of
reflective practitioner research. Schon sees everyday, professional practice as
characterised by "messy, confusing problems which defy technical solution."
(1984, p.3) - the paradox being that within this swamp, as he calls it, lie the
problems of greatest human concern. These "indeterminate zones of practice"
escape the canons of technical rationality because they are characterised by
"uncertainty, uniqueness and value conflict. " (ibid, p. 6). Good practice in such a
field has at its heart "a core of artistry":
''Artistry is an exercise of intelligence, a kind of knowing ... It is not inherently
mysterious; it is rigorous in its own terms; and we can learn a great deal about it
by carefully studying the performance of unusually competent performers. " (ibid,
p.l3)
Schon's vision of practice as an art has a parallel in Eisner's model of educational .
connoisseurship. Eisner sees educational practice as an "inordinately
complicated affair, filled with contingencies that are extremely difficult to predict,
let alone control." He goes on:
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"Connoisseurship in education, as in other areas, is that art of perception that
makes the appreciation of such complexity possible. " (1985, p.1 04)
Both Eisner and Schon shift the emphasis in researching educational practice away
from the measurement of quantifiable outcomes into a more detailed, qualitative
appreciation of the practitioner's art. And Schon is very clear that the audience
for such work is ideally other practitioners, who can learn from the practice of
fellow professionals through becoming part of a discourse community.
Such a concept of educational practice is congruent with the view of
learning presented in the earlier chapters of this thesis, inasmuch as it is consistent
with MacIntyre's interpretation of the Aristotelian tradition and sees a central role
for storytelling in the development and dissemination of professional knowledge.
According to Aristotle, there are two forms of rationality, techne andphronesis.
"Technical rationality is the form of reasoning appropriate to making products;
practical deliberation or phronesis is the form of reasoning appropriate to doing
something well. " (Elliott, 1991, p.138)
Social practices are made up of skills but are always more than an aggregate of
those skills as they need to have regard to ends and values which define those
practices and develop phronesis, which Carr translates as "practical wisdom"
(1987, p.171). The virtues are definable as goods internal to particular practices
and are distinguishable from external goods - such as wealth or good health - as
they benefit communities of practitioners rather than individuals. There is a
danger when education and educational research are understood in technical terms
only, in that those ethical issues or underlying values, central to the concerns of a
practice, become discounted or ignored. As Carr expresses it:
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"Withoutpractical wisdom, deliberation degenerates into an intellectual exercise,
and 'goodpractice' becomes indistinguishable from instrumental cleverness. The
man who lacks phronesis may be technically accountable but he can never be
morally answerable. " (1987, p.172)
The fact that, as teachers, we are morally answerable for what we do implies that
we are liable to be called to account, which means we should be prepared to give
an account of the actions we have taken. Such accounts as I refer to here are
those we render to our fellow practitioners who are best placed to critically
evaluate them. They are, first and foremost stories and they are profoundly ethical
in their concerns."
The case for case study
I have argued that, in the absence of grand theory, stories afford us our
best hold on the moral life, charting as they do the vicissitudes of human intentions
and actions. contextualised in culturally and socially specific situations. The same
holds true of educational practice, for reasons which are largely similar and this has
been evidenced by the recent growth of interest in ethnographic research and case
study throughout the human sciences. At the cutting edge has been the work of
Clifford Geertz within the field of anthropology. He argues that we take
anthropologists seriously not because of the facts they produce but when they
manage to convince us "of having, in one way or another, truly 'been there'"
(1988, p.4) Citing Foucault's What is an Author? he points out that the writings
of an ethnographer or anthropologist have more in common with literary than
scientific discourse, with the author-function described by Foucault. (ibid, p.7) In
an earlier work, he uses the phrase "thick description" to characterise the
hermeneutic art, which aims to describe and explain the meaning and significance
of actions and behaviour as they occur "in a cultural network saturated with
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meanings." (Eisner, op. cit, p.112) Recognizing as he does the importance of
writing well, ''where giving reasons for people's actions is the same thing as
describing them more fully and more vividly" (Inglis, 1993, p.164), Geertz's own
work provides a model for the literary, narrative case study whose purpose is to
construct an accurate, convincing picture of social reality.
Case studies have traditionally been in use in such disciplines as
anthropology, sociology or organizational behaviour and only more recently within
the field of education. Adelman et al. (1976) define case study as:
"an umbrella term for a family of research methods having in common the
decision tofocus an inquiry around an instance of action. " (p.140)
Kenny and Grotelueschen (1984) see them typically as:
"intensive investigations of single cases which serve both to identify and describe
basic phenomena, as well as provide the basis for subsequent theory
development." (p.37)
These points are important. Case studies are stories - contextualised, single
instances - but they are focused and rigorous and are intended to contribute
toward theory. Importantly, they generate theory that is grounded in practice' but
the research methodologies they employ and the shape the research can take are
not rigidly defined. Like the cases they inquire into, case studies themselves, in
their design and in their conclusions, are problematic. Truth, with a capital T, or
measurable certainty, are not their objectives but illumination and a broadening of
understanding most certainly are. In the words of Eisner:
"Their generalizing qualities are not so much located in Truth as in their ability
to refine perception and to deepen conversation." (1991, p,205)
135
Such is the aim of this research, however problematic and value-laden its area of
investigation and the methodology through which the inquiry was conducted might
have been. It is to an analysis of this methodology that I now tum.
METHODQWGY
The fieldwork was conducted with three over-riding, practical concerns.
Firstly, it embraced the principle of openness. InCarroll's words, this means:
"there is no restriction that can ... direct the research into predetermined goals or
paths of action" (1996, p.78)
Although I had a clear overall research focus, I was not setting out to prove but to
explore and I never knew what the exact focus of each case study would be until
the data was being analysed. As Levi-Strauss wrote:
"Exploration is not so much a matter of covering ground as of digging beneath
the surface." (cited in Geertz, 1988, p.43)
Secondly, I wished to work as far as possible under the same constraints of
curriculum, time and space as faced the classteachers with whom I was working in
their everyday, professional lives. This I saw as important if the work is ever to
speak directly to those primary teachers whom I hope will eventually benefit from
the research findings. It would also act as a sober reminder to myself of the
realities of classroom life faced by the students whom I teach, a point which leads
on to my third over-riding concern. I needed to ensure that the research
supplemented and enriched my own, everyday professional practice and did not
become too much of an additional burden to it. This was meant to aid the
crystallisation of my own understanding of the fieldwork as much as it was
intended as a necessary coping strategy.
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There were five stages to the fieldwork, namely
• selecting the tales and the focus for the dramas
• selecting the schools and the classes with whom I would work'
• teaching the lessons and gathering the data
• analysing the data
• presenting the findings
The case studies were not construed as an action research cycle; in other
words, the findings of one were not intended to influence the design of another.
Consequently, they sometimes overlapped and, although they each went through
the five listed stages in ways which were broadly similar, they progressed at
different rates and were open and responsive to different influences at each stage,
in particular from my reading or my professional conversations with colleagues.
Selecting the tales and the focus for the dramas.
My initial thought was to concentrate on one source, either tales from the
Hindu or the British tradition, but I eventually dismissed this as an artificial
constraint, untypical of how I would act as a classteacher and one which would
quite probably limit the problems I could explore through drama. In the end, I
decided to work with five tales from a variety of cultural sources, each of which
appealed to me as a teacher while suggesting a different moral focus for children of
different age ranges. I have drawn from the entire experience of this work but
have used the sequence of lessons with just three of the tales to analyse in
considerable detail and provide the basis for the ensuing case studies.
Jack and the Beanstalk (Years 1 and 2) This was the focus of a half-term topic
chosen by a teacher with whom I had worked before. I was drawn by the morally
ambiguous figure of Jack, the evident didacticism in some of its many versions and
the potential to explore concepts such as promise-keeping, stealing, obedience,
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loyalty and bullying. In the end, it was the comic elements of the drama which
most fascinated me and upon which I decided to concentrate my analysis.
The Brahmin, the Thief and the Ogre (Years 3 and 4) A Hindu tale, originally
from the Panchatantra but, in the version I used, adapted for children to take on a
form similar to the Victorian fairy tale. This was another story with a strident,
moralistic tone and it offered potential to explore the role of violence in such tales.
The drama sessions I evaluated as reasonably successful but in no way outstanding
and I chose to analyse them for this very reason.
The Star Maiden (Year 5) Originally a tale from the Ojibway people of North
America, and related by Barbara Juster Esbensen. I was attracted by the poetry,
the symbolism and the moral force of its environmental message. However, Ifelt
uneasy about its representation of the native American as "Noble Savage" and I
was interested in how drama might both deepen children's responses to the story
and offer a different representation of native American people. The drama left me
with more ambivalent feelings than any of the others, feelings which I hoped the
analysis would clarify.
Selecting schools and classes
I decided to work with children from a variety of local primary schools
who had little or no experience in educational drama. This, I hoped, would help
inform my understanding of the experiences faced by most of the students whom I
teach and most of the teachers to whom I provide In Service courses. It was my
hunch, too, based upon professional experience, that a skilful use of teacher in role
and a careful selection of dramatic conventions would enable young children,
inexperienced in drama, to explore moral issues successfully within the art form.
Like Colby (1982), I found questionable the conclusion reached by Johnson in his
research, that: "the higher the drama skill level a participant has, the more he/she
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will develop through participation in [creative drama]" (p.2l) As Colby
commented in response:
"if .. skills are perceived as necessary pre-requisites for drama, then students are
in danger of becoming 'exercised away' from meaningful engagement in drama.
Children learn to be better swimmers in the water, not by practising their strokes
on dry Iand." (op. cit, p.22)
I initially intended to work through each story with two contrasting classes of
children and to use both as sources for evidence. However, although this worked
well for the story of the Brahmin, with the other tales it quickly became clear that I
had sufficient material for analysis after work with just one class. Of the four
classes whose work is analysed in the three case studies, two were from village
schools and two from schools in a large, industrialised city. All were state-funded
but two had religious affiliations, one being Church of England and one Roman
Catholic. The social background of the children is indicated in each case by the
number in each class who were entitled to free school meals. One of the classes
whose work is not analysed here was made up of fifty percent Moslem and Hindu
children. In the event, race and multiculturalism did not become ethnographic
focal points for the three studies here, but the socio-cultural and religious contexts
of each school did inform the analyses.
Teaching the lessons and gathering evidence
Given that I wished to work under the same conditions as classteachers,
and that I had to fit in with their own, densely-packed time-tables, no session was
ever much longer than an hour in length; hall time was limited and the space was
prone to be used by children or staff as a corridor; individual children were
occasionally extracted or arrived late from special support or individual tuition;
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children who were absent one week were present the next or vice-versa; and work
in the classroom was often cramped and limited by restricted space. The
important point, for me, however, was that the work reflected the social reality of
the everyday primary school classroom for teachers coping with the pressures of
the National Curriculum.
Gathering evidence was the most problematic of all areas of the fieldwork
but the uncertainty was a necessary feature of a project where the focus of each
study would be emergent rather than pre-determined. Given that the attention
would, however, always be on the lessons themselves, upon what the teacher and
the children did within them, I was able to limit what I gathered to evidence which
would capture this experience and make it intelligible and susceptible to
subsequent analysis and argument. The data at the point at which it was gathered
can be roughly categorised as either raw or interpretive; and as either immediate
or interim. By raw data I mean evidence with no specific interpretive focus at the
time it was collected, whereas interpretive data was, from the outset, concerned
with evaluative judgments. Immediate data is that which was gathered at the time
the lessons were prepared and taught, whilst interim data was gathered over a
period of time between the teaching and the final written analysis. The raw data
can therefore be listed as follows:
1. The texts of the stories used directly to inform the lessons and the historical
sources of these texts.
2. Lesson plans
3. Video and audio recordings of the lessons taught. These were the most
crucial records for subsequent analysis but only for the final case study was I
able to secure the help of a university technician. On the other occasions the
lessons were recorded by the classteachers and on audio tape as back-up. All
children were used to video cameras, either at home or in the classroom, and
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very quickly began to ignore its presence. It successfully captured whole class
work in role; whole class discussions out of role; both teacher's and children's
facial expressions, movements and use of gesture; and group work presented
to the class. It did not capture the substance of children's talk when they
worked simultaneously in small groups.
4. Children's writing or drawing from the sessions I took or follow up sessions
led by the teacher. It is common in this kind of research for children to be
requested to keep journals or to record their written responses at the end of a
Iesson.? I have discussed some of the limitations of such evidence in the
previous chapter and saw it as particularly problematic in my case for a number
of additional reasons. None of the children were used to journal-keeping;
some were very inexperienced, poor or very young writers; and the pressures
on the drama time I had with each class were acute. I decided, again, to have
them write in ways they were used to and in ways I would use, as a
classteacher, to develop the drama ideas in separate sessions - through
straightforward written questions, story writing, simple poetry, and drawing.
These were to prove to be of limited value when I eventually found the focus
for each case study and were most useful as sources of evidence in ways I
would never have predicted, particularly in the case of The Star Maiden. In
the end, the best sources of information about individual children's reflections
and responses were the whole class discussions recorded on video and audio
tape.
5. Relevant school documentation. None of the schools had a policy statement
on drama, other than some very general statements subsumed within English
documents, and the particular area of moral education was always documented
within RE. I consulted each school's general statements of aims with regard
to children's moral and behavioural development but I was concerned about the
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ethics of seeking permission to see individual children's records and was unsure
whether this would be granted or would indeed be necessary. I decided to
refrain from requesting such access unless an individual child unexpectedly
became a particular focus of interest in ways which stretched beyond my ability
to trust the information teachers were providing me with. In the event, this
did not happen.
Most of the above evidence was gathered immediately, with the significant
exception being the historical sources of the tale of The Star Maiden. The
realisation that this source was closer in tone and imagery to Esbensen's retelling
than I had thought it would be subsequently helped determine the focus for the
analysis of the drama.
The interpretive doJa consisted of
1. Teachers' comments and responses. Most of these were immediate to the
time of teaching and were gathered informally and recorded by myself in note
form. I initially floated the idea to one or two teachers of their keeping a
written journal of responses but this was given a negative reception, mainlydue
to perceived demands upon teacher time, so I dropped the idea. In two cases,
I contacted teachers for interim comments on specific issues. All teachers
were asked to respond to initialwritten analyses of the drama sessions, though
only one responded in written form.
2. Lesson evaluations. These were my immediate responses to each session,
recorded soon after it was taught.
3. Journal. This was on-going and loosely structured, in a loose leaf folder. It
was a record of ideas, insights, doubts, responses to things I had read as they
might impinge upon my understanding of the drama lessons, and to
conversations with my supervisor, colleagues and students. It was kept in
note form throughout all five stages of the research process.
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Analysing the data.
I have indicated that the principal problem associated with reflective
practitioner research is concerned with ensuring sufficient critical distance between
oneself and one's practice in order to analyse it fairly and with integrity. The
process whereby a variety of perspectives are solicited to inform the research
analysis is known as triangulation. Recently, however, Taylor has put forward
the alternative concept of crystaUization. This, he argues:
"rejectspositivist and neo-positivist ideas of truth, validity and falsification, and
confirms the importance of struggle, ambiguity and contradiction, all noted
features of the reflective practitioner'sjoumey." (1996, p.44)
The metaphor of crystallization, he argues "beautifully captures how our
perspectives are shaped by our 'angle ofrepose'" (ibid, p.44) and it is the concept
which most accurately explains how I achieved critical distance from my teaching.
One of the chief aids to this process of crystallization was time. Time distanced
me from the immediacies of the experience and provided a gap wherein different
experiences, thoughts, readings and conversations were given the conceptual space
to inform my critical responses before beginning the formal analysis. In addition
to the data gathered and listed above, each analysis was therefore informed by
further sources of interim evidence, all noted in journal form. These were:
• a historical and critical literary analysis of the tale which had formed the pre-
text to the drama;
• use of the drama structures developed during the sessions, and/or videoed
extracts from the sessions themselves, as material for work with students and
teachers. This provided the opportunity for further reflection upon the
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material and allowed my own perceptions to be informed by those of interested
practitioners.
• the sharing of specific perceptions, ideas, doubts and insights with colleagues
and/or my supervisor for discussion or feedback
The visual and oral records provided by the videoed material were then
transcribed in detail and studied for aspects which could illuminate what had by
this time emerged as the points of particular interest for each case study. They
were written in the form of performance records, with dramatic dialogue recorded
in scripted form, together with detailed notes of relevant movements, gestures,
facial expression and tone of voice. The transcriptions were kept in a loose leaf
folder and made on one side only of A4 paper, with the adjacent blank sheet being
used for notes and commentary.'? This detailed record, when analysed, was to
show, in Geertz's words, how "the very small signals can carry very big
messages." (1988, p.59). I used coloured pens to denote different themes and
used the skills of close textual analysis to make sense of the transcriptions,
regarding them as artistic as well as historical documents. In this way the process
of writing itself became a crucial part of the analytical process, a struggle to find a
suitable form and an authentic voice, to do justice to what Geertz has described as
the purpose of ethnographic texts.
''Ethnographers need to convince us .. not merely that they themselves have truly
'been there' but ... that had we been there we should have seen what they saw, felt
what theyfelt, concluded what they concluded" (1988,p.16)
The initial draft of each case study was submitted to a variety of interested parties;
to colleagues, supervisor and to the classteachers themselves. Their comments
and critical feedback informed the subsequent redrafts and helped deepen the
144
process of crystallization, which has resulted in the completed case studies that
follow.
Presenting the findings
Each of the following case studies consists of:
• a summary of the tale in the version I used for the drama and an analysis of the
moral values embedded within this text and in those historical sources which
have influenced it;
• an explanation of the focus of the case study;
• a narrative summary of the lessons with relevant contextual details about the
school, the children, the conditions under which the sessions were taught and
the reasons behind the choice of focus for the drama;
• detailed analyses of selected parts of the lessons, intended to illuminate the
particular focus of each case study;
• appendices detailing: quantifiable information concerning each lesson and its
structure (date, length and location of lesson, number of children present,
organizational strategies, specific uses of dramatic conventions; context of
extracts selected for quotation and analysis); additional written or pictorial
material relevant to the particular case study.
In addition, the video recordings have been edited to provide an audio-visual
record of the extracts referred to in the case studies as supportive evidence.
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NOTES
1. The representation of Simon is evidently problematic in such a drama and was sensitively
managed by the use of photographic material, by teacher in role as one of Simon's parents
and by the use of an empty chair (op. cit, p.1I0)
2. Taylor provides a brief description of the aims and values of positivism and neo-positivism
and provides a detailed refutation of its claims, particularly within the Arts. See pp 4 - 16.
For a further, more general account of postivism see Carr and Kemmis, 1986, pp 61 - 70
3. The attempts to universalise the evidence to make it count as proof involved the participation
of 74 teachers, selected by LEAs and advisors as good, using the material which a group of
five teachers had developed and saw as their best. Obviously issues of value were at the
heart of the project from its commencement and Somers lists a series thirteen bullet points
where he detects need for further research, many of which are concerned with further
objectifying the findings, thus admitting at the completion of the project that problems of
subjective value still remain. (op. cit, p.117 - 118)
4. Significantly, Somers refers to the developmental models ofPiaget, Kohlberg and Courtney
on the first page of his report (op. cit, p.l08).
5. See Stenhouse, 1975, Ch. 6, pp 70 - 83; and p. 97 for his comments on the comparative
suitabilities of the objectives and process models of curriculum design
6. For a detailed analysis of professional accountability and the nature of accounts, see
Langford, 1985, Chapter 4
7. See Glaser, B.G and Strauss, A.L. (1967) for a full analysis of the concept of grounded
theory.
8. For the purposes of this research, I normally began by finding a particular story I wished to
work with, rather than attempting to find a story to suit a particular group of children.
9. For examples, see Somers (op cit); Edmiston (1995)
10. The transcriptions do not record every interruption and every individual word spoken. They
follow the development of the dialogue and record all salient contributions.
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CHAPTER VIII
CASE STUDY I
THE BRAHMIN, THE THIEF AND
THE OGRE:
DRAMA AS PEDAGOGY FOR
MORAL EDUCATION
The story: uThe Brahmin, the Thief and the Ogren
This story tells of a Brahmin who, though poor, always remained good,
honest and humble and who regularly prayed to the Gods. Because of this, the
gods decide to reward him and a kindly person makes him the gift of two calves
which he takes great care of. However, a thief sees the calves and decides to
steal them. That night, on his journey to the Brahmin's cottage, he is accosted
by an Ogre who, on learning of the thief's purpose, decides to accompany him
in order to eat the Brahmin. Once in the cottage, however, they begin to argue
over whether the thief should steal the calves first or the ogre eat the Brahmin
first. Their arguments awaken the Brahmin who prays to the Gods and they
promptly respond by getting rid of the Ogre; whereupon the Brahmin reaches
for a stick and puts the thief to flight by clubbing him over the head.
I found this English language version of the story in a volume entitled
More stories from Panchatantra (1981). The Panchatantra is an ancient text,
dating from between lOOBC and 500AD and its frame story explains the
purpose of the tales it contains. These are purported to be the stories through
which a wise old Brahmin taught three stupid young princes the practical
wisdom they would need to be successful rulers of the kingdoms they were due
to inherit. As such, their lessons are about understanding and manipulating
people and circumstances pragmatically rather than according to any ethical
code. In this way, the tales are 'moral' only in the same sense as Aesop's
Fables.
The Hemkunt Press is not stocked in English bookshops but is widely
circulated in India, geared toward a reading audience of young children. It is a
Sikh owned institution, but it packages as children's literature the stories from
the entire variety of India's cultural and religious backgrounds.' Although a
fable in its original form, the re-telling of this particular story, by Vernon
Thomas, reads like the sort of tale favoured by those nineteenth century writers
who used fairy stories for morally didactic purposes.' It is interesting,
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therefore, to compare this version with a translation of the original) Here, the
Brahmin does not strike the thief but frightens .him away by brandishing his
club. The original also states' clearly the moral of the tale: 'Even enemies may
be useful when they fall out with each other. · This particular moral - a
practical lesson for the Machiavellian prince - is not printed in the Hemkunt
version and is, in fact, totally obscured by a number of didactic lessons implicit
within the narrative.
In both versions, the protagonists remain archetypal, by which I mean
that they conform to what Northrop Frye calls "associative clusters" able to
convey:
"a large number of specific learned associations which are communicable
because a large number of people in a given culture happen to be familiar with
them. "4
Although a child in an ethnically white area of Britain may be unfamiliar with
the term "Brahmin", this term becomes sufficiently communicable for an
understanding of the tale when he is explained as a "holy man". The Brahmin
and the Thief, therefore, convey Good and Evil on the human plane whilst the
Gods and the Ogre do so on a supernatural plane. But whereas, in the initial
tale, this symmetry was merely functional, in the children's version it is
moralistic. The original tale is a stark, short piece of storytelling, true to the
oral tradition, with no literary embellishements. The gift of the calves, for
example, is narrated without comment. It is not a moral reward but simply
reflects the reality of Hindu society, where such gifts to a Brahmin are common
and part of the social fabric of the caste system. The original listener to the
tale would have recognised this as such, without any need for further comment.
The important narrative point is factual, not moral, that the Brahmin possessed
the cows, not that he deserved to have them. In the child's version, however,
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the Brahmin's good fortune is portrayed as a reward for his virtue, described as
follows:
"Once upon a time there lived a Brahmin who was so poor that he went about
in rags, and had hardly anything to eat. But though he faced so much hardship,
the Brahmin was good and honest. Daily he would pray. and accept without
grumbling whatever fate had in store for him. "
Goodness is, therefore, portrayed in terms of meekness, passivity, honesty and
religious piety - model behaviour for a child reared on Victorian values, in fact,
a model satirised, as we saw, in Saki's The Story Teller and one whose residue
still persists in many primary classrooms today, in both Britain and India. That
the child should identify with this model of goodness is re-inforced by the
description of the Brahmin's attitude to the calves he is given:
"He began to take great care of the calves. Daily he saw to it that they had
enough grass to eat and water to drink. "
He is kind to animals and they are described as his pets. Again, this is an
interesting deviation from the original, where the calves are already grown and
fattened and no mention is made of the Brahmin's care for them. The reality
of life in Hindu society is that these calves are religiously symbolic of purity
and prosperity but also economically very useful, likely to provide the Brahmin
with milk, if female, or the force to pull his plough, if male. However, most
of the Indian children who read the Hemkunt Press are urban and middle-class
and many are not Hindu; and this revised portrayal of the calves creates an
image of cuddly baby animals, accessible to any child reared in a culture where
the liberal western tradition of childhood is dominant.'
The Brahmin's violence at the end of the story provides an ethical jolt in
the narrative. When he clubs the thief, it is not to protect the calves from
harm, but his property from theft. The implied moral messages at this point
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seem to be that violence is justifiable when defending one's property and that
thieves will be punished for their crimes. As with those Victorian fairy tales
criticised by Tatar, the level' of violence re-enforces the lesson; just as Mr.
Miacca will chop your leg off if you disobey your parents, you will be beaten
with a stick if you steal. Nevertheless, the Brahmin's use of violence sits
uneasily alongside the model of passive goodness that he previously appeared to
embody.
Here we have an example, therefore, of how, with the literary retelling
of fairy stories, we get different and often contradictory values layered into their
fabric creating moral anomalies which are difficult to resolve. Indeed, the
issues connected with the use of violence raised unintentionally by the story are
very relevant for a child in contemporary British society:
• Are children influenced by the exposure to violence in fiction? (witness the
furore over violent videos such as Child's Play 3 which accompanied two
murder cases in 1993)6
• Is violence justifiable when defending one's property and if so, what level of
violence?
• Can one be good and violent?
I have proposed that process drama provides a methodology which allows for
the communal investigation and interrogation of the values within such tales.
The literary form is as capable as the dramatic form for creating new moral
meanings in stories, of course; and, as we saw in Chapter VI, process drama
can become as didactic and monological as a literary text. In the sessions
described below, my intention was to create a drama which dialogized Thomas'
tale, seeking to illuminate how the children intepreted its moral agenda and
then, through drama, to explore this agenda through problematising it.
*****
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I wish to now move on to analyse aspects of the sessions I taught around this
story. I refer to the different classes as Sophie's class, with whom I spent three
sessions, each one hour in length, and Martin's class with whom I spent two
fifty-minute sessions. With both classes, there was a week in between each
lesson. Sophie's class was a group of eight and nine year-old children from a
village Church of England school in Warwickshire. They were described by
their teacher as a "nice class" with a "fairly typical social mix and spread of
academic abilities." Martin's class, aged between seven and nine, were from a
school situated in the centre of a socially deprived housing estate on the
outskirts of a large city. Six of the children were statemented for particular
learning and behavioural difficulties but, according to the classteacher, roughly
half the class were in need of additional, learning support. I present the lessons
below as narrative summaries, emphasising the story which the drama
developed. A breakdown of the structure of the lessons and the conventions
used is provided in Appendix 2.
The iessoDS in summary
Lesson 1
This was essentially the same for both classes. I informed the children that the
tale I was going to tell was from India and explained that Hinduism was one of
the religions in India and that a Brahmin was a Hindu priest or Holy man.
Other cultural or religious aspects which needed explanation I incorporated into
the narrative of the tale, which I related orally and dramatically; that is, I took
on the characteristics of all the characters and allowed them to speak directly
when possible. After this, I explained the source of the tale via the frame story
of the Panchatantra and asked the children to help me decide what the moral of
the story might be, presenting them with a number of possibilities. After
collecting their ideas, I then asked them to suggest examples of good ethical-
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conduct and bad ethical conduct in the story, 7 and noted these down. With
both classes, children volunteered that the Brahmin's hitting the Thief over the
head was an example of bad ethics. Picking up on this idea, I asked if they
thought this story was a good one for children of their age or younger and
whether they thought the ending ought to be changed? All thought the ending
should, indeed, be changed. I put Sophie's class in groups to work out
possible different endings for the tale, suitable for children of their age, which
they presented in dramatic form. With Martin's class, I did the same exercise
via forum theatre, in which I played the Brahmin and different children took on
the role of the Thief. I spoke and acted only as the children suggested. .
In subsequent sessions with both classes, we invented, through drama, a new
story as a sequel to the first, leaving the violent ending intact.
Lesson 2 (Sophie's Class)
I cast the children initially as local villagers and narrated a new section of the
story, entering in role as a poor neighbour, recently moved into the village, the
mother of three children. I told them how I was worried about my husband
who had returned home late last night with his head bleeding and muttering
something about going back to sort things out with a certain Brahmin. Under
questioning, it emerged that my husband had been a thief, stealing food, gifts
for me and toys for the children. He had been caught, however, and had
subsequently made a promise to me to stop thieving. We had moved to this
village to try to start a new life where he would not be known as a thief. The
children soon told me that they, as villagers, knew what had happened and
agreed to help me prevent my husband from doing anything wrong, also
promising to ensure that he wouldn't come to any further harm. They set off
through the woods and hid near the Brahmin's cottage. I approached as the
Thief. They surrounded me and led me in to confess to the Brahmin. Children
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now took on the collective role of the Brahmin, whereupon I informed him that
I bad not come to steal his calves but to demand one from him; as he was
supposed to be a good man, and in the best interests of my wife and children,
he ought to comply with this request. A discussion ensued as the children tried
to make sense of this unexpected tum and no resolution was achieved. 1
stopped the drama with the question: "I wonder what Lord Vishnu is thinking?"
and recast the children as the gods, whereupon they discussed what they felt
ought to happen. The lesson ended before this was concluded
Lesson 3
After recapping the last session, the children returned to their roles as gods and
questioned me in role as the Thief as to my motives in returning and demanding
that the Brahmin give me a calf. They eventually resolved that the quarrel
must be a matter for the Brahmin and the thief to decide amongst themselves,
that divine intervention was inappropriate. I then cast half of the class in
collective role as the Thief, the other half as the Brahmin and they argued the
matter further. In small groups, the children then decided upon and acted out
an appropriate ending to this new story.
Lesson 2 (Martia's class)
The two drama sessions with Sophie's class were only partially
successful, inasmuch as there was too much role changing which, in turn, added
very little to the dramatic tension. Tbere was, too, an over-emphasis on talk
and the changes of role did not achieve the variety of perspective Ihad intended
and certainly did not deepen the children's involvement. Martin's class was
more volatile and difficult to control. For these reasons I simplified the drama
and kept the children in role as villagers throughout. This increased the
drama's fluidity and created a simpler but more coherent structure. When the
children apprehended the Thief (teacher-in-role), they sat him down and
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interrogated him. They began to sympathise with his case and went to the
Brahmin (again, teacher in role) to try and convince him that he ought to give
the Thief one of the calves. AS with Sophie's class, these strategies were used
to explore the dilemma, not resolve it and, in small groups, the children ended
the session by acting out what they saw as an appropriate ending for the story.
*****
Colby (1982) has analysed in some detail an extract from a justifiably
famous videoed drama session led by Tom Stabler, Elijah, on the video Three
Looms Waiting. It is a remarkable piece of improvised drama, but when
Colby uses it to show how the moral reasoning of a group of ten year-olds in
role, within the space of a few minutes, shows evidence of moving from Stage 3
to Stage 5 of Kohlberg's Stages of Moral Development, we may well regard his
conclusions with some scepticism.' Stage 5 moral reasoning is in the post-
conventional level and is often not achieved in mature adults, according to
Kohlberg. In the subsequent analysis, I make no similar claims. This is not
simply because this particular drama was inferior but also because I see
Kohlberg's schema as open to question, for reasons discussed in Chapter I, and
find the language of the virtues as expressed through social roles more in tune
-with the -aamre of dramatic narrative than the language of universal moral
precepts. Within the context of my own research, the claims I make are far
less ambitious than those made by Colby. Nevertheless, I think that, even
within ordinary lessons such as these, which do not produce remarkable results,
there is enough evidence to explore how children can and do engage with moral
thinking and express moral meanings through the art form of process drama.
The children '5 perceptions of the values in the story
I presented a list of seven statements and asked the children each to
choose as many as three of them as the most likely morals to the story. The
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reasons for presenting options which I had previously thought out myself were
twofold: to avoid the simple do's and don'ts I would have expected from
children so young; and to ensure that the moral of the original story was
unobtrusively among those open to choice.' Forty-three children were involved
in all and I present their opinions below:«
If you steal, you will be punished
If you pray, God will look after you
If you are kind, you will be rewarded
Even your enemies can help you if they quarrel
with one another
20
35
38
4
Be careful of the friends you choose, as they
might get you into trouble 22
Thieves are bad people 24
No matter how poor you are, you must not steal 38
These responses appear to support the interpretation of the values implicit to the
story which I offered earlier. It is also quite clear that the children picked up
these values, rather than the intended moral of the original tale and that they
were used to stories carrying didactic messages. This exercise helped
determine the focus of subsequent sessions, which took the last statement on the
list as its starting point.. _ -
The children suggested the following as examples of good and bad
ethical action. Unlike the previous responses, these suggestions were entirely
their own:
Good Ethics:
The farmer gave the Brahmin the calves (both classes)
The Brahmin prayed to Vishnu
The Brahmin was always helpful and good
The Brahmin looked after the calves (both classes)
Vishnu influenced the farmer to be generous (both classes)
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Bad Ethics
The ogre wanted to eat the Brahmin (both classes)
The thief tried to steal the calves
The Ogre and the thief quarrelled
The Brahmin hit the thief on the head (both classes)
Two teamed up against one (both classes)
The children, then, although not capable of presenting a satisfactory moral for
the story in their own words, were nonetheless capable of recognising a wide
variety of good and bad ethical behaviour within the context of the story.
Perhaps they would not have been able to define them as such, but they had no
trouble in articulating manifestations of generosity; religious piety; helpfulness;
care for living things; the benevolent exercise of authority; selfishness;
quarrelsomeness; violence and bullying. These were the virtues and vices they
implicitly understood, examples of the thick concepts through which they
grasped and made sense of the moral universe and Williams recognizes that this
implicitness is, in part, characteristic of how these concepts influence action.
"The benevolent or kindhearted person does benevolent things, but does them
under other descriptions, such as 'she needs it,' 'it will cheer him up', 'it will
stop the pain'. The description of the virtue is not itself the description that
appears in the consideration. " (1985, p.10)
So, if the first of these exercises enabled the children to deconstruct the ethical
values embedded in the narrative, this latter exercise allowed them to begin to
reconstruct the ethics of the story in the light of the sense they made of the
characters' actions.
DRAMA PEDAGOGY AS PEDAGOGY FOR MORAL EDUCATION
At the time I taught these lessons, there had been much reporting on the
TV and in the Press on crime and violence, particularly committed by youths.
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Such waves of moral panic» sweep the media at regular intervals and the
reporting, in particular in the tabloids, tends to sensationalise the issues, turning
complex problems into simplistic headlines. Reporting on his research into the .
sources of children's information, Cullingford comments that "Items (of news)
remain part of an inventory of attitudes rather than the construction of clear
principles" (1992, p.28) He goes on to point out:
"The images experienced on television might not always be understood but they
nevertheless contain an impact that remains ... (ibid., p.30)
The choice of focus for the drama was, therefore, intended to provide a
platform for the exploration of a current moral debate through a situation which
acted as a metaphor for these issues. The drama was intended to work
dialogically against the story but I did not wish to replace one over-simplified
message with another. My aim was to create a more morally ambiguous
instance of stealing, to raise questions and not provide answers. By creating a
believable social background for the thief, I created a moral dilemma that I did
not have any answers to myself and no agenda as to how I wanted it to end.
My sympathies were split between two characters and this I felt was essential
for the drama to be both honest and effective.
In the analysis which follows, I have chosen to focus not on any
meanings which children might have expressed outside of the drama, but on
their work within it. My intention is not to present drama as a vehicle whose
efficacy we judge only in a child's responses outside the art form but to
illuminate how drama can enable children to make moral meanings in ways
which are distinctive to it. As drama is a multi-dimensional activity, I have
addressed this analysis according to six frames of reference which emerged as
the most apposite lenses through which to view this particular case study. I
believe they could be transitional toward a more general model but am not
presenting them as such here.
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1. Archetypes and the brotherhood code.
Archetypal characters within fairy tales have a strong narrative function
as they impact immediately upon children, providing clear and instant
recognition patterns. This contrasts with the gradual and complex way in
which the characters of the more literary novel are conveyed to the reader.
The figures in fairy tales share more in common with the stock characters of
popular fiction and also, importantly, with those of popular drama. This link
has been emphasised by O'Neill who writes:
"Valuablepre-texts for process drama occur in folktales, fairytales, myths and
historical incidents ... Myth and archetype never merely reside in remote and
seemingly irrelevant tales of long ago. Theirpowerful echoes still wait to wake
us through the pre-texts we employ. These archetypal and essentially dramatic
threads in the work will connect it with a wider theatre heritage and the literary,
mythic and dramatic legacy of other cultures as well as with the soap operas
and popular movies, where archetypes clearly persist. " (1995, p.43)
The archetypal characters in the original story carried morally simplistic
meanings, serving to define the moral reference points of the tale; a holy man is
good, a thief and an ogre are bad. Such simplicity is similar to the formulaic
nature of the characters in B movies and Turner, in analysing the
appropriateness of Propp's morphology of the folktale to popular films such as
Star Wars, draws comparisons similar in implication to the points made by 0'
Neill. He speculates that:
".. the modem feature film and the primitive fairy tale serve similar functions to
their respective audiences. " (1993. p. 71)
It is worth lingering for a while to consider the archetypal B movie character
and the moral impact he or she makes. Such figures are, of course, associated
with particular genres of film. In such films - the western, the thriller, or the
police drama, for example - the villains, heroines and heroes are as readily
IS8
identifiable as the ogres, witches and princesses of fairy tales but the immediacy
of their impact is due to the visual and aural signaling conveyed by their
physical presence- costume, posture, facial expression, tone of voice. In a
classic film noir, too, one such as The Maltese Falcon or The Big Sleep, our
recognition of the stock characters of the private eye and the femme fatale are
made similarly immediate through visual and aural means: her black dress, his
distinctive hat and suit; her lingering gaze and sensuality, his cynical wise-
cracking and hard-boiled exterior. However, with these images come moral
expectations equally immediate but at once more ambivalent. Both characters
will be flawed and will generate sexual heat which resonates with a more
general sense of moral danger. He will operate on the margins of the law
administering his own rough justice, will be surrounded by corruption but will
remain untainted by it. She will tempt him and, though his pride and decency
will prevail, it will not do so without emphasising his loneliness, a loneliness
which signifies the difficulty of retaining a moral position in a corrupt society.
Polanski's Chinatown sets up these ambivalent moral expectations only to
undermine and frustrate them. In many ways, Jake Giddis appears to be the
archetypal private eye in the mould of Philip Marlow. He wisecracks, is
single-minded in his search for truth, and his work brings him into conflict with
the local police, who are professionally and intellectually his inferiors. The
plot of the film appears to closely follow those typical of the genre. Giddis
becomes sexually involved with his client, a wealthy widow, who is biding a
dark secret which he manages to expose in the film's denouement. But the
comparisons are misleading for, although Giddis might look like Philip Marlow,
he is his moral inferior. The plot is set in motion through Giddis' predilection
for handling cases of adultery, which Marlow makes clear he will never touch.
Evelyn Mulray might have the appearance of a femme fatale but she is not hard
and scheming, but a vulnerable and courageous woman. Her secret is, indeed,_
a guilty one but the guilt is her father's, not her own. In the end, Giddis' pride
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does not morally save him, it leads to disaster and, though he proves to be Mrs
Mulray's nemesis, this marks the triumph of evil and error, not of justice and
truth, and there is no moral redemption in the final images of loneliness and
loss. In this film, the archetypes, and hence the genre, are transformed and
this disturbance leads to a deepening of their moral resonance.
Archetypal characters such as the private eye, like the genres which they
represent, are cuhurally learned, of course. The figure of the Brahmin was,
however, culturally distant for both these classes of children but, through
dramatic storytelling, I was able to endow him with the stock characteristics of
goodness and piety which they could immediately recognize. I knelt and
prayed, seriously and with humility, to thank Lord Vishnu for his generosity; I
smiled at the calves and mimed petting them. The Thief I portrayed in a
neutral light in the initial story. The fact that he was described as (and only as)
a thief, that he set out to steal and that he struck up a nefarious deal with an
ogre was sufficient to establish his archetypal characteristics which I later,
within the drama, wished to undermine. Children's comments within the
drama showed that these simple impressions of good versus bad, embodied
within the two oppositional characters, were very persistent. "You were going
to steal! Stealing is bad!" was the unsurprising and emphatic denunciation
made by one girl in role as the Brahmin during the second lesson with Sophie's
class. The following short section is also taken from this lesson. I was in role
as the Brahmin and the children had come to warn me that the Thief was
returning to my cottage:
BRAHMIN I'm not sure I need your help. I've got this big stick. That
frightened him away last time. Why can't I use this again?
VIU.3
Because you hit him on the head and his head was bleeding
He was only trying to steal because he was poor and he hasn't
got any food.
He doesn't have any money.
VIUl
VHL. 2
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BRAHMIN Well I was poor and I didn't have any food and I didn't steal
anything.
VHL. 2 Well you're good. ann 't you?
BRAHMIN WeB he should be good/
VlU. 4 That's because you've got Lord Vishnu and he hasn't.
The Brahmin is still seen as essentially good, despite his violent action which
the children had condemned; but the Thief, although his intentions were bad, is
no longer seen as a bad person. This is a simple but important point. The
drama of The Brahmin and the Thief had begun with two archetypal figures
representing good and bad but their simplistic moral meanings had been quickly
undermined through a combination of visual signaling (analysed in the next
section), and by a change in the frame through which the Thief was presented.
At the heart of the drama there remained a tension, however, between the moral
restrictiveness of the archetypes and their moral re-assessment, which the events
of the drama had set in motion. This was a process dramatically far less
sophisticated than in the film Chinatown, of course, but notably similar in its
intention and moral purpose and it can be illuminated by reference to Dorothy
Heathcote's theory of the brotherhood code.
If archetypal figures help children make connections between the
particular and the general, then, within process drama, the brotherhood code
helps children make similar connections but in a way which is morally
expansive and thus able to transform and deepen the archetype. Wagner has
described this essential feature of the brotherhood code as follows:
"The new situation on the outside might look far removed from the child's own
experience. Yet because the people in that situation are in the same
brotherhood as those who are familiar. the child can focus on the common
element long enough to identify." (Wagner. 1979. p.52)
So, for the purposes of this drama, the Brahmin was in the brotherhood of all-
those who are envied for their good fortune; who face personal danger through
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this envy: who use violence to defend their property; who are challenged to
examine their moral conscience. Although the children could not articulate this
understanding in such terms, their actions in, for example, coming to protect the
Brahmin, and their words in role, such as those quoted above, indicate that this
is how they came to view him and his situation. The Thief, on the other hand,
came to belong to the brotherhood of all those who resort to crime due, in large
measure, to social circumstances; who try to reform their moral actions but fail;
who suffer as a consequence of their misdeeds; who come to believe in the
social justice of wealth re-distribution. Through the brotherhood code,
culturally distant figures such as the Brahmin and the Thief came to carry
ambivalent and conflicting moral meanings in a conflict which was nonetheless
comprehensible to these young children. Furthermore, the expansive quality of
the brotherhood code helped prepare the way for a redefinition of the moral
sympathies evoked by the narrative and hence continued the redefinition of the
children's moral perspectives, begun with the initial deconstruction of the
story's values in the first session. These perspectives were anchored in
particularity and were articulated through the language of drama.
2. The moral force of the dramatic image
Colby (1987) has argued cogently that classroom simulations and role
plays provide only limited opportunities for moral growth, arguing that visual
dramatic metaphors provide a much fuller moral experience. He illustrates his
argument with reference to the closing image from David Edgar's adaptation of
The Life and Adventures of Nicholas Nickleby.
"Nicholas, now happy and successful, stands before another wretchedly poor
cripple in the streets of London .... Nicholas reaches down, picks up the boys
and stands with him in his arms. His eyes look anguishedly heavenward as the
teeming, indifferent populace of the city swarms around him. As an image, it.
resists a facile translation into language, yet it evokes in an immediate, eloquent
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and visceral way a range 0/ meanings from the realm 0/ ethics and religion. "
(1987. p. 78)
As with the moment in Julius Caesar, when Brutus strikes Caesar with the
knife, presenting a visual metaphor of the betrayal of a friendship in the
interests of political freedom, the moral metaphor is here contained in a
dramatic image. Colby refers to a moment in an educational drama session
described by Gavin Bolton, where a handshake between a black South African
and a white South African journalist contained great dramatic power and moral
significance. He explains:
"Tnese significant experiences are similar to the notion 0/ catharsis ... a
notion 0/ practical wisdom or moral insight promoted through the 'temporary
alignment of passion, emotion and desire with right principle. ' " (1987. p.ll)
Such images gain their power through their location in time and space; that is,
through their place within the dramatic narrative and via the semiotic
communication of their visual signs - one human being holding another, a look
of anguish, a handshake. Such moments 0/ awe, as Heathcote and Bolton
somewhat unhelpfully describe them, are analogous to the concept of catharsis
theorised in Chapter V.12 They are, of course, difficult to achieve in a one-
hour session in a primary classroom but the use of visual signalling to create
significant metaphorical associations does happen readily in drama; and when
these metaphors have moral meaning, this meaning is rendered both deeper and
more accessible for the participants.
For example, when telling the story dramatically in the initial session, I
deliberately ended it with a physical representation of the thief cowering and
protecting his bead from the blows of the stick; later, in role as his wife, I
spoke softly and held a small bundle representing a baby; when a I reappeared
as the thief, I held a bandage to my forehead. All of these signalled that the -
thief and his family were victims, thus stirring the children's orectic capacity for
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pity and deepening the dilemma for them (they had already seen me represent
the Brahmin as a smiling, kindly person). In Beckerman's terms, the action
became dialectic. Noddings, in particular, has emphasised the importance of
visual signals for women when making moral decisions:
"Faced with a hypothetical moral dilemma, women often ask for more
information. . . .. Ideally, we need to talk to participants, to see their eyes and
jacial expressions, to receive what they are feeling:' (1984, p2)
The fact that Noddings is focusing on women here is, in itself, metaphorical;
women she sees as representatives of a morality based upon caring and
compassion. Visual signs evoke these human sympathies and also allow for
other processes apart from the linguistic to become engaged in the moral
reasoning task. Referring to work done by Howard Gardner's research into the
domains of intellectual competency, Colby writes:
"Drama by its very nature has the power to 'yoke' the competencies oj the other
domains to the moral reasoning task, thus allowing those with greater
visual!spatial or kinaesthetic intelligence to bring their talents to bear on the
problem. " (1982, p.24)
In order to see how children can create simple dramatic images which resonate
moral meaning, it is interesting to look briefly at how three girls and two boys
from Martin's class decided to conclude the drama.
1. BRAHMIN: I'm sorry I hit you on the head.(Hands the thief and his
wife a calf. All smile and hug each other)
2. BRAHMIN: I'm sorry I hit you over the head with the stick.
THIEF: That's OK. (Suddenly brandishes a small stick at him) I've still
got half of it! (Pauses, looks at the stick, then back at the Brahmin) No!
(Drops the stick) Thanks! (Offers his hand to the Brahmin. They shake).
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However blurred the distinction between child-in-role and child-working-with-
friend, these dramatic images were strongly defined, moral metaphors which
rejected violence while celebrating generosity of spirit and friendship. Through
the particularity of story and the language of drama, the children had the means
to explore and express their understandings of these thick, ethical concepts.
3. Moral argument as dramatic dialogue
In the penultimate scene of Top Girls by Caryl Churchill, two sisters
confront each other in a heated argument, representing together a poltical and
moral dilemma faced by women in the 1980s: whether to achieve independence
by adopting the socially dominant male values of ruthlessness and
competitiveness or to adopt the traditional role of woman as carer, here
portrayed potentially as unrewarding drudgery. Churchill herself is a
committed feminist and socialist but the action is constructed dialectically, so as
not to deliver a simple, didactic condemnation of the Thatcherite elder sister,
Marlene. Both protagonists argue with passion; the moral situation is complex
and is presented as such.
Moral discussion as dramatic dialogue differs from other forms of moral
discussion in the classroom. Colby (op. cit., 1987) provides a comprehensive
discussion of the formal weaknesses of debates, role plays and classroom
simulations. Essentially his argument is that all mitigate against "a real
involvement in the predicament under study. " (ibid, p.76) by either encouraging
entrenched argument or by concentrating exclusively on logic and problem
solving. Citing a late essay by Kohlberg, he argues that: "the personality is
unitary,' cognition and affect join in single structures rather than being divided
into separate organs of impulse and cognition" (ibid, p.74) If the passions are
not harnessed, or if the problem is morally too clear-cut and lacks ambiguity,
then discussion in role will fail to take on the power of dramatic dialogue. But
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there is a third and important constituent to dramatic dialogue which
distinguishes it from discussion or debate; in Esslin's words:
"the verbal element in drama must jUnction primarily as action."
(1987. p.83)
What matters more than what is said is what the words do to the characters to
whom they are spoken or who speak them; what counts is their effect on the
way they see their situation and how this vision defines or will re-define their
subsequent actions.
Below, I present two extracts, one from each of the classes, which go
some way toward illustrating that improvised dialogue in process drama can
attain these three characteristics of driunatic dialogue. Both extracts will be
recognized as readily achievable within classroom drama by experienced
practitioners. The first is taken from the final session with Sophie's class.
The children were in collective role at this point, with half of the class taking
the part of the thief and the other half the Brahmin. I was outside the action
and did not speak:
THIEF:
THIEF:
BRAHM:
THIEF:
THIEF:
BRAHM:
THIEF:
THIEF:
BRAHM:
BRAHM:
BRAHM:
How would you feel? If we hadn't stolen. then we wouldn't have
had anything for my family and all of my family would be dead.
If you give us a calf then we'll stop stealing.
'Ihe villagers manage alright don't they and they don't steal. Tbe
villagers are poor.
Yeah, but they've got calves.
And we can't qtford it.
Why don't you go and find one?
Because cows are sacred, you don't find them wandering around
everywhere.
You're not saying .... that we don't have to steal from you ..... you
mean we can go and steal from ..... ?
Well .
(muted) No... no ...
I'll give it you for a day ...
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THIEF:
BRAHM
Oh, come on ...
Ploughyourfields yeah, and I'll come over, yeah, and see how
you're doing... and we'll decide about it then.
This was the section of the drama which had most influence on how the children
in this class decided to conclude it. Throughout this discussion, the moral
ambiguity was constant and was responsible for holding the dramatic tension.
All arguments put forward were essentially valid (apart from the suggestion to
go out and find a calf). The overall flow of argument was logical, with the
children listening and responding to one another; but it wasn't a logic detached
from emotional concern. The section opened with a request from the Thief for
the Brahmin to empathise with his family's situation; the argument which finally
moved the Brahmin amounted to another appeal for him to look beyond his own
good fortune. But the Brahmin would not forget the previous injustice he had
endured at the hands of the Thief. His sense of indignation did not disappear
when he began the process which eventually led to the thief keeping the calf for
a period of time in order to prove that he could be trusted by the Brahmin to
mend his ways. So the words led to an action agreed by the children in role
which embodied their cautious reassessment of what might pass for justice in
this particular situation.
The following extract, somewhat longer, is from the second session with
Martin's class. Here, I was in role as the Brahmin with the children as the
villagers.
BRAHM:
VIU:
VIU:
BRAHM
So is he threatening me? Is he saying, "Give me a calf or else
I'm going to steal something?" Why should I listen to that?
Thas's not good.
No!
He only wants to be yourfriend.
He only wants to be my friend? So he comes round and tries to
steal things from me! Is that the way to be friendly to
somebody?
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Vl1L:
V1U:
BRAHM:
VlU:
BRAHM:
V1U:
BRAHM.
V1lL.
BRAHM:
WU.
BRAHM.
V1lL:
V1lL:
BRAHM:
VIUS:
V1lL:
BRAHM.
V1U:
V1LL:
BRAHM:
VHLS:
BIWlM:
V1LL:
V1lL:
BRAHM:
VIlL:-
VllLS
BRAHM:
V1U:
No. he wants to stan a new life.
Re wants you to help him as well.
Well look, Idon't know .....
Well, you're being a bit greedy with two. Why don't you give
him just one?
I'm not being greedy with two! They're mine!
You shouldn't have two! You should have one!
Why should I only have one?
You're too greedy!
I'm a brahmin! I'm holy!
Cos if you give him one, you'll still have one left, won't you?
Do you think that'sfair?
Yeah! We're only trying to help him!
Give him a calf1
Is that going to help him be a better person?
Yeah!
He'll be happy if you did that.
He'll be happy and a better person?
Re's got three children and he can't get a job and he needs food.
And he can't get any money.
Will I be a better person if I give him a calf?
Yeah!
Why will I be a better person if I give him a calf!
Cos you 'll be sharing
You could share with him
lfyou were me, would you give him a calf!
Of course I would!
Yeah!
But I'll have to work harder with just one calf!
But if you have one calf and he has one calf then everyone will be
happy.
The children had argued with quite some passion and their logic was driven by
their-desire for the Brahmin to take into account the feelings and desires of the
Thief (he wants to be your friend; he wants to start a new life; he'll be happy if
you did that). The moral ambiguity and hence the dramatic tension was
different from that which found expression in the previous extract. As
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Brahmin, I began by forcefully stating my case but the children's accusations of
greed led me to steer the conversation into an interrogation of their view of
fairness. They could see that the questions Ibegan to pose might be indicative
of a nascent change of mind on my part. This intensified the tension, and I
held it for as long as I could. The sense of moral ambiguity bad, therefore,
shifted its focal point to within the Brahmin himself. This the children were
both witness to and could aet upon through the persuasive power of their words
which, once again, was anchored and enhanced by the amount of contextual
detail they were able to draw upon.
4. Drama, moral education and the practice of virtue
In which of Koblberg's stages of moral development is this latter extract
best understood? Consistently, the children are arguing for the ethical principle
that it is right for those who bave to help those in need. Does this mean that
they have reached Stage 6, the "Ethical Principle Stage"? Conversely, is the
whole discussion best seen as fostering an idealistic and naive view of human
affairs, even one which is subversive, socialist and typical of trendy Marxist
education lecturers? Both viewpoints are, I would argue, erroneous. The
moral value and educational validity of the discussion is best appreciated in
modest language and within the children's real social context. This group of
eight year-old children live in a deprived inner-city area where crime is
common. At least half of the class has been diagnosed as baving special
educational needs and many exhibit bebavioural problems and social difficulties.
The school works very hard at providing a caring and tolerant atmosphere,
however, and at fostering good communal relations among the children. This
discussion allowed the children to apply, albeit in a fictional context, the virtue
of confliet mediation and to argue for the virtues of generosity, fairness,
forgiveness and compassion, all of which are emphasised by the school. In
Aristotelian terms, they were being encouraged to practice the virtues.
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"Just as musicians.... become musicians by practising on the lyre and the flute,
so. says Aristotle. men learn the moral virtues by the practice of courage and
justice.": (Carr. 1991, p.50) .
The roles children are given and the acts, including the speech acts which these
roles generate, hold the potential for this practice. With Martin's class, for
example, the children remained as villagers for most of the drama but, as
villagers, they listened with sympathy to the wife, disarmed the thief whom they
thought was about to commit a violent act; offered gifts for his children; and
pleaded for justice to be done to someone other than themselves. When in role
as thief and the Brahmin they patched up a quarrel; apologised for past wrong-
doings; and gave and accepted gifts graciously. The various roles played by
Sophie's class took them through a variety of situations where similar demands
were made of them to display the virtues of unselfishness, sympathy,
benevolence, kindness, generosity and charity. And the nature of these virtues
is, in itself, of interest. They are among those cited by Carr to illustrate what
he defines as "the virtues of attachment" (1991. p.2(0) These are virtues
where an emotion or feeling or passion is not engaged in a struggle with reason
but is joined in alliance with it:
"The correct attitudes consist of believing and caring for the right things in
respect of the good and well-being of others. " (ibid.• p.201)
Once again, the fusion of thought with feeling, reason with care, lay at the heart
of both the moral and the dramatic process.
In his book The Saturated Self, Kenneth Gergen undertakes an analysis
of contemporary post-modern society and proposes that we need to re-interpret
much of what we take for granted as reality. Amongst his arguments, he
postulates that our emotions are something we learn to enact on appropriate
170
occasions. Drawing upon the work of psychologist James Averill", he
describes emotions as "cultural performances" and writes:
"We are not driven by forces bottled up within US,' rather we perform emotions
much as we would act a part on stage. " (1991 p.165)
This argument is a development of the cognitive analysis of emotion rehearsed
in Chapter V, where it was emphasised that emotions such as fear and love have
known objects of attachment and are quite distinctive from mere sensation. To
emphasise the culturally learned nature of the performative aspects of emotion is
to indicate that children need to learn appropriate ways of expressing emotion in
particular circumstances. If we accept this argument, the case for moral
education through drama gains added validity. Learning how to practise the
virtues, how and when to display the emotions associated with them within a
fictional context, is simply a reflection of how children learn the virtues in their
social and cultural environments. This is a point similar to Lipman's, who, in
his influential work on teaching philosophy to children, emphasised that ethical
actions preceded ethical states; in other words, that ethical actions tend to
develop care and concern in those who perform them. In his words:
"We cannot expect children to be considerate if we do not give them
opportunities to learn what 'being considerate' is through allowing them to
practice in engaging in such conduct. " (Lipman et al, 1980, p.175)
This does not mean that children will automatically transfer virtuous behaviour
represented in drama into parallel situations in their real lives; but it does
indicate that they need the space and the opportunities to rehearse them if they
are to understand them. The value for both children and teacher, I would
argue, is the opportunity drama offers for exploring how virtues such as those
listed above can be appropriately manifested in particular contexts and under
specific circumstances. The practice of the virtues described here took place in
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a possible world which the children helped create. In the drama there evolved
a story which became a shared, communal experience. And just as tales in an
oral culture provide a community with a stock of stories which embody shared
cultural and moral values, so can stories developed in this way become shared
reference points against which a classroom community of children can, with the
aid of the teacher, gauge their own actions and those of others whenever such
references are needed on future OCcasiODS.
S. The force and moral ambiguity of symbolic objects
I can recall watching a programme back in 1980 in which Francis Ford
Coppola discussed the making of his film Apocalypse Now. He explained how
be had put a gun in his coat pocket and walked down a busy New York street to
experience what it was like to carry a weapon. The feeling of power which
surged through him he described as awesome and frightening. It is a truism to
remark upon Hollywood's fascination for weapons in general and for guns in
particular, certain of which have become mythologized, such as the Magnum 44
in Dirty Harry and the famous automatic rifle in Winchester 73. As dispensers
of destruction and violent justice in the hands of men who live by violence, they
are powerful, uncomfortably fascinating, morally ambiguous symbols. The
moral perspective they offer us is best summed up by the words of Alan Ladd in
Shane .~ gun is as good or as bad as the man who uses it. "
Allen Ahlberg has written a delightfully comic poem for primary school
children called The Cane.14 Within its irony, it reveals a similar fascination
exercised over children by this symbol of violent justice, particular to the
mythology of the classroom. We had no guns in this drama, but we did have a
stick. A real one. A big one. As the Brahmin in the opening story-telling
session, I swung it back over my head as I prepared to club the thief with it.
Later, with Martin's class, when acting the part of the thief, I approached the
Brahmin's cottage holding it, to create the tension that I might be about to use
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it. I knew this was risky and it was. As the children/villagers surrounded me,
some boys grabbed the stick and disarmed me. The fear Ithen expressed as the
thief was very convincing as the metaxis at this point was so acute; there was
little to distinguish the fear of the thief from the fear of the teacher. And when
the boys broke it, albeit accidentally, this event became a powerful moral
symbol that permeated the rest of the session and reasonated throughout the
images they created to conclude the drama. For example, the boy/thief who
brandished the stick, gleefully telling the boy/Brahmin "I've still got half of it! "
was experiencing something of the vicarious sense of power described by
Coppola. He was also enjoying the tension of metaxis. But, after revelling in
this heady mixture, he dropped the stick. Within the dramatic context, he had
chosen to reject the creation of an image of rough justice in favour of one of
reconciliation; within the classroom context, he played with the subversive
energy of the stick but displayed self-control and an understanding of the moral
code of the classroom. In both contexts, the reality of the stick heightened the
tension and hence the force of the moral metaphor signified by its rejection.
To express the meaning of this metaphor, Iam tempted to paraphrase the earlier
quote from Shane: "Astidc is as good or as bad as the person who refuses it. "
6. ""Happy Ever After?" The moral resonance of an ending
The ending of a story drama is as significant as the ending of a story for
the values resonated will linger within us. Colby's reference to the closing
image of The Life and Adventures of Nicholas Nicldeby draws its moral
meaning from Aristotle's idea of catharsis and leaves us with an image which
embodies questions rather than answers, about the extent of human suffering
caused by social inequalities and the apparently unending struggle of those who
would attempt to remedy this state of affairs. Caryl Churchill's Top Girls
leaves us with an unresolved argument about political and social values followed-
by the image of a frightened girl seeking comfort from the mother who has
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effectively disowned her. Again, it is an image which poses questions, in this
case about the contradictory social and moral pressures facing women in
contemporary western society' as traditional female roles and values are re-
assessed within a social and economic structure which must inevitably produce
winners and losers.
Drama is essentially about problem finding, not problem solving. The
action must finish but, in Bakhtinian terms, false attempts tofinalise it should be
avoided. However, there is an obvious tension here between the requirements
of a dialogical approach and the "happy ever after" convention of the fairy tale
which demands resolution in some utopian form. Moreover, if we accept that
empowerment is a major aim of education, then one of the aims of moral
education must surely be to help children grow into a sense of responsibility by
convincing them that their ethical decisions can make a difference and that some
are more justifiable than others. In moral issues there are no pat answers but,
from an Aristotelian perspective, there are better and worse ways of living.
And MacIntyre sees this approach to moral understanding to be at the heart of
tragic drama when he writes:
"There may be better or worse ways for individuals to live through the tragic
confrontation of good with good. And.... to know what the good life for man is
may require knowing what are the better and what are the worse ways of living
in and through such situations." (1981, p.224J
The confrontation between the Brahmin and the Thief was, of course, not a
tragic one but it did bring opposing viewpoints of what constituted good action
into conflict. Through the drama, both the Brahmin and Thief, and hence the
children, could learn that there were better and worse ways of living through
this particular conflict. Moral learning, in this sense, was not dependent upon
how the problem was finalized, nor upon how the thought processes which
informed this resolution fitted alongside a heirarchy of moral principles; rather
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did it depend upon the opportunity it presented for the children to become
increasingly responsive to the particularities of individual cases, to move
forward despite the moral ambivalence of the situation.
I have, however, received some astute criticism from a reviewer on this
particular aspect of the case study, which I quote in full below.
"What is the 'morality' of art? It lies, not in upholding option beliefs about
how people should behave but in the integrity oj being true to how people do
and would in certain circumstances behave. Hence, it seemed to me that many
oj the alternative endings to the Brahmin/1hiej story were false to the central
morality of the story itself, in that they were 'unbelievable ', The thief must
needs be punished (presumably), otherwise thieving becomes acceptable, the
Brahmin needs to act to defend himself and his property - after all, the Thief
had 'agreed' that the Ogre could eat the Brahmin. It is there that the moral
dilemma lies - and more deeply how should/could 'good art' handle such
mauers- have political correctness or conventional morality anything to do with
it at all?"
Did these endings constitute "bad art" and is bad art incompatible with good
morality? 'Ibis view begs the important question of what constitutes the social
function of drama and its intended audiences. The story used here offered a
pre-text for dramatic transformation, not a moral blueprint for aesthetic
- ..
emulation, and in the drama the children were devisers, performers and, of
course, audience. In fact, the question might be more precisely phrased as: in
what sense was this drama meant to be good art and who was it meant to be
good for? Nor should the unbelievable nature of the children's endings be
automatically depicted in a negative light; for unbelievable, utopian endings are
what help define the fairy tale as a genre. Jack Zipes has written:
"More than any other oral or literary genre, the fairy tale embodies the utopian
gestus of our lives through the wish. By gestus 1mean the way our behaviour,
actions and thinking gesticulate toward one goal, and this goal is a place that.
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we do not know concretely. It is no place and yet a better place. It is a place
we know intuitively and we call it utopia. " (1995. p.165)
It is doubtless true that the endings devised by the children showed an optimistic
vision of conflict resolution untypical of the world as we know it; but they were
nonetheless true to the spirit of "happy ever after" which the children knew to
be characteristic of the genre in which they had been working. And, in their
depiction of utopian conclusions to the tale. they expressed a vision where
individual happiness was dependent upon communal happiness. It is important
to remember, too, that the children were given both the experience of the tale
and the experience of the drama. The conclusion of the drama did not replace
the ending of the initial tale but constituted a dialogical alternative to it, working
against the inevitability my critic implies as integral to the structure of the story.
Nor did this resolution necessarily lead the children to see the problem as any
the less complex. In response to a question I posed at the end of the drama: "If
you were Lord Vishnu. what advice would you now offer the Brahmin and I or
the thief?" one child wrote: "If I were Lord Vishnu I would say to the Brahmin.
'Think about what the thief did and why he did it. •"16 The simplicity of this
statement belies its wisdom. This nine year-old child appears to understand
that the moral meanings in stories are not simple and didactic, that we
appreciate them through reflection and eventually must find them within
ourselves.
* * * * *
In our postmodem society, children face a saturation of stories in all
kinds of genres and no one, dominant cultural source can be said to provide
them. This confusion can only be exacerbated by the fact that TV, video and
audio cassettes, comics, magazines and books do not provide any opportunities
for children to engage in active discourse with their meanings, and hence with
their values. As such, rather than being instructive, they are potentially so
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many "invitations to incoherence", a phrase applied by Gergen to the post-
modem technologies of social saturation (1991. p.173). In contrast, Kirin
Narayan has written of a Hindu Swamiji who teaches through stories chosen for
their relevance to particular audiences at particular times. "The text." she
comments, "like aIlfolk narratives. was malleable to the teller's concerns and
perceptions of his audience. " (1991. p.121) Working with story through
drama, the values children are learning to live their lives by in the present can
be informed, clarified or guided by engaging with and, in this case,
transforming the stories we share from the past. And in the communality of
this process, we are practising what Gergen sees as "the basis for a post-
modem. relational view of morality. in which decisions are viewed not as
products of individual minds. but the outcome of interchange among persons. "
(1991. p.168)
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NOTES
1. I am grateful to my colleague Eleanor Nesbitt at the Institute of Education in Warwick for
providing me with this and other information on Indian society and Hindu culture which
informs this case study. Dr Nesbitt is a member of the University of Warwick Religionand
Research Unit and a recognized international expert within this field.
2. This is explored in depth in Chapter vm of the thesis
3. See Appendix 1
4. I am aware that the concept of archetypes is contentious and will use the term throughout
this thesis in accordance with the meaning offered here by Northrop Frye; and with that
proposed by Cecily O'Neill who refers, simply but clearly, to their "generalizing resonance"
(1995, p.36) Jung, from whom we derive the term, saw them as something much more
fundamental and universal. For him they were: "psychic residua o/numberless experiences
of the same type, experiences which have happened not to the individual but to his
ancestors, ofwhid: the results are inherited in the structure of the brain, a priori
determinants oftndividual experience. "(Brodkin, 1934, p.I) I do not deploy the term in
any such invariable or universalist sense but accept Frye's thesis that archetypes are
culturally learned. Annis Pratt, in her work on women's fiction, provides a definition of
archetypal literary criticism which reflects my own understanding of the term and a similarly
pragmatic approach to its use. She writes: "onemust not deduce categories down into a
body of material but induce themfrom images, symbols and narrative patterns observed in a
significantly various selection of literary works. I conceive of archetypal criticism thus, as
inductive rather than deductive, Aristotelian in its concern with things as they are rather
than Platonic in suggesting them as derivatives from absolute, universal concepts. " (1982,
p.5) This pragmatic approach within the context of folk and fairy tales would appear to be
supported by the work of Thompson (1977) who shows how archetypal patterns, in this sense
of the term, are detectable in folktales across cultures.
s. This development of childhood as a distinct phase of life in the liberal western tradition has
been thoroughly examined by Aries (1960) and is supported by Hayles (1989). Hayles
insists that childhood is "a social construction, not a natural state." He sees this as having
begun in the European towns of the late Middle Ages, with the change from Feudalism to
Capitalism and the accompanying growth and institutionalisation of schooling. The
eighteenth century, in particular, witnessed a change in the concept of childhood as a state
characterised chiet1y by original sin to one of weakness which needed protection and of
innocence which needed to be preserved. Rousseau's Emile was the literary work which did
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most to institutionalise this view which, of course, persists in many twentieth century infant
classrooms. See also Walvin (1982)
6. The murder of toddler Jamie Bolger in Liverpool by two children, aged ten years-old, was
thought by some to have possibly been influenced by this video, as was the murder of
Suzanne Capper in Stockport, Gr. Manchester, in December, 1992.
7. This is an approach developed by Baird Saenger (1993).
8. See Colby (1982), ppl6 - 20
9. With Sophie's class, Idid, in fact, ask them for their ideas first. Iwas provided with six
responses: don't steal; don't be greedy; don't eat people; don't be selfish; learn how to be kind
to people; don't be bad or, in the end, it'll be the worse for you.
10. The maths, of course doesn't add up, there being far more recorded responses than if each
child had only responded three times. This is unimportant. Iwas not looking for statistical
accuracy, simply an impression of which morals the children thought they could detect. By
asking them to limit themselves to three, Iwas actively engaging the children to make
choices and not respond to all of them.
11. The expression moral panic was first used by Stan Cohen in 1972 to define a process where
"a condition, episode, person or group ... emerges to become defined as a threat to societal
values or interests." See Branston and Stafford, 1996, p.312
12. O'Toole (1992, pp 232 - 235) analyses this moment very thoroughly and argues that its
particular significance was dependent upon the meaning the drama achieved due to its real
context, of a white and a black student making this moment happen in South Africa in 1980.
He comments: "The boy was making and participants and onlookers were actively
accepting, an ethical statement of significance in their real world, highlighting what should
be by presenting what could not be, within the permission granted by fiction. " (op.cit, p.234)
13. See also Averill, J.R (1985)
14. See Appendix 3
15. These comments were received from an anonymous reviewer of a summary of this case
study. See Winston (1995)
16. See appendix 4
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CHAPTER IX
CASESTUDY2
JACK AND THE BEANSTALK:
ETHICAL EXPLORATION AND
THE RISKS OF CARNIVAL
HUMOUR
THE STORY OF JACK AND THE BEANSTALK:
CARNIVALESQUE OR MORAL QUEST?
Jack and the Beanstalk is one of the most popular and widely known
British fairy tales, with scores of versions currently in print, as single volumes and
as part of more general anthologies'. Its origin in folklore is thought to be ancient
but is very unclear. As Peter and Iona Opie point out, a beanstalk: reaching to the
heavens is reminiscent of Jacob's ladder in the Old Testament and of the World-
tree Yggdrasil in the Norse Prose Edda.{l974, pJ63) Despite this, the earliest
known printed version is Benjamin Tabart's History of Jack and the Beanstalk,
Printed from the Original Manuscript. Never Before Published, which appeared in
a sixpenny booklet in 18072. The Opies see this as the source of all subsequent
retellings, and this claim is supported by Neil Philip (1992) with one important
exception. Joseph Jacobs' version, published in 1890, was claimed by the author
to originate from an oral narration which he had heard some thirty years earlier in
Australia. Having compared it with other oral versions from North America,
Philip concludes that it is "a lively, funny, supple telling", much closer to the spirit
of the original, oral tradition than is Tabart's and "the stiff, chapbook texts" which
emulated it (1992, p.8). This claim is significant as stories within the oral tradition
tend to carry very different moral meanings from their literary counterparts
Jacobs' version has, indeed, the wit, lightness of touch and jocular rhythms
shared by many oral folktales and, importantly, it ressembles them in its general
tone of optimism and fantasy wish-fulfillment. There is a lack of psychological
comment in the narrative which, in true oral fashion, concentrates on action,
peppered with lively banter and brisk dialogue. From this we divine the nature of
the characters. Jack is very much the trickster figure, to be found in such tales as
Jack the Giant Killer and similar to such anthropomorphic characters as Ananse in
the Afro-Carribbean tradition and Brer Rabbit from the Southern United States.
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He is cheerful and quick-witted throughout the tale, quick to propose ways of
helping his mother andwitty in his response to the old manwith the beans:
"Iwonder ifyou know how many beans make five?"
"Two in each hand and one in your mouth, " says Jack, sharp as a needle. " (1993,
p.66)
When the beanstalk appears, he climbs it without reflection or hesitation; nor does
he show any hesitation in stealing from the Ogre or returning for a second time up
the beanstalk "to try his luck" (ibid, p.69) He is "bold as brass" when he meets
the Ogre's wife for the second time, undaunted when she asks him if he is the boy
who stole from her husband.
''I dare say I could tell you something about that but I'm so hungry I can't speak
till I've had something to eat. "(ibid, p.70)
On his third return, he shows a good deal of cunning, hiding outside the castle until
the Ogre's wife appears, then slipping in through the open door and, unnoticed, on
into the kitchen. This time he hides in the copper, not the oven, thus evading
discovery when the Ogre and his wife later search for him. At the end of the
story, the Ogre is dispatched swiftly, with a witty reference to the nursery rhyme
Jack and Gill:
"Then the ogre fell down and broke his crown and the beanstalk came tumbling
after. " (ibid, p.72)
Jack and his mother become very rich, he marries a princess and they live happy
ever after - information provided in as many words in the final sentence of the tale.
Here, then, we have a brisk tale where happiness is defined in terms of
material wealth and is achieved through optimism, resilience, good luck and
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opportunism. The emphasis is on a satisfactory narrative, with no hint of moral
didacticism and no need to explain Jack's actions in terms of motivation, moral or
otherwise. As Propp pointed out:
''In folklore, reasons, or to use the language of poetics, motivations, are not
required for actions. ... It is the action that is primary, not the reason for it. "
(1984, pp 25 & 26)
Ideologically, there is nothing morally problematic for a peasant community in a
tale which relates how a poor boy steals from a wicked, wealthy ogre so that he
and his mother do not starve. First and foremost, it is an entertaining tale of
fantasy, wit and wish fulfillment, where the weak triumph through intellect and
cunning.
"Cunning and deception are the tools of the weak against the strong, and this
conforms to the moral requirements of the listener" (propp, ibid, p.28)
Philip is right to see Jacobs' text as a genuine oral version of the tale rather than as
a revised, literary retelling based upon the Tabart text, as the Opies claim it to be.
Tabart's version is very different in many respects. It is longer, more
ponderous and descriptive, with very little dialogue and much more psychological
comment. The lightness of touch has given way to a more sombre, moral
didacticism. Jack's mother, we are informed,
"..had been a widowfor some years, and had only one child named Jack whom
she indulged to a fault; the consequence of her blind partiality was that Jack did
not pay the least attention to anything she said, but was indolent, careless and
extravagant. His Jollies were not owing to a bad disposition but that his mother
had never checked him. "(Opie, 1974, p.164)
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The admonishment to the parent, "Spare the rod and spoil the child" is barely
concealed. Jack's disobedience, signalled in this opening paragraph, is later
confirmed when he climbs the beanstalk despite his mother'S entreaties to the
contrary', In order to provide Jack with moral justification for stealing from the
Giant, Tabart introduces a character wholly absent from the oral version; a fairy, in
the guise ofan old woman, who meets Jack at the top of the beanstalk. In a story,
stretching to two pages of closely-printed text, she explains how a wicked Giant
had murdered Jack's father when Jack was a baby, robbing him of his castle and all
his possessions and forcing his mother never to tell Jack of his true identity. The
fairy informs Jack that he has been appointed to punish the Giant for all his
wickedness.
"fou will have dangers and difficulties to encounter, but you must persevere in
avenging the death of your father, or you will not prosper in any of your
undertakings, but always be miserable. As to the Giant's possessions, you may
seize upon all with impunity; for everything he has is yours, though now you are
unjustly deprived of it.... Remember the severe punishment that awaits you if you
disobey my commands. " (ibid,p.169)
Not only is he given justification for stealing from the Giant, he is set this as a
challenge to obey, to atone for his past wilful disobedience that has been
highlighted as one of the major flaws in his character. A series of editorial
footnotes, reminding the reader of the fairy's command, permeates the rest of the
tale in order to justifY Jack's further ascents up the beanstalk, as they must so
evidently clash with any good mother's wishes for the safety of her son. At the
very end of the tale, when the beanstalk is destroyed, the fairy re-appears in a final
footnote.
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"Shefirst addressed Jack's mother and explained every circumstance relating to
the joumies up the beanstalk. Jack was now fully cleared in the opinion of his
mother. n (ibid, p.l74)
As for Jack,
"he heartily begged his mother's pardon for all the sorrow and affliction he had
caused her, promising faithfully to be very dutiful and obedient to her in the
future. He proved as good as his word and was a pattern of affectionate
behaviour and attention toparents." (ibid, p.174)
In this form, then, Jack's adventures up the beanstalk have not only been presented
as a test of moral courage but have also been clearly framed, however uneasily, as
a lesson in obedience and filialduty.
lack Zipes' commentary on the distinctive tradition of the nineteenth
century English Fairy Tale offers an historical explanation for the tendency of
many to be stridently moralistic in tone.' The fertile legacy of medieval English
folklore, so evident in the work of Chaucer, Spenser and Shakespeare, was
suppressed under the domination of Puritan political power, which culminated in
the "Glorious Revolution" of 1688. Puritan culture and its philosophical heir,
Utilitarianism, placed an emphasis on rational judgment and Christian principles
and mistrusted the imagination, particularly in its more fantastic forms of
expression. Thus, whereas the fairy tale was able to flourish in eighteenth century
France, those few which made their way into publication in England during the
same period did so only when transformed into didactic tales, preaching hard work
and good behaviour. With the emergence of Romanticism at the end of the
eighteenth century, middle class sensibilities began to change and the fairy tale
slowly began to become more widely accepted with Tabart, in fact, being among
the first to publish them extensively. However, the Calvinist influence remained
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deeply entrenched, with influential writers like Mrs Sherwood attacking fairy tales
as late as 1820 as "an improper medium/or instruction" (Zipes, 1987, p.xvii) As
the fairy tale established itself as a genre, writers such as Dickens and MacDonald
saw its real moral purpose not as instruction but as a means of nurturing children's
imaginations, offering alternative, utopian visions to counter the drab utilitarianism
of Victorian industrial society. However, the tradition of didactic tales for
children remained strong and even major writers of fairy tales such as George
Cruickshank continued to regard them as vehicles for moral teaching. His version
of Jack and the Beanstalk, for example, published in 1854, transformed the Ogre
into a drunkard and the tale into a diatribe against the evils of alcoholism.' Such
overt moral didacticism characterised another popular retelling of the tale,
published by Anne Isabella Ritchie in 1868, and this tendency persisted in the
numerous retellings which appeared in chap books and cheap anthologies
throughout the nineteenth century, all of which were derivative of Tabart's version.
Recently published versions of Jack and the Beanstalk are not so
thoroughly or self-consciously moralistic in their tone, yet the influence of Tabart
remains strong in the cheaper, contemporary retellings to be found in the numerous
fairy tale anthologies which appear regularly', The reasons for this have been
amply explained by Zipes (1993) with reference to the tale of Little Red Riding
Hood. Anonymous chap books, often presented on single broadsheets, were a
popular way of marketing fairy tales for children in the nineteenth century. Many
anthologies drew upon these sources and still do so today because they are cheap
and involve no copyright. These retellings were, and still are, printed purely for
profit, to exploit an existing market, drawing their texts and illustrations directly
from earlier publications. There is little authorial re-assessment of the tales and,
as such, their values persist in the retellings.
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The values emphasised in the traditional, pictorial representation of lack
can be usefully gleaned from a book by Cooper Edens, which has gathered
together a number of illustrations from anthologies published between 1888 and
1927. The pictures consistently depict a pre-pubescent lack with long, curly,
blonde hair, wide blue eyes, and innocent, cherubic features.' Generally he shows
no emotion: even while he clutches the axe and watches the giant tumble he
registers only mild shock and surprise. In only one illustration is there the slight
hint of a scowl, as he wields the axe and chops down the beanstalk. The images in
which lack is contextualised are pervasively nostalgic, embellishing the fairy tale
world with pastoral settings, attractive old cottages, colourful cottage gardens and
rich, dark interiors of the castle. They are congruent with what Zipes has noted in
Victorian fairy tale writers as "a psychological urge to recapture and retain
childhood as a paradisaical realm of innocence." (op. cit, p.xx) Such images
hark after a simpler, pre-industrialised past and lack's cherubic, almost pre-
Raphaelite features avoid painful or unpleasant emotion at the same time as they
idealise the pre-pubescent boy whose appearance could well embody the filial
virtues which resonate from the Tabart text. The nostalgic appeal to parents is,
therefore, a double one, idealising the fairy tale world they recall from their own
childhood and idealising childhood itself in the images of the little boy it offers
them.
This representation of lack as heroic cherub is at odds with the lack of the
Jacobs text. Here we have a lack much closer to the trixter of Jack the Giant
Killer, wilful, cheeky, sharp and cunning. A subversive figure, be flouts authority,
takes risks, causes havoc whenever he climbs the beansta1k and always wins
through in the end. The comic power and ethical positioning of this Jack can best
be understood with reference to Bakhtin and his theory of folk humour, which he
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defined as the Carnival, and to the characteristics of the picaresque heroes of
comic drama.
Bakhtin developed his theory of the Carnival in his long study on Rabelais.
Fundamentally, he believed that the spirit of the Carnival is one of liberating
mockery through which official ideology and oppressive norms and taboos can be
parodied and hence humanised. Carnival laughter, according to Bakhtin, can be
defined as:
'''0 specific ethical attitude to reality' that allows no ideal to 'ossify in one-sided
seriousness.'" (Kelly, 1992, pA7)
The spirit of the Carnival, characterised by "inversions, parodies and
discrownings" (Dentith, 1995, p.65), suffuses the tale of Jack and the Beanstalk.
The young, the small and the weak defeat the old, the big and the powerful. The
Giant, parodying the abuse of feudal power, is "discrowned" in more senses than
one when he falls from the beanstalk. The grotesque representation of the body, a
major characteristic of Carnivalesque humour, is celebrated in the figure of the
Giant, who, with his tantrums and cannibalistic appetites, is as exaggerated as any
offering from Rabelais. But Jack, the trickster, both in his wit and in his actions,
has characteristics identifiable in the picaresque heroes of early literary works, such
as the Spanish Lazarillo de Tormes, and m the classic comic dramas of Moliere,
Jonson and Congreve. Charney has defined the characteristics of the comic hero:
he is cunning, resourceful and "could never conceivably be overcome by the
material forces he scorns." (1978, p.146); he is sharp, witty, "never at a lossfor
an answer." (ibid, p.152); in true carnivalesque fashion, he is "the enemy of all
abstractions, moral principles, seriousness and joylessness." (ibid, p.160)
Furthermore, the tale itself uses the classic comic devices of deception and
disguise, reveling in the ease with which Jack deceives the giantess, who, in tum,
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deceives the Giant. The tension as the Giant searches in vain for Jack is
essentially comic, as is the irony when he unwittingly leaves all of his riches ready
for Jack to run off with.
The comic spirit of the Carnival and of comic drama is identifiable not only
in the fonn the tale takes but also in the moral meanings it conveys. In the oral
folk tradition and the Carnival spirit it embodies, conventional morality is irrelevant
and taboos are suspended in favour of utopian wish-fulfillment, imagined through a
comic excess of feasting and material wealth. The ethic here works against
oppressive, social agencies in favour of the temporary emancipation afforded by
laughter. Similarly, comic drama does not celebrate conventional, social and
moral norms; rather does it poke fun at the shallowness and hypocrisy that often
accompanies those who preach them. The comic hero is one who can flout
authority and highlight, through his wits, the bluster and stupidity of the powerful.
Dario Fo's Maniac, wreaking havoc in a police station in Milan, is a distant cousin
of Jack wreaking havoc in the Ogre's castle.
The literary tamperings with the oral text were bound to destroy the comic
spirit of the tale as soon as it was transformed into a vehicle for conventional moral
lessons. As Charney points out:
"comedy does not arise from well-adjusted, middle-class persons, decent,
hardworking, sane, with ... realistic goals and expectations." (ibid, p.170)
The comic hero "never truly feels sorrow. guilt, compassion, or any of the
legitimate tragic emotions." (ibid, p.176) This is certainly true of the Jack in the
Jacobs text but very unlike Tabart's Jack, where the central theme is how he
actually comes to learn to feel these emotions in the context of his relationship
with his mother. The moral overlay suppresses the laughter as it converts Jack's
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oddyssey from an anarchic adventure into one which paradoxically praises filial
docility.
Most contemporary refellings of the tale lack the comic energy of the
Jacobs version whilst retaining residues of the nineteenth century moralisingwhich
seems pious and inappropriate to modern sensibilities" A notable exception can
be found in Kevin Crossley-Holland's volume of British Folk Tales. Although the
author admits to using Tabart's text as his source, he goes some way toward
reintroducing the tone and energy of an oral, folk narrative, as the title of the book
suggests. The prose is dense and resonant but its short sentences, tone and
rhythms echo that of oral storytelling. Jack, for example, is introduced as follows:
"What a drone he was! A lie-abed and lounger, a sugar-tongued scrounger, a
scattergood without a thought for yesterday or tomorrow. " (J988, p.118)
Like Jacobs, Crossley-Holland moves the plot on quickly, is sparing on
psychological comment and makes extensive use of sharp and witty dialogue.
"So Jack decided to climb the beanstalk again and pay a second visit to the
giant's mansion.
'Don't think of it, ' said Martha.
'Iam thinking of it, ' said Jack.
'You're afool,' saidMartha." (ibid, p.126)
Jack's mother is far from the weak, insipid figure of Tabart's text. She is assertive,
sharp of tongue, is actually given a name, and has the last word in the tale.
"So that was the end of the giant; and that was the end of the beanstalk.
'Amen, ' said Martha. " (ibid, p.131)
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What makes this version particularly interesting is the tension it achieves between
the differing moral meanings of the oral and literary traditions. On the one hand,
it restores to Jack some of his comic energy, extending it to include his relationship
with his mother, which is captured in their repartee. The spirit of the carnival is
present in his antics in the giant's castle and in the figure of the Giant himself, who
is generously and comicallygrotesque in his appetites:
"Thegiant ate a monstrous supper: vegetable stew, half-a-dozen loaves, and half
a pig, accompanied by a sluice of beer. 'And now, , said the giant, '/'11have one
of those children ... II' (ibid,p.129)
On the other hand, the comedy manages to embrace rather than ignore Jack's
moral flaws and the figure of the giant's wife, in particular, is problematised.
More in the twentieth century spirit of tragi-comedy, she is painted as a bullied and
beaten victim of her husband's violence. On Jack's last visit to the castle:
"The expression on theface of the giant's wife had changed She looked afraid
And when at last Jack persuaded her to take him in, she was only able to limp
ahead of him.
'That'll be the end, , she said 'Ifhe catches me. II' (ibid, p.129)
This retelling chooses to hint at moral ambiguity rather than impose a moral
resolution on the contradictory values which are the legacy of Tabart's literary
interventions. Wishing to use the tale as a means to explore rather than avoid
these moral ambiguities, and to harness the energising potential of its humour, I
chose this version as the basis for a drama with a class of Key Stage 1 children
who were using the tale of Jack and the Beanstalk at the heart of a cross-
curricular project.
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NOTES
1. A casual print-out from Warnick University library in March, 1995, showed that at least
forty new English language versi~ns of the tale have been published since 1990.
2. There are earlier printed references to the tale, however. Thomas Nashe, writing in 1596,
dismissed it in an attack on "idle pedants who will find matter inough to dilate a whole daye
of the first invention of Fy, fa, fum, I smell the bloud of an Englishman." In 1734, a skit of
the tale was published by 1. Roberts in London, entitled Enchantment demonstrated in the
Story of Jack Spnggins and the Enchanted Bean. (see Opie, 1974, p.162)
3. Jack's active, adventuresome nature and his mother's passive response to his waywardness
are typical of the kind of gender stereotyping common throughout literary fairy tales,
thoroughly analysed by Meller et al (1984). Although Iam aware of this, gender issues are
not the focus of this particular case study. They are, however, discussed in Winston (1994)
4 See Zipes (1987). The following argument is largely taken from his introductory chapter.
5. See Zipes (1987) p.37
6. My daughter was recently given a volume entitled Traditional Fairy Tales as a birthday
present Published in 1990 by Tiger Books International (London), its illustrations are
taken directly from an Edwardian publication and the written text, though anonymous, is
obviously derivative of Tabart. For example, this is how the fairy concludes her tale to Jack:
"You are reckless but, J trust, brave and earnest. Go boldly forward, fearing neither danger
nor hardship. Remember that my protection can be given to you only as long as you work
boldly and faithfully. II (p.76) There is less moralising but it is just as strident.
7. See Appendix 5
8. I am discounting here such postmodem works as Raymond Briggs' Jim and the Beanstalk
(1970) and Jon Scieszka's Stinky Cheese Man (1992), which are not so much versions of the
tale as parodies which necessitate a prior knowledge of the tale proper.
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THE DRAMA OF JACK AND THE BEANSTALK: EXPLORING
ETHICS THROUGH COMIC PLAYFULNESS
"...in drama, we are not teaching truths, but unteaching them, trying to reinvest
the curriculum of certainty with uncertainty and ambiguity. (O'Toole, 1995, p.80)
Tabart manipulated the story of lack and the Beanstalk into a parable
meant to illustrate a moral rule, the commandment: "Honour thy father and thy
mother. " Such rules have been defined by Haste as "the grammar of social
relations." (1987, p.163) According to Aristotle, rules in ethics are important but
of limited value.
''Among statements about conduct, those that are universal are more general but
the particular are more true - for action is concerned with particulars. " (cited in
Nussbaum, 1986, p.301)
Rules he saw as guidelines in moral development, summanes of the WIse
judgments of others, good for young children who lack the experience to have
developed moral praxis, or practical wisdom. What is important, then, is for rules
to exist alongside educational measures which attempt to develop children's
powers of practical moral wisdom. Stories are ideally suited for this latter
purpose; to see them as a way of enforcing rules is to misunderstand their true
moral potential. The drama of Jack and the Beanstalk was meant to embrace and
explore the ambiguities which the Crossley-Holland version had inherited from the
Tabart text rather than attempt to eradicate them. In seeking to do this, I
enhanced the playful, comic spirit, making it more akin to the Jacobs version, and
my analysis of the drama will concentrate on the interaction between its comic
form and its moral content; and how, I believe, the two proved to be compatible.
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The drama in summary
The school was situated in a semi-urban, village area of Warwickshire.
The children were mainly white, from a mixture of private and council housing,
and had some limited prior experience of educational drama. Their half-term's
topic was planned around the tale of Jack and the Beanstalk to stimulate work in a
wide range of curriculum areas and also involved the reading and telling of
different versions of the tale. The teacher learned the Kevin Crossley-Holland
version and told it orally in serial form over a number of days. She completed one
episode with lack climbing the beanstalk for the third time. For the subsequent
episodes, drama took over as a series of three sessions, each of about fifty minutes
in length. A structured breakdown of the strategies used is provided in Appendix
6. The fact that they were dominated by teacher-in-role was a conscious decision
determined by the age and inexperience of the children. It also, of course, allowed
me to keep a very firm grip on the direction the drama took.
At the beginning of the first session I introduced the children to the basic
costume I would use to denote the various characters from the story; a black shawl
and a walking stick for the old woman at the top of the beanstalk; a blue shawl for
the Giant's wife, and so on. For the children to find entrance into the drama, I
decided to cast them as friends of Jack from his village and began the story by
narrating the discovery by Jack's mother that he had gone missing for the third
time. Taking on the role of the mother, I asked them if any of them knew where
he might be. When some of them suggested he might have gone up the beanstalk
I replied that I didn't believe that as he had promised me faithfully he would never
climb it again. But Jack was a boy who broke his promises, they told me. They
all agreed that breaking promises, especially to one's mother, was wrong and they
volunteered to go up the beanstalk and bring him back home. Before they did
this, I made them promise not to let him steal any more money from the ogre; it
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was too dangerous and, besides, we didn't need any more. This they all did and I
narrated their ascent up the beanstalk. At the top, in the guise of the old woman,
I informed them that the Ogre used to blame his wife every time any of his money
went missing, and sometimes even hit her. The children made a second promise
not to steal any money themselves if I told them the way to the Ogre's castle. I
played the giant's wife as a timid, frightened woman, peering through a crack in the
door, and said that I had chased Jack and mimed shutting the door in their faces.
The children, however, spotted an open window, decided that Jack must have
already climbed through it and quietly did the same, making their way along the
castle corridors and into the Ogre's kitchen.
The second session began with the children exploring the kitchen, looking
for places to hide should the Ogre come. I then took on the character of Jack for
the first time and narrated my appearance out of the spout of a kettle. A long
discussion ensued. The children began by trying to persuade Jack to leave
straightaway, which I refused to do. Playing him very much as the trickster, I
amused the children with my actions and responses and the clarity of their mission
began to fade as some of them volunteered to help me escape with the money.
The discussion was interrupted by the arrival of the Ogre and the children all hid
and remained silent while I shouted and stamped and then counted my money.
When the Ogre finally fell asleep, I stopped the drama and asked a girl to take on
the role of Jack and decide whether he would take the money or not. He did.
The final session began with the children creeping out of the kitchen
without waking the Ogre, only to meet his wife in the corridor. My shriek of
surprise, in role as the wife, awoke the Ogre and I told them all to hide while I
persuaded him to let me make him some hot chocolate so he could go back to
sleep. This kept the children from being discovered and they decided to show
their gratitude by helping the wife. One girl eventually suggested that we should
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tie up the Ogre while he slept and then make him promise to change his ways.
Once "captured" in role as the Ogre, I screamed and yelled and struggled in vain to
their amusement and satisfaction, The drama ended with the Ogre, being lectured
as to how, and in what manner, he ought to change his ways.
These sessions are among my fondest memories as a drama teacher. My
faith in their educational worth was warmly supported by the classteacher and has
since been reinforced by the responses of experienced first school teachers, with
whom I have used the videoed material for In-Service work, and of a much
respected colleague who has used sections of it for lecture and demonstration
purposes. I believe it is, therefore, worthy of analysis but, within the following
commentary, I address relevant critical questions that have been posed by those
practitioners who have seen and commented on the material.
To look at improvised educational drama as moral pedagogy through the
filter of comedy poses a number of problems. Literature on drama in education
seldom makes more than passing references to comedy; and comedy itself is seen
by many influential theorists as essentially amoral in its nature. Langer, for
example, points to what she sees as Meredith's failed attempts to promote the
ethical nature of comedy:
"In his very efforts tojustify its amoral personages he only admitted their amoral
nature and simple relish/or life." (1953, p.345)
Whereas comedies go out of their way to assure us, through a happy ending, that
the good will triumph, Charney suggests that virtue gets little play in the action of
the drama: and concludes that:
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"wit outshines, outstrips and outperforms goodness and the comic action remains
essentially amoral." (op. cit, p.59)
Moreover, inasmuch as these happy endings do express values, they are essentially
conservative and reflect the ends of society. As Ben Jonson saw it (or said he saw
it), the purpose of comedy is to purge socially unacceptabe behaviour; or, in the
words of Northrop Frye:
"The society emerging at the conclusion of a comedy represents ... a kind of
moral norm." (J965, p.147)
- meaning that harmony, common sense and civilized behaviour must be restored.
The hero of classical comic drama may well cock a snook at conventional social
morality but, at the end of the play, he is reabsorbed into the dominant social
framework. The social conservatism of classical comedy is, according to O'Toole,
at odds with the more anarchic comedy of the folk tradition.
"Classical comedy operates at the 'rule-fixing' end of the continuum of art and
play; the kind of comedy which emanates from the other, 'exploratory' end
operates by calling those very rules into question, and gives a discomorting
experience where anarchy, immorality and misrule are temporarily validated, and
may be left so. " (J993, p.153)
Here the carnival spirit is defined as essentially amoral, with no promise that any
kind of social or moral order will be restored. Despite this, it is with reference to
this tradition of folk comedy and its manifestation in both traditional and modern
forms of participatory theatre, that most light can be cast not only on the comic
representation of Jack and the Ogre in this drama but also on their potential as
agents for moral education.
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Jack as "Joker"
Traditional folk drama, such as the Coventry Hox Tuesday Drama or the
Cheshire Souling Play! is looser and more participatory in form than the classical
or bourgeois theatrical traditions. The narratives are often scripted but always
feature a character such as the Derby tupp (in Coventry) or the Wild Horse (in
Cheshire) whose function is to cause havoc, particularly among spectators, chasing
girls and generally making a nuisance of itself Sometimes this character might be
human in form, such as Tosspot in the Pace Egg play of West Yorkshire, and thus
be free to improvise lines, draw in the spectators and generally subvert the
narrative, a tradition whose influence partially persists in stage pantomime. The
discomforting, subversive and comically provocative nature of such a role is
analogous in spirit with Jack, the trickster of the oral folk tale, and of the medieval
giullare, inspirational to the theatrical practice ofDario Fo:
"The giullare was the street performer of his day, the busker of the Middle Ages,
with something in common with the Shakespearean Fool, but nothing at all with
the aristocratic pet who was the Court Jester. Of his very essence he was the
people's entertainer, but also the people's spokesman, giving satirical voice to
resentmems felt by ordinary people against authority." (Farrell. in Fo, 1991, p.6)
The role of the "Joker" in Boal's Forum Theatre performs a similar function.
Although the Joker is more a facilitator than a jester, his purpose is to engineer the
subversion of socially and morally oppressive narratives by encouraging the
audience to move from the position of passive spectators to more active spect-
actors. As such, one of the roles he adopts is that of devil's advocate, disturbing
the spect-actors' received values in order to challenge their thinking and empower
them into enlightened forms of action. It is the spirit manifest in the dramatic
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function of these distinct but related roles which can best enlighten the nature of
my representation of Jack, comic in form but serious in intention.
For the children, the drama was framed in the form of a moral quest.
Tabart-like in their certainty, they were dispatched to carry out the mother's
parental wishes, to ensure that Jack would return and keep the commandments
which forbid stealing, lying and disobedience. Rules to guide moral behaviour are
an important feature in the lives of young children and are particularly evident in
institutionalised, social environments such as the classroom and the school; and,
through the promise made to lack's mother, they were being requested to take on a
role which would involve the enforcement of these rules. When I entered in role
as lack, there was no mistaking the focus or the seriousness of their mission:
GIRL
JACK
MANY
JACK
BOY
GIRL2
GIRL3
JACK
BOY
You've got to come down now I
I've got to come down now? Who says?
Your mum I
My mum says?
You haven't got aIQ' time to steal things yet
Like the money ..
You're not allowed to steal aIQIIhing
What are you saying?
You must go down now because your mum's told you to!
Children, however, have their own private, social codes, which can emphasise a
different set of virtues: loyalty to one's friends, courage displayed through risk-
taking and dales, quick-wittedness and a sense of humour, the ability to deceive
authority and hence avoid trouble'. These are often, by their very nature,
contlictual with conventional rules of moral behaviour. It was these qualities of
the "streetwise kid" that I was attempting to represent in the role of Jack, playing
him as trickster, rebel, the subversive but likeable rogue. My costume - baseball
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cap worn in reverse - immediately signalled this, as did my cheerful banter and my
high-status posturing.' I played tricks on the children and had lots of verbal fun
with them. To apply Macintyre's concept of virtues and vices embodied in social
roles, if Jack as a child was disobedient, cheeky and dishonest, as afriend he was,
in contrast, funny and clever; and as son (to his father, ifnot to his mother), he was
courageous in seeking to avenge his father's death and reclaim his and his mother's
rightful inheritance.
A justification for this interpretation of the dramatic impact of Jack can be
found in comments made by the children outside the drama, in a discussion with
the classteacher.' The children were asked why they had risked going up the
beanstalk to fetch Jack and responded that Jack was their friend, that he was brave,
strong, played good games and that he was fun. When asked if there was
anything not so good about him, they had many suggestions: he broke his
promises, was lazy, told lies, took back things which didn't belong to him, didn't
tell his mummy where he was playing and used bad language. Two conclusions
can be drawn from these responses. Firstly, these children, as a group, were very
clear and articulate about the basic concepts of right and wrong and could easily
recognize virtues and vices in action within specific social contexts. Secondly,
they show that the Jack of the drama had impacted upon them as much as the Jack
of the story, interweaving with their own ideas of what made a good friend and a
naughty boy. The last three examples listed above came directly from the story
we created: from our discussion as to whether everything the giant owned had
belonged to my father; from my complaints about Jack in role as his mother; and
from my use of the word "bum"!
Jack made a powerful impact upon the children in part because, although at
the centre of the dramatic interest from the outset, his actual appearance was
substantially delayed, a strategy used to great effect by Moliere in Tartuffe. All of
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the contributions made by the characters the children met along the way - his
mother, the woman at the top of the beanstalk, the Ogre's wife - performed the
dual function of reinforcing the children's moral mission and building a consistent
expectation of what Jack would be like once he did appear. When I took on the
role of Jack, I worked to confirm rather than deny this expectation and used
humour to subvert the moral highground from which the children began their
dialogue with me. A few minutes into the scene we had the following exchange:
JACK So what are you going to do do if I tell you I'm staying here until
that Ogre comes and then, when he falls asleep, I'm going to steal
something off him? (Spoken as a dare) What are you going to
do?
We're going to tell your mother.
You're going to tell my mum, are you?
Yeah!
BOY
JACK
BOY
JACK
BOY2
JACK
GIRL
MANY
MANY
That I wouldn't do as she says? That I wouldn't come down?
Alright! (addressing another boy) What are you going to do?
Erm, 1'1/help you carry whatever ....
Oh, you're going to help me, are you?
Yeah, so am II
And me! So am II
I'm not!
By bringing alive the subversive charisma of Jack and by having it interact with the
children in role, I was able to stir up dissent in order to replicate a picture of the
moral conflicts within children's lives truer than is portrayed in the Tabart text. In
other words, I turned a "rule-fixing" text into an exploratory one. By adopting
this stance, I was then able to encourage the children to reflect upon their moral
positioning although, in the spirit of comic playfulness, this could take an
unexpected turn.
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JA(J(
BOY}
JACK
BOY2
JACK
BOY2
JACK
BOY}
JACK
GIRL
JACK
Alright, those people who aren't going to break their promise to my
mum, I want to know why not.
Because we'll get told off.
Because you'll get told off?
And so will you when you get down there.
(cocky) I can handle that.
You can't.
Maybelcan.
You might not.
Maybel can.
(wagging her finger) You'll get a smacked bum.
Maybe I'm not scared of a smacked bum!
(Burst of general laughter)
The children's laughter here points to another way through which the carnival spirit
was working to energise this drama; that is, through the tension of metaxis
generated by the deliberate inversion of the roles, in both a moral and a social
sense. The teacher/adult was playing naughty boy whereas the childrenwere the
voice of conventional moral authority. As a result, I, the teacher, was empowered
to say deliberately naughty things; whereas they, the children, where liberated to
speak to me as an equal or even scold me from a morally superior position. Thus
the overriding tension within the form of the drama when the children were with
lack was both cornic and moral at one and the same time and the dialogical
exchanges could take on the pace and mood of cornic repartee.
JACK
GIRL
JACK
BOY}
JAC"/(
BOY2
JAC"/(
Well, I didn't make a promise.
Cos you never keep promises.
Who says I never keep promises?
Andyou lie!
Who says I lie ?
You lied to the Ogre!
Well, he's a rotten Ogre. I've never spoken to that Ogre, anyway.
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BOY3
JACK
You lied to your mum.
(flustered) What did 1 say to my •..1 never lied to my mum! When
did 1lie to my mum?
(in triumph) You said you wouldn't go up the beanstalk and you
did!
MANY
It is a dramatic as much as a moral necessity which energises this short exchange,
illustrative as it is of the kind of competitive status game described by 0' Neill as a
frequent feature of this kind of improvised event. S But, to paraphrase the earlier
quote from Charney, here wit does not outperform goodness; in the children's
eyes, their wit outperforms lack's and his attempt to cover up his lies. The spirit
of play is strong here but for the teacher it provides for a devil's advocate style of
role-taking, long recognized by drama teachers as a valuable way of creating
I . 6eammg. What is not generally recognized, however, is how close such an
approach is to the carnival spirit. In Bakhtin's words:
"The temporary suspension, both ideal and real, of hierarchical rank created
during carnival time a special type of communication impossible in every day
life. "(Bernstein, 1981, p.l06)
According to Bernstein, this involves:
"a loosening of the codes of linguistic decorum and a new readiness to mingle
forms of address and speech otherwise kept strictly apart. " (op.cit, p.l06)
This temporary suspension of hierarchical rank was at the heart of the moral
ambivalence of teacher in role as Jack but the dramatic and educational functions
remained highly ethical, intended to ensure that the children were given sufficient
opportunity to explore the moral complexity of the situation. Using Beckerman's
terminology, Jack rendered the action dialectic in nature, opening oppositional
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empathic alignments not, perhaps, within each individual child but certainly within
the group community they were each a part of. And at the heart of this action
was an issue that went beyond whether the children should simply obey rules and
authority; it covered questions of responsibility for one's actions, particularly when
these actions can lead to others being harmed. "Responsibility for self and others"
is defined by Gilligan as one of the six components of an ethic of care' and here the
"other" gained particular form in the role of the giant's wife.
Children are used to comical images of grotesque violence from such
sources as cartoons, Punch and Judy shows and fairy tale characters such as the
ogre of this tale. If the violence suffered by the wife was to be taken seriously by
the children, however, it had to be played as such. Consequently, she was not
represented as a comic figure. Her status as victim, hinted at in Crossley-
Holland's retelling, was emphasised in this. drama for, as the previous case study
illustrates, such roles tend naturally to draw out a sympathetic response from
children, activating the other-regarding emotions of sympathy for the victim and
indignation at her oppressor. This sympathy was heightened in the third session
when she also performed her narrative function of helpers, saving the children from
being found by the ogre. As lack, Iwas able to play against this sympathy and
hence encourage its artic dation:
JAc"/(
BOY
I don't like that Ogre and I don't like his wife, so I don't see why I
can't take what Iwant from here. Have you met his wife?
His wife'S nice!
JACK
GIRL
Put it this way, if I take the money from this Ogre, it doesn't hurt
anybody apart from the Ogre and he's horrible.
Yes it does! It hurts the wife!
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She, unlike Jack, was an unambiguous or iconic figure, and the desire to protect
her from harm was always apt to be articulated At the climax of the children's
meeting with Jack, there was a dramatic moment which illustrated this:
JACK (confused) So should I take the money or shouldn't I?
Should/shouldn't (one girl says something which only I hear. I
silence the children and ask her to repeat it to the whole group)
GIRL I don't think you should because all the Ogre will do is hit his Wife
MANY
JACK
again.
(pause. Silence)
(provocatively) And I thought you said she was a nice woman.
The generally agreed reason why Jack should not steal therefore began to shift
from the fear of punishment expressed in the earlier exchange to the altruistic
virtues of compassion for someone who had activated the children's orectic
potential, virtues consistent with Gilligan's ethic of care. Of course, this was
never debated in such abstract terms, but the conflicting moral demands they
engendered are what drove the dramatic narrative, gaining physical actuality
through the representation of the characters and their actions."
Bakhtin's theories of the carnival and of the dialogical function of the novel
are related inasmuch as they are fundamental to the worldview he promotes, where
human existence is a "mixture of styles, an irreducible heterogeneity." (cited in
Todorov, 1984, p.80). In the second session, I manipulated the drama so that the
caring virtues of attachment could be considered but I did not, in the manner of
Tabart, impose a resolution where it triumphed, as illustrated by the fact that a
child, enacting the part of Jack, still felt that he would take the money and flee.
What I did do, however, was to ensure that it came into a dialogical relationship
with the rule driven ethic of the Tabart text and ensure it was added to the
polyphony of voices within the dramatic narrative. "Carnival, " writes Holquist,
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"like the novel, is a means of displaying otherness: carnival makes familiar
relations strange. n (1990, p.89) To have kept the violent relationship between
the ogre and his wife on the level of the grotesque, comic style of Punch and Judy
may at first seem to be a more camivalesque thing to have done; paradoxically, this
is not the case as it would have detracted from the multi-voicedness of the drama
and hence rendered it less ambivalent, and so less provocative and less capable of
producing disturbance. Here it is worth reconsidering Bakhtin's antipathy toward
drama as an inherently monological art form, briefly discussed in Chapter VI.
Pechey argues, however, that we learn from his writings that Bakhtin is referring
restrictively to "pure classical drama" (1989, p.58) and that this position, too, is a
highly contentious one:
''Drama is perhaps not so much monological as monologised by being read as
'literature' rather than theatre." (ibid, p.61)
In particular, Pechey presents Brechtian theatre as a "radically novelised drama -
dialogised indeed to the point of polyphony. " (ibid, p58) Bakhtin himself, Pechey
points out, noted Brecht as a representative of the "'realist grotesque' which
'reflects at times the direct influence of carnival forms. III (ibid, p.58) and adds:
"The typical roles of Brechtian theatre are ... the rogue, the"clown and the fool,'
images of infinite trresolution as everything they do or say is fraught with
dialogical ambiguity. "(ibid, p.59)
In this sense, the drama was Brechtian in nature and, if Jack had been both rogue
and clown then the Ogre was to be the fool, albeit a very frightening one.
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The Ogre
Giants are among the most recognisable figures of the carnival tradition,
still dominating notably famous carnival processions today, such as those which
take place on Shrove Tuesday in both Belgium and in Nice. Similarly, giants and
ogres are an integral part of European folklore, proliferating in folk and fairy tales,
although theorists disagree as to their symbolic significance. Bettelheim argues
that, for children, they may represent adults in general:
"We ... appear to them as selfish giants who wish to keep to ourselves all the
wonderful things which give us power. {op.cit, p.27}
His Freudian reading of Jack and the Beansta/k identifies the Ogre as "the father
who blocks the boy's oedipal desires", a figure upon which "the oedipal boy
projects his frustrations and anxieties." {ibid, p.1l4}. The child needs to
overcome the giant at a symbolic level to grow up into a secure adult; and, of
course, the particular importance of fairy tales for Bettelheim is their unique ability
to fulfil that psychological need. For Zipes, on the other hand, giants are figures
of socio-political rather than psychological importance. Taking his perspective
from the cultural evolution of folktales, giants, for him, represent the tyranny and
injustice of brute force and political repression which can nonetheless be overcome
through communal and individual demonstrations of bravery, wit and decisive
action". Both theoretical approaches go some way towards providing an
understanding of the symbolic function and moral significance of the giant/ogre
within this drama inasmuch as they identify the symbolic empowerment of children
with his defeat. Viewed as an archetype, the specific crimes of the Ogre are
irrelevant; he is simply evil and must be overcome. In our drama, however, his
defeat had more than archetypal significance. His crimes were historically specific
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and it was the twin other-regarding emotions they provoked -sympathy for his wife
and indignation at his violent bullying - which energised the final confrontation.
In my representation of the Ogre, I was influenced by Dario Fo and
dramatic creations such as Pope Boniface VITI I I emphasised his grotesque
qualities in speech, gesture, gait and action. He was monstrous but also comically
ridiculous and, above all, he was excessive - counting a huge bag of gold, kissing
the huge coins, shouting both in anger and pleasure, stomping his feet and
displaying signs of enormous appetite and greed. In this sense, he was the
antithesis of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean.
"The conduct which conduces to the well-being of men in human society is that
which exhibits reasonable moderation and avoids unreasonable extremes of
action and passion" (Carr, 1991, p.54)
There was much comic tension, as the children stayed quietly hidden and watched
and listened to my grotesque display of appetite and evil. And, although comic,
there was a real thrill of fear in their faces as they gripped on to eachother in their
various hiding places. Iona Opie has written of traditional children's games,
persisting as part of our folk tradition, which, as she puts it, "seem to satisfy a
deep desire for vicarious fear expressed in dramatic form. " (1995, p.3l) In this
dramatised version of hide and seek, I was able to harness this desire (perhaps
itself another aspect of camivalesque ambivalence) to create a tension which
allowed the children to participate safely in the experience of his evil power. This
image of a rampaging, dangerous bully was in marked contrast to the image in the
final scene where, "tied" to a chair, I was forced to listen and respond to their
haranguing. Transcribed references from this scene - notably and significantly
from the girls - reveal that this grotesque representation of violent, male aggression
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coupled with arrogant laziness was one they could recognize and which aroused
their moral indignation.
GIRL You should be a nice giant, be friendly so you don't have to hit
your wife. Look at all the jobs she does for you! And you do
nothing. You just sit around and count your money. You do
nothing, just tell the hen to lay and tell the harp to sing.
GIRL2 Imagine if you were your Wife, if you kept doing all the work. You
wouldn't like it if you had to do it all the time.
GIRL3 Youjust leave your wife alone. She doesn't hurt you.
His excessiveness was what the children enjoyed but they had the satisfaction not
only of overpowering the bully but the additional challenge of trying to transform
him by telling him why his behaviour was so unacceptable. The drama ended with
them once again in possession of the moral high ground but this time not in the
role of messengers of parental authority but, within the fiction at least, as their own
agents, acting in response to the events of the story as they had unfolded and the
possibilities which I, as teacher, had been able to interweave into the drama. In
this small but significant way, the figure of the giant was able to offer the
possibility of moral empowerment; by arousing the children's indignation, he could
stir them into feeling and articulating ethical values which were already deep within
them.
As with the representation of Jack, however, the dramatic energy of this
scene was redoubled by the added tension of metaxis and its carnivalesque
implications. Not only was the fairy tale Ogre defeated but this defeat had
physical embodiment, being represented through the gestures, gait, in short the
body of an adult male. Furthermore there was the added, anarchic thrill of the
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traditional classroom Ogre, the teacher himself, being symbolicallydisempowered
and suffering from children the haranguing and the scolding which it is normally his
role to deliver. This play with power is risky within the classroom but in its
riskiness lies its potency as drama and as education. Here was performed a
controlled, camivalesque ritual, the symbolic debunking of abusive power and the
liberation for the children to express a different ethic as to how it should be
exercised, one correlative with Aristotle's "mean" as well as with a feminist ethic of
care and responsibility.
Conclusion
Bettelheim saw no room for moral ambiguity in fairy tale characters. For
him, there was a distinct polarity between good and bad characters for this
reflected the psychological need of young children if they were to learn the
difference between good and evil. "Ambiguities", he argued, "must wait until a
relatively firm personality has been established" (op.cit, p.9)12 A mature student
who watched the videoed extract where I role-played Jack was not impressed, and
for reasons very similar to those expressed by Bettelheim. These children had a
clear sense of right and wrong, she said, which I began to blur for them. My duty
as a teacher was to reinforce virtuous patterns of behaviour for children as young
as this and not to license morally unacceptable attitudes, even in pretence. The
children were too young to learn that distinctions between right and wrong were
sometimes difficult. What they needed was a belief that the moral rules they were
taught could be trusted and believed in. In a way, I was flattered to have my
teaching arouse such passion and I can sympathise with her sentiments although
disagreeing with her interpretation. Her comments are interesting, however, for
to explain this disagreement is to engage with the limits of making educational
drama analogous with carnival and the limits of carnival itself.
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Of course I believe children need the security of moral rules that make
sense to them. I was a headteacher for three years, how could I possibly not
believe this? Even if I had wanted to unteach them the rules then I had singularly
failed to do so, as was evidenced by the teacher-led discussion where the children
were still able to use the language of rules to voice condemnation of Jack's
behaviour soon after the offensive scene. Yet this was surely the most
carnivalesque of all the sessions, it being the only one which ended without the
moral order being restored, as Jack escaped with the money. The final session, in
comparison, despite its carnivalesque characteristics, ended with a purging of the
giant's socially unacceptable behaviour and a reassertion of moral norms, typifying
what Northrop Frye saw as a characteristic tendency of conventional comedy. So
my mature student need not worry; moral anarchy was not my aim, nor was it
achieved within this drama. The quote from O'Toole which I used to open this
account is relevant inasmuch as the absolute truths with which the children began
the drama were brought into conflict with one another, just as they are in real life.
In negotiating their way through this uncertainty, moral order was restored but
was not, as I have explained, based upon the same principles with which the
children began the drama. Yet how can such an emphasis on moral order square
with an equal emphasis on carnival?
The paradox here is inherent to the form of carnival itself By its very
nature, it might do no more than reinforce the dominant social order by
temporarily allowing it to be turned upside down and distortedly emulated. There
is no question that, after taking on the roles of Jack and the Ogre, I reassumed my
role of teacher, called the class to order and discussed with them what had
happened in the drama. Carnival is clearly temporal and temporary by nature.
Like the utopian world of fairy tales, it exists as an alternative world but as one
that can be actualised and lived in with the knowledge that it will not last. For
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educational purposes, its potential lies both within the temporary license it
provides to pursue alternative explorations of power and responsibility and within
the modes it presents to enable 'this pursuit to happen. Certainly, within a school
setting, drama as carnival is unlikely to be as revolutionary as O'Toole suggests it
can be in principle; and my portrayal of Jack lacked the satirical and political bite
of Fo's giullare. But that need not reduce it to the role of politically expedient
safety valve. As Morson and Emerson point out:
"The specific forms that carnival takes vary over time and from culture to culture,
and some forms exploit the generic potential of carnival more than others. " (op.
cit, p.459)
Carnival is variable and flexible and a teacher's capacity to explore its generic
potential will be limited and defined by the mix and match of values which exist
within the culture of the school, embodied within the local community from which
the children are drawn, the institutionalised rules of the school establishment and,
crucially,within the teacher herself. The lessons described here were infused with
my own value agenda, as expressed within the characters I chose to represent, the
form in which I chose to represent them and the moral exploration I was
deliberately trying to engender. But I could not force the children to go on this
journey, only create the motivation and the structure for doing so. Hence the
charm and the power of carnival, whose spirit is waiting to be tapped in the natural
playfulness of young children. It is there, too, in the amorphous sense of
community a classroom can generate among them, in the spirit of many of their
traditional tales and in the flexible pedagogic form of process drama. Together
they can generate a potent force for moral education as well as the liberating
energy of laughter.
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NOTES
l. See Pegg (1981) p.l07
2. See Opies (1959), Chapter 8 and Meadows (1986, p.199). The latter examines how children
are in "the difficult position of having two reference groups within the classroom" the
teacher and their peers.
3. I have been questioned as to my use of stereotype here but I am willing to argue for its
justification. One critic saw my use of the baseball cap as a negative portrayal of black
youth culture. In the first place, it was not at all negative as far as the children were
concerned. "You look cool!" was the immediate response of one boy, which leads to my
second point. It established immediately and effectively the connotations I wanted, as
evidenced in this boy's response. It also matched the archetypal role of Jack as trickster and
carried with it what O'Neill describes as "an immediate implication for action ... easily and
eagerly anticipated by the audience." (1995, p.38). O'Neill comments further on this
functional aspect of character. "Because dramatic characters are defined precisely by their
context, it is inevitable that they will partake, to some degree, of the nature of types and may
remain 'stereotype figures and theatrical scarecrows, ' as Thomas Mann called them. " (ibid,
p.l2)
4. See Appendix 7
5. See O'Neill (1995), p.16
6. See Neelands (1984), p.36; Booth (1994), p.82
7. See Brabeck, M (1993), p.37.
8. The function of helper is defined by Propp (1968) as characteristic of the folk tale.
9. It is also possible to interpret this dilemma, as a colleague has, as centring upon a conflict
between Jack's right to his father's money (Kohlberg) versus his responsibility to avoid
causing harm to another person. (Gilligan)
10. See Zipes, (1979)
11. See Mistero Buffo in Fo and Rame (1994)
12. Tricksters like Jack and Puss-in-Boots serve a purpose entirely distinct from mora11eaming,
according to Bettelheim; they build character "..not by promoting choices between good and
bad, but by giving the child the hope that even the meekest can succeed in life. ... Morality
is not the issue in these tales but rather assurance that one can succeed. " (op. cit, p.1 0)
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CHAPTER X
CASESTUDY3
MORAL AND CULTURAL
VALUES IN BARBARA J.
ESBENSEN'S THE STAR MAIDEN
Moral and cultural values in Barbara J. Esbensen's "The Star
Maiden"
In recent years, story-tellers and educationalists have perceived in the
culture of native Americans a respect and love for the land, demonstrative of the
moral virtues of care and stewardship, and a spirituality which emphasises human
connectedness to the earth, Historical figures such as Chief Seattle have gained
iconic status, becoming symbolic of a type of natural wisdom, expressed through
communal values, which western society would do well to learn from) ~and, as a
result of this perspective, native American stories have been retold and presented
as purveyors oftbis wisdom,' However, the rise of post-colonial consciousness,
particularly within the areas of cultural and literary studies, has raised questions .
regarding the ethics of appropriating stories from colonised cultures. As the
native North American Lee Maracle has written:
"The truth is that creeping around libraries full of nonsensical anthropocentric
drivel, imbuing these findings with falsehood in the name of imagination, then
peddling the nonsense as 'Indian Mythology' is literary dishonesty." (cited in
Green and LeBihan, 1996, p.297)
The successful novelist Margaret. Attwood believes that the. best writing about
such a group is likely to come from within that group:
"..not because. those. outside it are likely to vilify it; but because they are likely
these days, and out of well-meaning liberalism, to simplify and sentimentalise it,
or to get the textures and vocabulary and symbolism wrong." (op: cit, p.297)
Rather than being treated with respect, the stories may become subjected to
misrepresentation and trivialization, their part in a complex. system of thought and
myth misunderstood and reduced to platitudes, their values and cultural symbols
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becoming polluted by those of the colonizer and by the commercial forces of post-
industrial capitalism.
Barbara Juster Esbenseit is an award-winning writer of children's stories
who lives in Wisconsin. Many of her books are retellings of native American
stories and two of them, Ladder to the Moon and The Star Maidm are versions of
traditional Ojibway tales. These retellings are, in tum, based upon literary
versions published originally in 1850~in a volume entitled The Traditional History
and Characteristic Sketches of the Oiibway Nation, and written by an Ojibway
chief who had taken the English name George Copway. I am an admirer of
Esbensen's work but a literary and historical analysis of her own and Copway's
texts can serve to illustrate the argumentative force of these two, contradictory
perspectives; the moral power and beauty of such tales on the one hand and the
problematic issues of cultural misappropriation on the other, the latter being
rendered all the more problematic when the retelling of the tale has overtly ethical
intentions.
Esbensen's Tale: "The Star Maiden"
From the outset. Esbensen sets her version of the tale within the natural
environment of the Ojibway nation as itwas "long; long ago, when all the tribes in
the land lived in peace". The illustrations show us a land of beauty and of plenty,
of lakes, streams, woods and wildlife, a world, as the text tells us, "rich with
everything the people needed" The Ojibway are referred to as the people
throughout the tale, a people who love to watch the sky at night when their work
is done. One night, they notice a star, brighter than any ever seen before; and, as
they watch, it falls to earth, coming to rest over a hilltop in the distance. A group
of braves is sent to investigate but they return afraid because the star has refused to
answer their questions. That night, however, a beautiful star maiden appears in a
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dream to a young brave. She tells him how tired she is of her wandering, how
much she loves his people and their world, and bow mucb she would like to live
with them. In the morning, the brave tells the chief of his dream and, at a council
of the wisest men and women of the tribe, the chief announces that they will
welcome the star maiden to live with them in the form she chooses, whether as a
flower, a fish or a bird. That night, the ymmg brave leaves to find the star maiden
and, while she drifts above him, lighting his way through the darkness, he leads her
back to the village. The maiden slips into a rose, but is unhappy there as it is too
far from the village and she can never see the people she loves. So she chooses a
small, blue, prairie flower to be her home, but is disturbed by the trampling hooves
of the buffalo. "I cannot rest here!" she cries out in despair and, that night, the
people are sad to see her return to the sky. But, bovering over the lake, she sees
her reflection, and that of all her sky-sisters floating on the water. She calls to
them to stop their wandering, that the quiet waters below can be their bome. The
people watch as the lights in the sky shake, the lake comes alive with stars and, the
next morning, hundreds of water lilies can be seen floating on the lake. The star
maiden and her sisters have found their place on earth.
The tale is written in a simple and economic poetic style, beautifully
illustrated by Helen K. Davie. Through the artistry of its language, imagery,
structure and illustrations, it promotes a coherent set of spiritual and moral values
which can be illuminated by careful analysis.
The opening lines establish the style and the tone of the whole story.
Once there was a time,
long. long ago,
when all the tribes in the land
lived in peace.
215
There were no wars among them.
Summer was always in the air.
The streams were clear and pure,
and filled with fish.
Esbensen has chosen to write the tale in the fonn of free verse, which serves to
measure the pace of the language and accentuate its rhythms. At times repetition,
like the steady beating of a drum, emphasises this effect. "Your world calls to
me, " the Star Maiden announces to the brave.
"I love the blowing winds
I love the colours I see below me.
Ilove your rivers and lakes. It
The words are simple throughout the narrative, the sentences short, with little or
no subclauses. Similes and metaphors are striking in their simplicity and draw
upon the natural world: the people love to watch the stars j1icker their icy fire";
the Star Maiden's voice is "like a thread of silver". When the chief speaks, his
tones match perfectly those of the narrative as a whole:
'~ star wants to live on earth,
Our people will welcome her.
The blue air over the prairie
wtll fill with bird-song
To honour her coming. "
This simplicity of language may well serve the needs of a young readership but its
cultural and artistic functions go beyond that; for, alongside its rhythm, pace and
imagery, it matches the representations in white, Anglo-Saxon culture of the
speech patterns of wise native American chiefs such as can be seen in numerous
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Hollywood westerns or read in the speeches of Chief Seattle himself In other
words, Esbensen uses the language of the tale to build upon culturally received
images of an idealised nature which conjure a vision of the simple but wise Indian,
the "Noble Savage".
These values are re-inforced and fleshed out by the full-page illustrations
on every alternate page. Each illustration is divided in two, consisting of a large
depiction of the narrative, underneath which a smaller image shows a species of
wildlife - owl, deer or fox, for example - sharing the natural environment of the
Ojibway people. The images are distinct but simultaneous and so emphasise the
independent but peacefully co-existent relationship between the people and the
other creatures of the natural world. The colourful borders which frame each
page are based upon Native American patterned designs and are thus a celebration
of the artistic skills of the people. In addition, the narrative illustrations
throughout sustain an image of communal life, showing us men and women
building a birchbark canoe together; children playing in the fields of com; family
groupings, gazing in wonder at the light in the sky; and the chief and his council
dancing to celebrate their decision to welcome the Star Maiden to earth. In their
work, their play, their politics and religion, the pictures show us a people who live
simply but in harmony with themselves and with their environment. Women, too,
are seen to share in the work and the decision-making; the pictures present images
of a non-sexist society and this is re-inforced in the written text by Esbensen's use
of the gender-neutral pronoun they to describe the tribe's collective activities:
"Allday long, they hunted
andfished They gathered fruits
and nuts. They made birchbark canoes ... "
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Foremost of all the story's ethical messages is the value of stewardship.
For a child listening to or reading the story, the personification of the water lily
equates its existence with that of a recognizably human, if supernatural, life. In
her three manifestations as star, woman and water lily, the Star Maiden is special,
unique and beautiful. The fact that she chooses the most vulnerable of all as her
final destination is an act of love and of faith in the Ojibway people. The last page
of the book, for the first time, addresses the reader directly and the imperative
UTouch them gentlyll is repeated within the space of five lines of text. The reader
is being urged to treat water lilies and, by extension, all forms of natural life which
we, as humans are capable of destroying, with care, restraint and respect. The
water lily may not be of material use to us, it may not feed or clothe us, but its
beauty is meaningful, signifying an active and loving relationship between human
kind and the natural world.
Elizabeth Tooker, in her study of the spirituality of the native peoples of
North America points out that, for the Ojibway, natural phenomena, such as the
Sun, are regarded not as objects but as persons of "other-than-human-type", She
comments that:
"(Ojibway) myths are not about fictitious or necessarily fabulous characters, but
about past lives of 'persons', including importantly persons of the other-than-
human-type. u (1979, p.24)
This gives us some perspective on the religious significance of the original tale for
the Ojibway. Esbensen's rendering of the tale achieves a powerful, spiritual
resonance; but, for a largely white, English-speaking readership, it is fashioned
through analogy with traditional Christian mythology, in particular through the
creation of images implicitly associated with the Garden of Eden and the Coming
of Christ. The world presented at the beginning of the story is immediately
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recognizable as a form of Eden, an idealised land of plenty, of peace and harmony
which the narrative implies no longer exists', The coming of the Star Maiden is
preluded by the appearance of a bright light in the night sky, as is the coming of
Christ to the shepherds; her appearance to the brave in his dream recalls the
visitation of the angels to both Joseph and Mary at the time of her pregnancy; and
the journey of the brave, guided by the light of the Star Maiden, has echoes of the
jouney of the Magi. These analogies are equally in evidence in the illustrations,
where the Star Maiden, beautiful and bathed in light, hovers over the figure of the
brave, or over her reflection in the lake below, with her arms outstretched like an
angel, with the smile and downcast eyes of the Madonna. And when she chooses
a form in which to live among her chosen people, she, like Christ, chooses to
become vulnerable.
"Water lilies! Touch them gently
And remember. "
These last words of Esbensen's text are dense with meanings. She is
signalling that her aim in retelling the story is the same as George Copway's,
namely, to keep an important cultural artefact from disappearing. However, her
intention in selecting this particular story from Copway's book has been shown to
emanate from the important ethical values she believes it can convey to a
contemporary young reader. So, in its most immediate sense, her use of the
imperative "remember" is an urge for her readers to bear in mind how important it
is to treat the natural world with care. It is also a general reminder of how
important stories are for the transmission of values. Finally, and very importantly,
it confirms and emphasises the sense of wistful nostalgia that has permeated the
text since the opening sentences and which is emphasised in the pale water colours
of the illustrations. It is nostalgia for a lost age of innocence, for a noble race
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whose simple but morally admirableway of life has vanished. To recognize this is
to see Esbensen's story, in its portrayal of Native Americans and their culture, as
more than a simple story for ctiildren or the manifestation of a recent educational
trend; it places it in the tradition of a romantic vision of the Indian that extends at
least as far back as Rousseau and James Fenimore Cooper and which has
ideological as well as literary implications.
The dangers of Noble Savagism.
The phrase "Noble Savage" was first coined by Dryden in 1670 in his play
The Conquest of Granada but the concept it engendered was most clearly
expressed by Rousseau. "Thiscondition", he wrote:
"is the real Youth of the World, and .. all ulterior improvements have been so
many steps, in Appearance, towards the Perfection of Individuals, but in Fact
towards the Decrepitness of the Species." (Washburn, 1964, p.418)
Rousseau's belief in a primal age of innocence and his nostalgia for an imagined
time when man was a creature of simple tastes and good instincts, uncorrupted by
the tyranny of modem civilization, is notably similar to the vision at the heart of
Esbensen's tale. But it is through the work of James Fenimore Cooper that this
vision had the most seminal influence on European American sensibilities towards
the American Indian. Rousseau's emphasis on emotion and sentimentality had a
great impact on Romanticism, a movement of thought and art which confronted
the philosophical belief in rationality and progress associated with the
Enlightenment. The Romantics threw aside a belief in the future and embraced
and glorified the past. For them, as for Rousseau, primal peoples were imagined
as living in perfect harmony with nature, morally and physically ravaged only by
civilization. As creations of the Romantic movement, Cooper's "good" Indians,
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such as Uncas and Chingachcook in The Last of the Mohicans, are literary
embodiments of this depiction. However, Cooper was also writing at a time when
the Native Americans were being systematically dispossessed of their territories
and, despite the genuine empathy and pity he felt for the plight of the Indians,
many critics see a particular ideological significance in his depiction of their heroic
but doomed qualities. In the words of Seymour House:
"Since it is far easier to lament a race than to preserve it, Americans accepted
Indian extinction as inevitable and indulged themselves in sentimental nostalgia
for a lost cause that was assuredly lost but that had never truly been a cause. "
(1965, p.61)
Slotkin has described Cooper's "mournful treatment" of the Indians' dispossession
as "at heart, a sentimental response, covertly justifying that very dispossession. "
(cited in Peck, 1992, p.7)
"Through myth, " he writes, ''weimaginatively hoard away the cake we have eaten
and voice our affection for a precapitalist Eden even while we reaffirm our
affiliation with the values and priorities of bourgeois society. " (op. cit, p.86)
Sentimental romanticism, therefore, and the presentation of the Indian as a tragic
figure, noble but doomed, brings with it the dangers of a fatalistic discourse, which
has no room for the expression of political alternatives. As Pearce has written:
"They (the European Americans) pitied his state but saw it as inevitable; they
hoped to bring him to civilization but saw that civilization would kill him. " (cited
in House, 1965, p.61)
Thus the representation of the Native American as an ideal type, the nostalgic
regret for his vanished way of life, can be interpreted as part of a literary tradition
which re-enforces a historical perspective confirming the dispossession and demise
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of the Indian as inevitable. In this sense, adulating and celebrating the Indian is a
type of white man's penance for a collective sin that was really nobody's fault. Its
message becomes one of inaction and regret rather than action and hope.
It is therefore at least arguable that significant ideological values,
historically and culturally transmitted, are at the root of the nostalgia and sentiment
that permeate Esbensen's text; and that, from a post-colonial perspective, she is
guilty of cultural misappropriation. However, before we rush to condemn either
her or her story on ideological grounds, we should not ignore the source of her
tale, itself a literary artefact; nor should we neglect the life of its writer Kah-Ge-
Ga-Gah-Bowh, alias George Copway, Chief of his Nation and missionary of the
Methodist Church.
Copway's Tale: "The Star and the Lily"
The Ojibway, or Chippewa nation traditionally populated the land of lakes
and forests which border on the prairies to the north, west and south of Lake
Superior. Today, many live in Canadian Ontario or in reservations, such as Red
Lake and Leech Lake, in north Minnesota. In 1850, when George Copway wrote
his version of the tale, members of the Ojibway Nation living in the United States
had, for fourteen years, been bound by a treaty to remove to land south of the
Missouri River, a treaty which they managed to have modified by petitioning the
Washington Government in 1855. The words with which they opened the petition
were significant.
"We love the spot where our fathers' bones are laid and we desire that our bones
may rest beside theirs also. Now Father, when our chiefs sold their land to you,
your advice and counsel to us waY that we should abandon our Indian habits and
customs. We have renounced them and are trying to follow your advice and
examples. " (Washbum, 1973,p.2510J
222
Their petition was successful, inasmuch as the threat of removal was lifted; in
agreement, however, their tribal organizations were dissolved. They could now
continue to inhabit the land of their fathers, but as individuals, not as a tribe. Such
were the times Copway lived in. He himself was a native of Ontario and was thus
free from the extent of the oppression endured by those members of his people
who lived in the United States, coerced into consciously abandoning their cultural
practices and into renouncing their capacity to organize politically. However, the
life he chose appears to have been in accordance with the advice offered to the
chiefs who sold their land to the Great White Father.
Copway's book was, in fact, the first volume of native American history
written by an Indian, (Indian being the term he uses himself)' and from it we can
pick up details of his autobiography. His early years were spent following the
traditional way of life of his people but this was broken by twenty months
schooling, conversion to Christianity and six years residency in Boston,
Massachussets.' He appears to have divided the remainder of his life between
missionary preaching among the Ojibway in the West and to pleading their cause
to white Christians and philanthropists in the East. 6 In a series of letters written to
the Philadelphia Saturday Evening Post, he is revealed as a visionary who foresaw
a "catastrophic exterminating war" on the plains of the West; and as a champion of
his people's rights, albeit one who urged that their salvation lay through the
civilizing processes of Christianity and an education in English language and
literature"
In the light of this, a study of Copway's version of the story, which he
entitled The Star and the Lily, is revealing. The accusations of nostalgia, of
idealization, of sentimentality that one might level at Fenimore Cooper, or at
Esbensen, are accentuated in his own narrative. The whole of his book, in fact, is
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suffused with nostalgia, presenting a vision of his people not too dissimilar from
that of the Noble Savage. The tale is narrated in the voice of an old Indian chief
and is framed by Copway's own' experience of hearing it told as a child. The chief
himself is presented in images evocative of peace, wisdom and simple tranquility.
Before relating the tale to a group of children, he is "sat in his wigwam, quietly
smoking his favourite pipe" (P,97). At the end, "while tears fell fast from the
eyes of all, the old man laid down and was soon silent in sleep," (ibid, p.l02)
Copway then takes up the first person:
"Since that, I have often plucked the white lily, and garlanded it around my head -
have dipped it in its watery bed - but never have I seen it without remembering the
legend of the descending star. "(ibid,p.l 02)
His prose rings with cultural echoes different from Esbensen's, having more in
common with Dickens than Chief Seattle. It is written with the fluency, the
rhythms and the manners of the nineteenth century educated middle classes, of
those white Europeans who wrote in sentimental terms about the Indians rather
than in the language which Esbensen represents as that of the Indians themselves.
As a man who devoted much of his adult life to the propagation of Christianity
among his people, it is unsurprising that the biggest influence on the tone and
imagery of his prose is recognizably that of the Bible. In his version of the tale the
allusions to the Garden of Eden are explicit:
"The beasts of thefield were tame, they came and went at the bidding of man. It
was ...a time when earth was a paradise and man worthily its possessor'(ibid;
p.98)
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This is not the unheirarchical paradise of Esbensen's tale. Here, as in Genesis,
beast is servant to man; and, as in nineteenth century capitalist America, man owns
the land. The Indians, he tells us, loved to watch the stars:
''for they believed them to be the residences of the good who had been taken home
by the Great Spirit. "(ibid, p.98)
Expressed in these terms, there is evidently very little difference between the
Ojibway belief in an afterlife and the Christian concept of heaven. In the words
chosen by the chief to close his tale, Copway makes a direct reference to heaven in
a phrase which calls to mind the cadences of the Lord's Prayer ("Thy will be done
on earth as it is in Heaven").
"Children! when you see the lily on the waters, take it in your hands, and hold it
to the skies, that it may be happy on earth as its two sisters, the morning and
evening stars, are happy in heaven." (ibid, p.102)
The imagery associating the Star with the coming of Christ, and the angelic
appearance of the Star Maiden, are also present; like Christ, the Star Maiden will
suffer little children to come unto her:
"Children! yes, they shall be my playmates, and I shall kiss their brows when they
slumber by the sides of cool lakes" (ibid, p.lOl)
and she hovers "with expanded wing" as she follows the braves to the village.
Copway's stated aim may have been to preserve the stories of his people but, here,
he chose to do so in the Christian vernacular. This may have been a subconscious
result of his own acculturation but is more likely to have been a conscious attempt
to accommodate Christian values into the traditional stories of his people. In
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either case, Esbensen's adaptation can be seen to have harnessed Christian religious
imagery already existent in Copway's text.
The extent of Copway's christianisation of the tale can to some extent be
measured by comparing it to another version, that published in a collection by
Louise Jean Walker in 1961. Walker claims in her introduction that her tales are
faithful versions of those told to her in person by Chippewas themselves. Here,
the Star Maiden is a spirit, one of the good fairies whom the Chippewa people
respect and never disturb. She is not the vulnerable figure portrayed by Copway
and Esbensen and there is a strong hint of sexuality in her decision to live in the
lake.
"... she saw a whiteflower with a heart of gold shining on the waters below. As
she looked, a canoe, steered by the young warrior who had told her wishes to his
people, shot past and the strong, brown hand brushed the edge of the flower. "
(p.18)
She does not seek or need the protection of the people and this mix of desire and
respect is a spiritual reflection of the Chippewa's relationship with Nature, a
relationship of mutual respect and sensual pleasure. Devoid of the sentiment,
nostalgia, and Christian imagery, Walker's tale has a very different meaning.
Conclusion
Copway's paradox is a moving one. The nostalgic regret for the
disappearance of his people's way of life is expressed in Romantic and Christian
sentiments acquired from the very culture responsible for this disappearance; and,
as a Methodist missionary, he was himself, in part, an agent of this culture. Yet
his intentions as a writer were different from those of Romantics such as Fenimore
Cooper. For right or for wrong, he saw western civilization as a force which
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could bring either dignity or corruption to his people, dependent upon which
western values they were exposed to. Those of the Christian and the
Philanthropist (to whom he dedicated his preface) would enable the Indian "to rise
above the soil of degradation and hover about the high mounts of wisdom and
truth." (1979, p.tx); whereas those of the frontiersmen would bring about the
downfall of the Indian for the white man's personal profit and gains. Civilization
as he defined it wouldn't kill his people but, at the time in which he lived, could
possibly save them. As such, he did not despair for the future of his people but
saw it in terms of a struggle, a cause not yet lost, and he campaigned hard for their
political and educational welfare. The publication of his book in 1850 had a
political purpose, stated in the preface:
". that I may awaken in the heart a deeper feeling for the race of red-men and
induce the pale-face to use greater effort to effect an improvement in their social
and political relations " (ibid, p. Vii)
Despite its sentiment and nostalgia, it was a work intended to provoke political
action, not excuse political inaction. And the extent of his own acculturation into
the contemporary, western, literary canon meant that he understood how to appeal
in his writing to a white, urban, educated audience.v
James Axtell (1981) has pointed out that, when the Indian and Christian
cultures met, the direction of religious change was unilinear, due to Christianity's
aggressive and exclusive evangelism However, he goes on to argue that to be on
the defensive did not imply a total lack of initiative.
"The Indians were incredibly tenacious of their culture and life-style, but their
traditionalism was neither blind nor passive ... native peoples ... were remarkably
resourceful in adjusting to new conditions, especially in using elements of
European religious culture for their own purposes. " (ibid, p.86)
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When preaching to the Ojibway, Copway had most probably learned to adapt the
traditional tales of his tribe for missionary purposes, using them to promote
Christian values. Nonetheless, his purpose in publishing was to find a white
readership for the tales, to promote an appreciation for the cultural richness of his
people among those Euro-Americans who could influence political action. For
this reason, the integration of European cultural references within the Ojibway
narrative can be interpreted not only as a conscious attempt to preserve that
narrative within an aggressive, dominant culture but also as a play upon nineteenth
century, bourgeois sensibilities for the intended political benefit of his people. The
symbolic imagery and nostalgic aura which he contributed to The Star and the Lily
need not, therefore, be viewed in a negative light. As Fred Inglis has written,
''Nostalgia is not a swearword It may be as much a powerful force for good and
positive action as it may be a passive or anaesthetic pervasion of the spirit. (1993,
p.46)
It is attributable to Copway's artistry and inter-cultural referencing that his book
survived and that Esbensen, over one hundred years later, came to see in his
version of The Star and the Lily a powerful vehicle for moral values, relevant to
the dominant culture in a much later age. And, aware though we might be of the
ideological complexity and problematic intertextuality of her tale, I would argue
that the moral concerns at its heart are more a force for good than for anything
else and that we should permit children the possibility to be moved by its simple
poetry and the play of its images.
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NOTES
I. Although there is currently some doubt as to whether Chief Seattle ever delivered the speech
for which he has become famous, its influence persists. See, for example, the resource pack
published by the United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (1984).
2. See Caduto, M. and Bruchac, B. (1988a and 1988b).
3. Sally Hunter, a professor of Children's Literature who lives in 81. Paul. USA, insists that
there is no Eden-like story inOjibway mythology. I am grateful for Barbara Juster Esbensen
for this information.
4. See Copway (1978) p.xi
s. Op.cit, p.vili
6. Op. cit, p.vili, where he specifically addresses the preface of his book "To the Christian.and
the Philanthropist" .
7. Op.cit, p.ix and p.24S.
8. Op.cit, p.241.
9. Copway openly declares his love for English literature and, on p.viii of his preface, indicates
his admiration for the literary styles of Irving and Macauley.
229
Moral and cultural values in the drama of "The Star Maiden"
The work described and analysed below was taught over five sessions, of
approximately one hour each in length. The children were a Year 5 class in a
Roman Catholic Primary School situated on the outskirts of a city centre. My
analysis of the story has indicated that, unlike the previous case studies, I had
identified its ethical values as a source I wished to tap into rather than to counter
but that there were nonetheless problems concerning the cultural representation of
native American people and the appropriation of their mythology. My broad
intentions in the drama were, therefore, twofold. Firstly, to explore the moral
agenda of the tale - issues of stewardship, of care for the environment - through
enhancing the poetic symbolism, not disturbing it, and by harnessing the powerful
emotional pull of the tale. Secondly, to de-mythologise the representation of the
Noble Savage by presenting historicised models of dispossessed Native Americans,
framed within a contemporary context. The drama was intended to explore an
ethical tension between economic pressures and cultural identity and hence
introduce further moral dimensions. I was aware that this was an ambitious
project and, in the event, the drama which ensued worked most effectively through
the moral resonances of its symbolism while throwing up further ambivalences
concerning cultural, moral and spiritual values and their manifestation in drama.
Yet this uncertain outcome is what makes it worthy of analysis.
A narrative of the Sessions
In the first session, I read the children the story, first of all giving a brief
introduction to its source, its age and to the importance of stories for the Native
American peoples. We then studied the illustrations and I followed this with an
origami exercise, making a water lily out of two squares of coloured paper and
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promising to come into the school to work in small groups with all those children
who would like to make their own. We then began to work together on a dance
which told the story of The Star Maiden through movement. I taught the opening
sequence and choreographed the rest, which was devised from the children's own
movements. The dance was completed and performed to music in the second
session. Following this, we created a composite calligram, in the shape of a star,
using phrases from the final two pages of the book, and experimented with
different ways of reading it.I
The drama proper took place during the third and fourth sessions, spread
over two days, in the following week. First of all, the children took it in turns to
lay the lilies they had made over some blue paper which I had placed in a comer of
the hall. They then sat in a semi-circle before it and recognized that they had
created a representation of the lake where the Star Maiden lived with her sisters.
We recapped the significance of the story and I then showed an illustration of a
modem day, teenage native American, which depicted clearly the poverty of life on
a reservation'. I briefly related how the white settlers had dispossessed the
Indians of their land. I then told the children that we would begin to make our
own story, set in the modem world, about the people to whom the story of The
Star Maiden belonged. We would make this in the form of a drama which began
with a dream. I simultaneously narrated and enacted the dream, explaining that it
was the recurring dream of the young Chief of his tribe. In it, he would see
himself signing a contract in exchange for money, and then, dressed in a smart,
new suit, floating in a canoe on the lake beside which he had lived as a child. He
would stoop to pick a water lily, which he would then crush in his hands and drop
into the lake, awakening suddenly and in a sweat. After discussing and analysing
the dream image in great detail, the children worked in groups to create a dramatic
image which might explain this dream in terms of recent events in the chiefs life.
231
All images' depicted the chief selling the land and the lake without the consent of
his people.
At the start of the next Session, we sat around the lake and re-opened the
discussion of possible reasons as to why the chief might have decided to sell the
land and why he now felt so guilty about it. I then took on the role of the Chiefs
grandfather and told the children how I had traveled to the city to speak with my
grandson, who worked there as a successful businessman; and I explained how the
people in the offices there had ignored and been rude to me; and how I pitied
them, for they were not at peace. After creating the atmosphere of those offices
as it must have felt for the old man, the children then played out, in collective
roles, the meeting of the son and his grandfather, at the end of which the son
agreed to meet with his people and explain his decision. For this meeting, I took
on the role of the Chief and insisted that the money from the sale would be used to
build houses and provide jobs and amenities that my people could enjoy and
benefit from. At the end of the meeting I came out of role, stood at some distance
from the lake and asked the children to position themselves either around the lake,
close to me, or in-between, depending upon where their sympathies as members of
the tribe now lay. All grouped closely around the lake. We discussed how the
Chief must have felt to experience such rejection; then, as the drama had begun
with a dream, I asked them to end it with a dream. In small groups, they were
asked to think how the story might end and to create a dramatic image, this time
from the dream of a member of the tribe, which would hint at what this ending
was. After viewing and discussing these, I asked the children what they thought
we could learn from the story we had created. The following week, in a final,
classroom session, the children created their own star poems. Given the phrase
Touch Them Gently, they were asked to compose the poem by naming and
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describing things in the world of today, or in the traditional world of the Native
Americans, which they thought needed to be treated with care.'
These lessons were not ideal models of sustained good practice. There
were two boys in the class with behavioural problems who were never disruptive
but only intermittently involved in the drama or its accompanying classwork;
overall, the children's lack of experience with the medium affected their ability to
create effective dramatic images; I made a very basic error of judgement by
thinking the children would be able to manage the scene where, in role as the chief,
I visited the office environments they had created. However, I felt at its
conclusion that, on the whole, the children had worked with commitment and
serious moral engagement, creating a strong sense of group identity, a view
supported by the spoken and written comments of the teacher'. In addressing
where, why and how it worked as moral education, I will not be neglecting the
ambivalences which make it, in the end, a difficult drama to evaluate. The
framework established in Case Study 2 is still pertinent to its analysis and I will
make direct use of it but will begin by proposing and analysing a further category:
that of ritual.
Ritual enrolment and moral involvement
''Even to say it in one word, ritual, is asking/or trouble" (Schechner, 1993, p.228)
The dynamic of the drama was dependent upon the children being able to
feel, understand and articulate the moral issues contained within the symbolisms of
the tale and why it might be of significance to a particular culture. Consequently,
the main intention of the first two sessions was to help them internalise and care
for the story and for this I deployed strategies which were ritualistic in form. As
the above quote from Schechner suggests, however, the concept of ritual is a
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slippery one and recently theorists within the field of process drama have
attempted to define its characteristics in greater depth. O'Neill usefully draws our
attention to the nature and function of ritual in social life and to how many plays,
particularly by Shakespeare, contain examples of them, ranging from processions,
feasts and coronations to weddings, trials and funerals. Such rituals she defines
as: "a way of understanding and celebrating our own lives in the context of our
communities. " and emphasises their purpose in the theatre as bearers of "harmony
and fulfillment" (1995, p.147) In process drama, however, the term ritual is used
not only with reference to the imitation of such real life rituals but to define
specific conventions intended to serve similar communal purposes within the
contextualised, structural needs of a particular dramatic event. These commonly
include the use of a conch to ritualise turn-taking and the deployment of theatre
forms such as trials and public meetings. O'Neill sees a significant function of
both kinds of ritual as the "distancing and containing (of) emotion." (ibid, p.149)
For O'Toole, ritual in process drama is characterised by "the formalised and
ceremonial sharing of a moment perceived to be Significant by all those
concerned" (1992, p.29) He sees its use at the beginning ofa drama as:
"... part of the enrolment, as a way of committing the participants to eachother
and to the drama. " (ibid; p.160)
One of the ways it manages this is to involve the participants in a task in which
there is a tension implicit to its very undertaking. Neelands and Goode stress the
differences in drama between ritual and mere entertainment. For them rituals
"establish a community of ideas, beliefs and values." (1995, p.17) and ritual
experience ''actualises .. through symbols the spiritual and material aspirations of
a community." (ibid, p.18)
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In the drama of The Star Maiden there were three enrolling events which I
would classify as ritual: the creation and performance of the Dance; the creation
and reading of the communal Star Poem; and the creation of the water lilies and
the lake, the visual "set" for the drama. All were communal, formalised
experiences meant to enrol the children into the spirit of the drama by generating
commitment and by creating a shared feeling of significance, harmony and
fulfillment. The success of these rituals was most powerfully evidenced by the
children's involvement in and responses to the dance.
The movements of the dance depicted the story and used the book's
illustrations as stimuli. The opening phrases, which I taught, consisted of stylised
movements suggesting how the Ojibway people used to live: hunting, fishing from
the lake, gathering fruit. The children's own motifs were structured around the
journey of the young brave to meet the Star Maiden, the descent of the stars from
heaven and their transformation into water lilies. The music - Red Wind, by
Gabrielle Roth and the Mirrors - was characterised by soft but heavy rhythms,
resonant of native American drumming.' The tensions implicit to the creation and
performance of this dance involved the children in measured movement through
space; in working in unison, as individuals yet as one; in groups which changed
formation and where touch, support and teamwork were necessary; and in shared,
repetitive spatial and temporal patterning.
demonstrated through the body.
It was learning achieved and
"The body ... is the place where humanity achieves the ritualisation of motion in
an artjorm called 'dance' ... the most important and pervasive means by which
primal peoples celebrate living. " (Highwater, 1981, p.133)
Jamake Highwater is a contemporary Native American writer who has explained
the spiritual, ritualistic force of dance in the experience of primal people and
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argues that only recently has western culture begun to rediscover an understanding
of the significance of dance to the communal emotional and spiritual life. Recent
writing by western theorists and educationalists on dance would support his
argument," Boas is one theorist who stresses the transformative nature of dance,
defining it in terms of an aesthetic available to all:
"ordinary gestures and actions can become dance if a transformation takes place
within the person; a transformation which takes him (sic) out of the ordinary
world and places him in a world of heightened sensitivity. (cited in Spencer, 1985,
p.2)
Understood in these terms, dance has the potential to become a powerful,
sensitizing, communal experience and, after creating, rehearsing and performing
the Star Maiden dance, the children were questioned as to its emotional impact
upon them. Their responses were immediate:
GIRL:
GIRL
GIRL
BOY
BOY
GIRL
GIRL
It makes me feel peaceful inside, nice and calm.
Happy
Special
It looked like the stars in the night, in a nice night, like seeing it
with a nice sunset.
I feel like I'm in the tribe, like I'm in the story, cos the music fits in
with my idea of the people.
I feel comfy.
It reminds me of lilies, floating about on the water.
Performing the dance, therefore, enhanced the emotional impact of the story by
distancing and containing this impact within a strong, artistic form." It conjured
up positive feelings of well-being associated with a web of imagined images which
had the story at their centre, helping the children to care, not necessarily, in any
deeper sense, for eachother but for the story, the focus of the dance itself An
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emotional bond, encouraged by ritual, now linked them more firmly to the fiction
and to the symbolic figure of the Star Maiden. Consequently, within the drama
that followed, children were more readily able to participate in serious, symbolic
play, where care for the story as a cultural belief came to be at the heart of the
moral confrontation between the Chief and his people.
However, it is interesting to reflect once again on Williams' contention that
"drama .. is neither ritual which discloses the God nor myth which requires and
sustains repetition. ''8 The Star Maiden dance exhibited both these features of
ritual and emphasises that the drama was to have a different function, one intended
to dialogize the experience of the dance. In the event, as subsequent analysis will
suggest, the success of the dance as ritual provided an emotional imbalance which
worked to the detriment of the intended dialogism of the drama. To appreciate
why this should have happened, it is helpful to remember that I was not working in
a value-free, cultural vacuum. This was a Catholic school and a class in which all
bar one of the children were Catholic and where, according to the teacher, 70% of
them were regular church-goers." In other words, these were children whose lives
were attuned to ritual; whose school community was defined largely by the
importance it attached to the ritual of the Catholic mass; and who consequently
understood ritual as a serious and significant event. The children's firm grounding
in Christian mythology needs to be borne in mind as an important contributary
factor to this particular drama with these particular children. Rather than the
ritual creating their ability to work with the story, it is more precise to see it as
working in congruence with an already existent sensitivity to the story's symbolism
and its potential significance to a people. Although Christian terminology was
never used or referred to throughout the drama, I will argue that its resonances,
skilfully interwoven by Copway into the text of The Star and the Lily and inherited
by Esbensen, greatly facilitated the children's capacity to work fictionally and with
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integrity in a cultural context different from their own. At the heart of this was
their ability to work with the symbolism of the story and the drama.
Responding to the dramatic image as a source of moral reflection
''It is the play's central image that remains, its silhouette, and if the elements are
highly blended this silhouette will be its meaning, this shape will be the essence of
what it has to say. n (Brook, 1968, p.152)
Ezra Pound has defined the poetic image as "that which presents an intellectual
and emotional complex in an instant of time". He writes:
"The image is more than an idea. It is a vortex or cluster of fused ideas and is
endowed with energy." (cited in Rogers. 1978, p.7)
These characteristics - complexity, fusion of intellect and emotion, energy - give us
some clue as to the power of imagery to generate moral reflection and to capture
moral conflict as it is most truly experienced; as a complex nexus of contradictory
reasons passionately argued and emotions passionately felt. The sensorial
qualities of symbolic imagery carry with them the necessary charge to convey this;
and, in the words of Iris Murdoch:
''Metaphors often carry a moral charge which analysis in simpler and plainer
terms is designed to remove. " (1970, p.77)
The meaning of this drama hinged upon the dramatic image which gave form to the
Chief's recurring dream, used at the beginning of the third session. The image
portrays the chief, dressed in a smart suit, signing a contract for the sale of land
and water and being handed money in dollar bills; then, as dreams do, the location
shifts to the lake where he grew up, the contract now being used as an oar to steer
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him across the lake in a birchbark canoe. As he stoops to pick the lily, the words
of a proverb taught him by his grandfather resound through his head:
"Ourpeople will live until the waters turn sour
Until the land is scorched by the Sun
And the Star Maiden loses sight of her sisters above. "
As the words fade, he crushes the lily and drops it into the lake, awakening in a
sweat and covering his face with his hands.
Dreams are a common convention in non-naturalistic drama and O'Neill has
shown how they can be used by practitioners of process drama.
"Words, actions and sounds in a dream can be patterned and distorted in a
grotesque but highly Significant manner. The dream also provides a strong
temporal orientation - a reliving of a happy or painful past incident or a
premonition offuture happenings." (1995, p.146)
The dream suggests a tension between the tribe's past and the chiefs desire to
make a different future.'? It also served the aesthetic function of placing symbol,
and the interpretation of symbol, at the heart of the drama, thus creating a
congruence with the poetic form of the original story and allowing for a dialogical
interplay between their symbolisms. The ambivalence integral to these symbols
provided a holding form with sufficient space to accommodate a polyphony of
related meanings which the children could supply; and the fact that these meanings
had moral connotations allowed the symbol to carry a moral charge, as defined by
Iris Murdoch. Semiotically the image signalled just such a moral conflict through
somatic responses indicative of feelings associated with the discomfort of anguish,
guilt and remorse. Finally, its unfinished, unexplained ambivalence had the appeal
of a mystery, providing the impetus to engage the children's imaginative energies in
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the task of interpreting its meaning. Ambivalence, described by Ushenko as "a
coprescence of contextually controllable and integral alternatives" is seen by the
same theorist as the motor of the imagination, which he defines as "thepower to
envisage, or visualise, ambivalence and ambiguity." (cited in Nawottny, 1962,
p.147) Given such a stimulus, the children's analysis of the dream image proved
to be striking, not only as a demonstration of their ability to make moral sense of it
but also for the complexity of moral meanings they could justifiably interpret from
it. For this reason, I present their responses in detail below, slightly editing my
contributions as teacher, followed by an interpretive commentary.
GI Well, it's the contract, like, asking themfor water lilies
BI Someone's asktngfor his land and he gives it to them
T. Does he give it to them?
G2 No, he gives in and sells it.
G3 He thinks he's been a traitor to his people for selling the land.
B2 I think he's really selfish. The clothes are just for himself. And
he sells the land without telling anybody else. Hejust sells it.
He sold the land where his people lived? Without telling them?
They won't have anywhere to live because he sold the /and.
Right, OK
He's fed up being poor and not having good places to live. He
thinks, 'I'm fed up with all this, I need to do something better!'
But, really, the better thing was wrong.
... What do you think he did, then?
T.
B2
T.
G4
T.
G4
GI
T
Well ... he realised it was wrong.
Well, the thing was, he crushed the water lily so afterwards, like,
he realised what he had done and he was really mad with himself.
It's a dream, it's not necessarily anything he's done. What do you
think this means? (picks up the lily and crushes it. Hands shoot
up)
It's the Star Maiden.
So what's he done to her?
He's killed her
G5
T
MANY:
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Why do you think that's the last thing in his dream, when he wakes
up he goes ....? (covers his face with his hands) What does it
mean? What's it making himfeel?
G5 Angry
G6 Mad
T
B3 Like someone's telling him off
D2 I think that the water lily is like his land and he's crushed it when
he's sold it, like he's got rid of it, just for himself.
B4 It's freedom, getting away from things .. hard things .. things like,
living like tramps all around the place and not having good food.
T .... Does anyone think he might have sold the land not just for
himself but he's still feeling bad about what he's done? ... (several
hands go up)
B5 He might feel, to help people cos he's got the money to make, like,
the power to improve their lives, giving them water and things and
stuff like that.
T. .... So why might he still feel so bad about it?
DI He may havefallen out with his people, with his tribe, then he took
the land awayfrom them. Now he knows what he's done and he
can't give the land back to them.
GI I think he's done something bad to his people and without asking
them what they wanted first. But, like, he's just gone and made
this decision and didn't ask them and he might have done the
opposite to what they want.
B4 He's betraying the Star Maidens cos he's leaving them.
D6 I think that his grandparents said that their people would stay until
the water's gone sour, like they'll keep on going until, like, it's all
gone but he's changed that, by taking the /and and water from
them and giving it to someone elsefor money.
D3 He's scared cos his grandma and grandad made a rule and he
feels that he's breaking it.
G6 I think he wants to sell the land because he knew his tribe were
poor and probably he thought, like, because we're poor I should
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sell the land. But just because his people are poor, it doesn't
mean that they don't want to live on this land.
It is to be emphasised that all of the children's comments were, and were
understood to be, speculative, in the mode of "perhaps", even though they often
chose to express these speculations as substantive statements. Immediately, the
contract, a formal symbol of a social, moral code, is seen to be at the heart of the
tension and the vice of moral cowardice, of giving in, is offered to account for the
Chiefs discomfort. Girl 3 sees it as deeper than this; the Chief has betrayed his
people and failed in his obligations as their leader. Boy 2 detects selfishness in the
contrast between the Chief's own display of wealth and his people's poverty; and
also in his despotic action and aggressive individualism. His crime, in this boy's
eyes, is to be incriminated in the dispossession and resulting homelessness of his
community. Girl4 is the first to describe a motive for the Chiefs action but sees
his own desire for personal betterment as unjustifiable, sensing that a subsequent
realization of this has caused his sense of remorse. The Chiefs crushing of the
water lily is first interpreted as a projected act of aggressive destruction, directed
really at himself but is then seen very lucidly by Boy 2 as entirely symbolic. It is
interesting that the children's responses throughout show that they understand the
feelings associated with guilt but never articulate it as a concept. It is sensed in
the Chiefs body language, as the anger which expresses the shame and fiustration
that a child can experience when scolded by an adult; hence the Freudian depiction
of guilt here, which envisions a parental figure censuring the Chief Boy 4
expresses with some sensitivity an understanding of the harshness of life on the
reservation and sees that the money could be used to buy freedom, which he
defines in economic terms. There is a swift response when the Teacher suggests
that there might be a possible altruistic explanation for the Chiefs act. This is
242
voiced by Boy 5 and recognizes that the Chief could have been acting in the
economic interest of his tribe. Boy 1 speculates that it might, in fact, have been a
vindictive action, regretted after the event while Girl 1 passes judgment on the
Chief's qualities of leadership. Boy 4 returns to the concept of treachery, this time
evoked through the symbol of the Star Maiden while Boy 3 sees the fact that the
Chief's grandparents uttered the proverb as particularly significant. This, to him,
gives it the status of a rule and suggests that the ties of kinship are significant but
have been disrupted. Finally, Girl 6 gives a very concise and balanced
appreciation of the fact that this could be a story of a conflict between economic
interests, as defined by a leader, and the historical and cultural attachments of the
people he is trying to serve.
The image itselfwas "imposed" by the teacher but its meaning was not; and
the children's interpretations were so many possible stories, speculative and
communal, clustering around a variety of thick concepts and evoking a number of
interweaving moral themes. The children could see stories of cowardice, of
treachery, vindictiveness, tyranny, and unjust dispossession. They could also see
the story of a clash between economic and cultural forces, of stability and change,
of well-intentioned but flawed leadership. This latter point illustrates MacIntyre's
argument: that it was within the Chief's social role as leader that children identified
his moral function - to do right by his people and uphold the traditions of the tribe.
They articulated this by suggesting different narratives to explain the dream which,
to use Louis Arnaud Reid's term, were apprehended rather than comprehended
from the resonance of the symbolism." J.H. van der Hoop has described symbols
as:
"the chief means by which the human mind expresses not so much those ideas
which it has outgrown, or wishes to conceal, but those which it has not yet
mastered" (cited in Nowottny, 1962, p.174)
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To rephrase this insight speculatively, perhaps it is through symbolism that children
can appreciate and learn to express ideas they have not yet mastered. With this in
mind, it is worth examining how the children made dramatic use of the starflower -
the symbol linking our improvised story dialogically with the original - as an aid to
making moral sense of the drama.
The starflowers the children made were of tissue paper. Like a real water
lily, they were pretty but fragile. The ritual of bringing them into the hall and
laying them on the paper at the start of each of the final two sessions was a
physical reminder of this and of the story's closing words. "Touch them gently." I
had, in fact, made my own starflower and had placed it on the "lake" but not all of
the children realised this. So when I picked it up and crushed it, the effect was
marked as the metaxis was so acute. Here was I, a teacher, destroying something,
perhaps the work of a child in the class. The fictional act of destruction was
represented by a real act of destruction and the children's faces initially registered
shock; for not only had the moral of the initial story been contravened but so, they
felt - for an instant - had the moral code of the classroom." Comments in the
transcript above reveal the extent to which, on the fictional level, the children were
able to identify this act of destruction as a symbolic act of violence against the Star
Maiden, against the land where the Chiefs people lived and, by analogy, against
their values and beliefs. This persisted in their minds as the moral touchstone
throughout the rest of the drama In the fourth session, when the Chief spoke in
collective role with his grandfather, the following exchange took place:
CHIEF
You'll be breaking the Star Maiden's heart.
You're the one who'll break the Star Maiden's heart by selling the
/and
Why?
CHIEF
GRAN
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GRAN Because she came here to settle and we let her in and now you're
taking all that away from her. That is no longer her land and she
is one of us.
This was echoed soon after in the scene where, in role as their Chief, I addressed
the children as my people:
BOY
TGWR
BOY
TCHR
GIRL
TCHR
GIRL
TCHR
GIRL
TCHR
You sold the land. Get it back, or you are not an Indian, you're a
city person.
Are you saying I will not be one of you?
Yes.
I'll always be one of you.
Ifyou destroy our lake and the lilies in it, you are actually killing a
person. Someone that we loved and she loved us.
A person (pointing to the Jake) But they aren't people, they're
flowers.
Have you forgotten what they mean?
What do they mean?
They're a star from the sky.
But that's a story, it's just a story.
GIRL It isn't. Us Indians believe in it. If you are an Indian, you
should, too.
TCHR
GIRL
In the city, if you told them that story, they would say, 'It's a nice
story.' Ifyou said you believed it's true, they'd laugh at you.
Let them laugh. It's our beliefs.
The words of the girl in this exchange resonate with spiritual significance. At this
moment in the drama, the Star Maiden and her story are defined as something
sacred, as a symbol of the values and beliefs of a people and their betrayal by the
Chief is seen as a betrayal of his own cultural identity. Once again we need to
remember that such an understanding was perhaps not difficult for this Catholic
child; for, if she could believe in reality that a wafer of bread could be transformed
into the flesh of the Son of God then she could manage a fiction where to kill a lily
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was, indeed, to kill a person. This does not diminish the effectiveness of the
dramatic symbolismbut emphasises that its power lay in its ability to activate and
transform, through art, values which were already present within the participants.
Cultural representation and moral interpretation
In a previous case study I argued that Heathcote's brotherhood code could
be deployed by teacher-in-role to make simplistic moral meanings represented in
archetypal characters more expansive. In this drama, matters were more complex
as both characters were new creations and their meanings were built not from their
representations within the text of the original story but by their dialogical
relationship with the values it embodied and the symbols it contained. If the
Grandfather was in the brotherhood of all those who are victims of prejudice and
of economic "progress" and of those who resist change, he was also in the
brotherhood of those attached to historical values and traditions; who have faith in
religious stories; who place spiritual values above material values. The Chief, on
the other hand, was in the brotherhood of all those who embrace material values;
who believe they have the understanding to act in the best interest of others. He
was also in the brotherhood of those who reject the beliefs upon which they were
raised; who compromise their cultural identities; who embrace material values at
the expense of spiritual values.
My intention was to create these characters as historicised, non-mythic
figures, with the grandfather and the chief finding eachother on opposing sides
when encountering the historical forces of cultural and economic change. This
would, I hoped, work against the flawed image of the noble savage and engage
children, in role as members of the tribe, with a genuinely historicised moral
conflict. The final confrontation between Chief and tribe would become the scene
in which this conflict would be articulated. It was, and it was powerful, but not in
246
the manner I had intended and it is debatable as to how far the drama became
historicised in any real sense.
When introducing the Grandfather into the drama I used the convention of
the spoken stage direction, focusing carefully on each item of costume before Iput
it on.
"This hat is an old hat, white with age. The grandfather can't afford another.
He needs this hat to protect his head against the rain. It is not an Indian hat but
he uses it.... A blanket, woven by his wife, many years ago. A traditional Indian
blanket which keeps him warm in winter .... A stick. He's old, not as strong as he
once was. "
These descriptions emphasised the status of the old man as victim and the items of
costume acted as deictic signifiers of this fact throughout his appearance. The
fact that he represented a world under threat was reinforced by his speech. I
spoke in short, simple sentences, similar to those of the Esbensen text, echoing its
nostalgic tones and the cultural references evoked through its rhythms.
"People in the city, they are not at peace. They shout, they move too fast, they
appear to me to be angry. My people used to like to sit in the sun, to listen to the
sounds of the natural world, to live by runmng waters. "
On reflection, these examples reveal the danger of replacing one sentimentalised,
cultural stereotype - the noble savage - with another - the equally noble and wise,
old Indian. If the hat and the blanket were meant to historicise the old man then
they did so in a very imprecise way. They were not chosen from any knowledge I
had of the modern Ojibway tribe but were drawn from cultural representations of
native American people I could recall from documentary and film and were used
primarily for functional reasons. The bowler hat, in particular, could be artfully
contrasted with a newer, smarter version worn later by the chief, bearing the
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different connotations of a city businessman. There was a tension, therefore,
between artistic efficency and cultural accuracy and I was cavalier in my approach
to the latter for the sake of the former. If the two men were represented with a
lack of historical and geographical precision then so, too, was the conflict they
evoked. This was an entirely fictional representation, drawn from a knowledge
that there exist in Canada and the USA native Americans who have become
millionaires from running gambling casinos on their reservations, as well as those
who continue to suffer poverty from their historical dispossession. In my defense,
I can argue that my aim was not precise, historical accuracy but the representation
through dramatic fiction of an historically plausible moral conflict, using those
resources I could best muster. If the drama lacked a certain kind of truthfulness
based upon cultural specificity, it was, perhaps, specific enough for these children,
thousands of miles away and in another culture. Nevertheless, the extent to which
the children were able to appreciate this conflict remains debatable; and if, as I
have argued, the moral power of the story's symbolism can be largely explained by
its Christian analogies, we need to view the nature of any moral learning which
took place within this final session not only from within the fonn of the drama but
from within the boundaries of the children's own cultural identities.
The old man may have become a cultural stereotype, verging on the
mythic, but despite this - or possibly because of it - he proved to be a very efficient
dramatic creation." When given the chance to hot-seat him, the children were
quick to convey their sympathy in questions which denoted a moral standpoint as
well as a sense of emotional connectedness.
''Doyou think people ignore you because of your colour?
"Apartfrom your grandson, is there any other family you could tum to?"
"Since he's been in the city, do you feel alone?"
''How do you feel about the way you live, like in shacks?"
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"How do you feel now that the land's been taken away from you?"
These questions reveal sympathy for the Grandfather as a victim of racism,
loneliness, poverty and dispossession, sympathies aroused by the visual and
sensorial qualities of his embodiment as much as by the sense of the words he
spoke. Stereotype he may have been, but he was nonetheless a clear poetic
symbol, containing a powerful, moral charge. For what intrigued the children
most of all when questioning the old man, was the conflictual relationship between
grandfather and grandson. In particular, their kinship took on symbolic
importance as it deepened their sense of treachery.
''Doyou feel angry because your grandson has betrayed you?"
''Doyou still count him as a native American?"
The grandfather was seen as a victim in the same sense as was the Star Maiden and
the children evidently did understand that he embodied a whole set of values at
odds with those being represented by the Chief. As his grandfather, I offered
some sympathy for the Chiefs actions when they questioned me about them:
"You think he has betrayed us by selling the /and? He is my grandson. I am
sure what he does he does because he thinks it is goodfor us. "
''In his dreams he will always be one of-us, thougltin his life he may try to pretend
not. "
However, when they met him, the Chief failed to win their sympathies in the way
the grandfather had done.
When addressing the tribe as Chief, I spoke briskly, confidently,
authoritatively but passionately and with conviction. I was respectful, listened and
found numerous ways to project my argument. I admitted to being saddened by
their accusations of betrayal and conveyed, through gesture, feelings which echoed
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the remorse and inner conflict the children had witnessed in the dream. None of
this was enough to move the children from a position of hostility and an unshifting
expression of support for the values represented in the figure of the old man and in
the symbol of the Star Maiden. As the chief's arguments in favour of a hospital,
new housing, jobs and better prospects for the young fallon deaf ears time and
time again, the words of the children in role carry echoes of those used earlier by
the grandfather; references to ancestors and to a love of the land resonate
throughout as the children in role pass judgment on the Chief, condemning him as
a destroyer of tradition and as an outcast of his tribe
"We've lived here for centuries. Now everything is going to be demolished"
"At the end of the story it says remember and you're not remembering any of it.
You're just destroying the Star Maiden"
"You say you want to be one of us all the time. But you're not, because you're
doing things all wrong"
"You sold the land. Get it back or you're not an Indian."
It is obvious, on reflection, that there was a dramatic imbalance in favour
of the grandfather's position. Not only was he cast in the powerfully sympathetic
role as victim but, as guardian of the Star Maiden, he was an embodiment of the
values which I had spent so much pedagogical energy in cultivating, through
drama and through ritual. The Chief, on the other hand, had been seen to destroy
a startlower, the moral touchstone of the drama. As a dramatic creation, he may
have been more than a cultural stereotype but I singularly failed to arouse any
sympathy for his dilemma. Consequently, the climax which was meant to engage
the children in history rather than myth, however contentious this version of
history might have been, failed to do so.
Perhaps the children were too young to sympathise with the moral conflict
of the Chief, although in an earlier part of the drama one boy at least had shown
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some appreciation of his motives and could feel for his dilemma. When analysing
an image created by a group of girls showing the Chief being coerced by
businessmen to sign the contract, he had suggested that the Chief was thinking
"Whatever I do, it's wrong." When pressed, he explained that the tribe would be
happy if the Chief did not sell the land but without the money he couldn't help his
people. This was a sensitive dramatic insight, casting the Chief in the role of
tragic agent. "The tragic agent", writes Martha Nussbaum,
"senses that no matter haw he chooses he will be left with some regret that he did
not do the other thing." (1986, p.27)
However, this understanding was not at all general. I had assumed that
the childrenwould have no problem in understanding his altruistic concerns for the
material needs of his tribe but one boy's comments at the end of the session were
revealing. "Well," he said, "the ideas about the hospitals and the houses were
good but we still like the land the way it used to be." For him, myth in this drama
had clearly triumphed over history and, in his imagination, he was living more in
this mythical past than on the present day reservation. On reflection, this is hardly
surprising; the idyllic life portrayed in the images of the book and celebrated in the
dance was a far more appealing, utopian vision for a ten year-old to linger in than
the Chiefs promised world of hospitals, houses and schools. The dialogue in the
final scene, however, indicates that there was a further, perhaps more significant
undercurrent running in favour of the myth and this was further emphasiseded in
the discussion after the drama. "What's more important than money?" I asked
and a girl replied "Their stories, because the Star Maiden story is like a symbol of
their life, cos that's what you believe in. You've got to stick up for what you
believe in." Such an insight, I would hazard, did not emanate from the drama
alone but primarily from this child's understanding of her own religious faith. The
251
achievement of the drama was to help her articulate an appreciation that people of
cultures other than her own might feel the same way about their beliefs as she did
about hers. If previous examples have shown that the children's own moral and
spiritual values had helped them engage deeply with the drama, here they can be
seen to have informed the moral meanings it constructed. And the collective
moral statement which resulted was a powerful one, consisting of a strong
affirmation of the moral and spiritual values central to Esbensen's tale. In being
presented with a version of a myth more analogous to their own than to Ojibway
mythology, the children could nonetheless learn and articulate respect for cultural
difference; and this illustrates the self-other continuum, referred to in Chapter V, at
the heart of drama's potential for moralleaming. 14 It was the world of otherness
which activated and stretched the children's own moral resources into a dramatic
statement which became an example of iconic rather than dialectic action. The
minds of the children were not changed and their responses reveal an affirmationof
belief rather than a change in belief; but in this affirmation there lay the possibility
of cathartic illumination, for developing what Nussbaum has defined as: "a richer
self-understanding concerning the attachments and values that support the
responses. " (1986, p.388)
Conclusion
Rustom Bharucha has been largely responsible for bringing arguments
concerning the politics of cultural representation into the arena of modem
performance studies and, in doing so, has mounted a strong attack on Peter
Brook's production of the Mahabharata. What western critics acclaimed as a
triumph of inter-cultural performance, celebrating a masterpiece hitherto neglected
by Eurocentric, global culture, Bharucha denounces as a continuation of British
economic misappropriation of India's cultural resources. From his own cultural
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perspective, he mounts a sharp and astute analysis of what he sees as the
conceptual and performative shortcomings of Brook's adaptation, which he sees as
exemplifying:
"...a particular kind of western representation which negates the non-western
context of its borrowing. Brook has not grown up with the epic in his childhood,
unlike most Indians, who have internalised the Mahabharata through a torrent of
emotions, thoughts, taboos, concepts andfantasies." (1993, p.70)
If the internalisation of the Mahabharata's spiritual concepts and values is what
renders it comprehensible to those who have grown up with it in the Hindu faith,
any western director must, Bharucha argues, confront the meanings of such an
elusive text within its own cultural context. He hints that Brook found this
impossible and suggests that, instead of misrepresenting 'other' cultures, he should:
" ... focus attention on his own cultural artefacts, the epics of western civilization
like the Iliad or the Oddyss({)'.which he is more likely to understand." (op. cit,
p.70)
Bharucha's criticisms of Brook should act as a tart warning to anyone
wishing to use stories from other cultures for dramatic purposes and are very much
in line with the criticisms ofMiraclee and Atwood, voiced earlier. My attempts to
dialogize the story of The Star Maiden in order to address some of the problems of
cultural representation were, in accordance with Bharucha's arguments, bound to
fail. The drama did not attempt to strip the tale of Christian analogies in order to
gain an understanding of the story's real significance for its original tellers, the
Ojibway people. Here there remained a deep and obscure heart of darkness.
Without meaning to, I did quite the opposite; I harnessed and enhanced the
Christian symbolism and the moral meanings imposed by Copway and Esbensen
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respectively. Moreover, in the teeth of a perspective which must regard this as
cultural misappropriation, I have argued that these cultural accretions were what
provided the story and the drama with moral and symbolic power for these
particular children. My aims to historicise the story through drama were possibly
misconceived and certainly did not work; and a member of the Ojibway people
may well have found them deeply insulting. On the other hand, like the values
within the Esbensen text, they were of ethical importance to our contemporary
world and it encouraged the children to articulate attitudes of non-racism,
stewardship and respect for the beliefs of others. In the final analysis, I am happy
to argue that this, at least, should not be offensive to right-minded people; and if
this constitutes the judgment and aspiration of one of Atwood's "well-meaning
liberals", so be it. To paraphrase Inglis, liberalismneed not be a swear-word. It
may be as much a powerful source for good and positive action as it may be a
deceptively complacent pervasion of the spirit. And so too, I suggest, were the
story and the drama of The Star Maiden.
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NOTES
l. See Appendix 10
2. See Appendix 11
3. See Appendix 12 for examples
4. A copy of a letter the teacher wrote to me some time after the sessions is enclosed as
Appendix 13.
5. I have since developed this dance in workshops with students and teachers. A teacher
whom Igreatly respect voiced his doubts about it, suggesting that the movements and music
amounted to a form of insulting, cultural tokenism. The problem of cultural representation
will become a major theme of this case study but, in this case, I remain unconvinced that
there is an argument to answer. The dance was illustrative of the story and did not purport
in any way to emulate how the Ojibway might themselves have danced or represented the
story. If the objection is essentially to any form of working with the story, it is an issue I
address in the conclusion.
6. See. for example, Hanna (1979) and Spencer (1985)
7. This paradoxical capacity for art to make us feel emotion through achieving distance from its
object was briefly discussed and referred to in Chapter V. O'Toole (1992, p.llO) defines
those tasks where participants work as artists as those which achieve maximum role
distance.
8. See Chapter III, p.30
9. See Appendix 13
10. This is a reference, of course, to Suzanne Langer's phrase where people indrama are defined
as "makers of the future." See Langer, 1953, p.307
11. See Reed, 1980
12. For another example of how a simple, destructive act in drama can attain strong, moral
significance, see the earlier case stndy on the tale of The Brahmin and the Thief
13. Stafford and Branston (1996, p.90) make the point that. although the word stereotype tends
to always carry pejorative associations. a stereotypical representation need not, per se, have
negative effects. They define stereotyping as a "process of categorisation necessary to make
sense of the world. "
14 See Appendix 12, where children illustrate their work with iconic references from their own
religion
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CONCLUSION
The issues which have driven this thesis are being increasingly recognized
as significant. I have already referred to work by Baird-Saenger (1993) and Zipes
(1996) in the United States and, in Britain, recent publications by Murris (1992)
and the Citizenship Foundation (1994) show concerns and approaches which are
illuminating in the ways they reflect and diverge from the arguments developed
over the previous chapters. I Both British projects are aimed at primary schools
and are presented as teachers' packs, with stories as their central resource.
Murris, in particular, is openly indebted to the work of Lipman (1980, 1988) and
the Philosophy in Schools Project he inspired. As such, moral philosophy is one
of its major concerns and its pedagogy is almost entirely centred around classroom
discussion aimed at encouraging children to move from the particularity of the
stories into a consideration of "the universal laws that govern our thinking."
(Mums; 1992,p.10). She comments:
''A philosophical discussion can start off with personal, emotional experiences,
but should move on quickly to get to the more general rules about how people
should behave - rules resultingfrom an enquiry based on reason." (ibid, p.10)
So, for example, in work related to Sendak's Where the Wtld Things Are. children
are questioned about issues relating to Mischief, Manners and Punishment and
asked to consider, for instance, whether wolves are bad, whether they know the
difference between good and bad and to postulate on different meanings of the
word 'bad'. The emphasis it puts on rules, universal laws and objective rationality
are clearly distinctive from my own work.
The Citizenship Foundation's publication entitled You. Me. Us is a major
government initiative, sponsored by the Home Office and specifically aimed at
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developing social and moral responsibility in primary schools. For this reason it
merits rather more detailed attention. It, too, adopts moral reasoning as its chief
pedagogical approach to undetstanding the issues raised by the stories it offers.
Whereas Murris makes use of published picture books, including many in the fairy
tale tradition, You. Me. Us uses tales in a variety of genres, all of which have been
especially written for the pack. Once again, Lipman's influence is openly
acknowledged and so, too, is the work of Kohlberg. In fact, the rationale
provided in the teachers' notes identifies five progressive stages entirely dependent
upon Kohlberg's developmental categories and great stress is laid upon the kind of
reasons children offer in support of their beliefs, with teachers being urged to:
''pick up on the higher or more aware thinking and subtly reinforce it by offering
it back to the group for further consideration. " (1994, p.9)
This strategy is the one proposed by Kohlberg for encouraging children to move
on to a higher stage of moral reasoning. A clear distinction is made between the
cognitive and affective sides of moral awareness, with the ability to care for others
and empathise with them being identified as "another important factor" which has
an influence on people's moral actions (ibid, p.l 0).2 Universal moral principles (or
Golden Rules, as they are referred to) underlie teaching modules such as those on
Rules and Property and Power and the stories provided in each section have clear,
didactic purposes, similar to those provided in Assembly books. So, for example,
the module on Property and Power includes a school story entitled A Lucky Break
intended to provoke a discussion into the reasons why stealing is wrong.
The You. Me. Us material is engaging and very well-targeted, with
interesting and varied pedagogical approaches to supplement the classroom
discussion. Its intentions are unlike my own, however, inasmuch as its stories
have clearly focussed, pre-determined moral agendas aimed at encouraging a
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particular pattern of social and moral behaviour. This didacticism is also apparent
in its suggestions for drama work. Whereas Murris' ideas for drama are in the
manner of diversions, with little relevance to the philosophical or moral agenda
being pursued in the discussion work, the You. Me. Us pack makes use of drama
to re-inforce its didactic intentions. Having worked on the story A Lucky Break,
for example, children are asked to make up a play to show the possible effects,
both mental and physical, of stealing on a victim (op. cit, p.136). More sustained
role plays are suggested, such as an entire module where children are to pretend
they have been shipwrecked and are required to invent the rules for their new
society and deal with a series of moral and social dilemmas which subsequently
arise. (op. cit, p.90 - 96) Here, the intention is clearly to teach children about the
need for social rules and the workings of democracy.
There are, therefore, some fundamental differences in approach between
the You. Me, Us material and the the work described in this thesis. I have been
sceptical of stories being used for simple didactic purposes and have deliberately
worked with a genre of story where moral values are often obfuscated or
contradictory. I see drama, its potency and its effectiveness, as ambiguous, at
times risky, and regard the whole area of understanding and working with values
as at once inescapable but deeply problematic. In addition, the philosophical base
from which I argue a view of moral education is in the broader area of neo-
Aristotelian ethics rather than the post-Kantian morality system. It is important,
therefore, to consider how such an approach might inform a primary school's
moral education policy and the key, I believe, lies in relating two principles
paradoxically at the heart of the You Me Us project - that of encouraging moral
enquiry while building community - with the philosophical premisses promoted by
Williams (1985) and MacIntyre (1981). Essentially this would involve schools
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consciously regarding themselves as communities which attempt to define,
promote and enquire into the virtues.
I am aware as I propose the idea of schools as "communities of virtue"
that, as Williams points out, such language today has an air of reactionary
"priggishness" about it and that it is liable to be misapprehended. At first glance,
it might appear to aspire to the views of WilliamBennett, whose recent publication
The Book of Virtues (1993) seeks to teach children what he defines as "moral
literacy" through a selection of stories from the western historical and literary
canon intended to inculcate a fixed list of virtues. Stories such as Horatio's
defence of the bridge are offered alongside passages such as Baden Powell's The
Duties of a Scout as definitions of a prescribed set of virtues, in this case those of
Courage and Duty' "Thepurpose of this book", Bennett writes:
"is to show parents, teachers, students and children what the virtues look like,
what they are in practice, how to recognize them and how they work." (1993,
p.ll)
They are, therefore, a fixed moral code, embodied in the cultural heritage of the
western tradition and schools are strongly criticized for failing to teach them.'
This is very much the same tone and perspective I problematised in my
introductory chapter. MacIntyre's perspective, which informs my own views, is
different. Virtues exist and are defined by the communities which practise them.
They are, indeed, understood as part of a tradition which these communities inherit
but they are only vigorous when their nature and their relationship to one another
are the source of argument and debate. Defining the virtues - and hence the good
life - is a struggle and different communities in history have recognized and
cultivated different virtues in different ways. The virtues exist factually, as
Williams points out, inasmuch as we share a common vocabulary through which
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we can negotiate our understanding of them. These thick concepts are the
vocabulary of ethics but if they are encapsulated within traditions and the stories
which are part of these traditions, then we must understand the concept of
tradition as an argument, an evolving conversation to help create the future, not as
a set of rigid principles to which we must conform. Being located within history
is not the same as being its slave.
The concept of community is, however, like most of the concepts debated
in this thesis, complex and problematic. In a simple sense, my community is one
of place, and equates with my neighbourhood or my local area. But it might also
be determined by my work. As a drama teacher, I might regard the teachers with
whom I work as my immediate professional community and those other drama
teachers who share common interests and beliefs as my extended professional
community. There are also family communities, ethnic communities, religious
communities and other communities of shared interests, whether political or
cultural in nature. Over-arching all of these, is the western community of liberal
capitalism. I belong to several of these communities at once. Some I choose,
some I inherit, each with its own perspectives on particular virtues which can come
into opposition with one another. Many teachers understand, for example, the
conflicts that can exist between the family and the professional community and the
difficulties involved in attempting to be a good parent and a good professional at
one and the same time. The school is the forum where different communities of
interest meet and one of its fundamental challenges is to forge itself into an
institution conscious of its role as a community where certain agreed virtues are
cultivated and learned. In fact, in an era when communities of family, work and
place are increasingly unstable, the school remains one of the fixed, communal
spaces where this cultivation can be trusted to take place.
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There is nothing new or revolutionary in this idea. Williams identifies that
the cultivation of the virtues, whether this terminology be used or not, has long
been an aim of moral education, socialization and education in general (1985,
p.IO). In fact, schools must of necessity define and promote particular virtues
such as industry, responsibility, honesty and respect for others and draw up either
implicit or explicit rule systems to encourage conformity to them. As Sullivan has
explained:
"The school is now, and has always been, an institution immersed in values. In
fact, it legitmates currem societal values and consolidates them for a new
generation. If we are facing a value crisis ... it is a crisis of legitimacy of the
values that our culture holds. " (Modgil, 1985, p.239)
This latter point underlines the difficulties that schools face but values nonetheless
remain an area they cannot avoid. The language of the virtues is a common
language, however, and can be used to negotiate meaning. The virtues present us
with a perspective which sees moral values as neither absolute and prescribed nor
relative and negotiated. Such a perspective recognizes that communities share
common values; that truthfulness, honesty and justice, for example, are common
virtues but that understanding their nature in practice may well vary from
communal context to communal context. ---Issue-s of how and which virtues are to
be recognized and encouraged within a particular school emerge from argument
and discussion, to be agreed and defined in policy and aims statements which
evolve and are subject to review, taking account of the needs and interests of the
different communities the school serves.
Mechanisms for such procedures already exist in UK schools. This
process aspires to create the moral ethos of a school which serves, as we have
seen, to initiate children into moral knowledge. Such knowledge, however, as
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Stenhouse informs us, is only one aspect of learning and for a full moral education
children need, in addition, training, instruction and induction into moral
knowledge. All four aspects are important, all have different emphases and a
school should map out in its policy documentation in which areas of the curriculum
the different emphases will occur. Ihave indicated that, in its emphasis on group
co-operation, on listening, sharing and respecting the work of others, as well as
through the opportunities drama provides for children to fictionally practise the
virtues, that drama can make an important contribution to the social and moral
training of young children. But the main preoccupations of this thesis have been
in the more problematic area of induction to moral knowledge and the
opportunities drama can offer for enabling children to explore the nature of the
virtues and vices as thick concepts, manifested in particular social actions, played
out within particular social roles. If stories are the means by which we learn
hermeneutically about the virtues, vices and the nature of the moral life, we have
seen, too, that, as teachers, we need to remain alert to exactly what they are telling
us. Drama can be the means through which these values are opened up to
question and are actively conversed with through enactive, narrative story-making.
Hornbrook is right when he argues that drama's collective, moral discourse does
not stem from "the private preferences of emotivism" but is located upon the
"stage of critical judgment" (op.cit, p.139) Through drama, the classroom can
become this communal, public stage where the virtues can be problematized,
played with, subverted, reframed, or brought into conflict with one another.
Through generating moral engagement and active inquiry, drama can deepen a
child's sensitivity to and understanding of the complexities of the moral life.
To advocate that teachers mine the rich seam of traditional stories from
within a variety of cultural sources is, of course, partly an ethical response to the
reality of postmodern, global culture and the ethnic and cultural diversity within
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contemporary Britain. But it is more than this. The project began with a
pragmatic observation - that dramas using such stories as pre-text could contain a
powerful, moral charge. In the process of the inquiry, I have suggested some
theoretical explanation as to why this should be the case but, at its conclusion, I
remain aware that these suggestions remain partial and incomplete. I have only
touched upon what O'Neill describes as the close relationship between characters
and plots within mythic stories and those within drama, and this remains an area, I
believe, worthy of further research. It is in the nature of a reflective inquiry such
as this that further questions should be raised, further lines of inquiry suggested.
In turning my attention to what I consider these might be, I will attempt to address
the different parties whom I hoped would benefit from this research at its outset,
practitioners and academics, interested in drama, traditional stories, moral
education and reflective inquiry.
Despite my criticisms of the Citizenship Foundation material, there is much
that is admirable in its presentation and its potential as instructional material. It
could be of use to primary teachers in general to research into ways in which the
material could be adapted and supplemented to engage children in the kind of
drama and moral learning experiences I have promoted here. Such a project
would involve a re-negotiation of the project's underlying, philosophical approach
to the nature of moralleaming but this could be more achievable than might at first
appear. For example, the key ideas in the unit on Property and Power are listed
as stealing, trust, punishment and fairness, all of which pertain to the drama work
pursued around the stories of the Brahmin, the Thief and the Ogre and Jack and
the Beanstalk. The appeal of such a project is that it would be informed by
material which practising primary teachers have found useful, covering concepts
which they have found relevant to children's moral lives. Such an inquiry could
include a broader investigation into the kinds of thick ethical concepts children find
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it rewarding to explore at different ages and in different social circumstances.
These should spread beyond those concerned with the development of good
citizenship and could include courage, loyalty and compassion as well as
stewardship, tolerance and fairness. The intention would not, of course, be to
create an alternative stage system to Koblberg's but a loose framework informed
by professional experience, evaluation and reflection. It would be useful, as well
as exploring new resources of stories which teachers might find useful to look at
those that are already in widespread use and build them into such a project.
This work, aimed at primary teachers in general, could be complemented
by related inquiries of interest to specialist practitioners of drama. Throughout
the study, I have ventured a number of hypotheses which could be taken further.
For example, in the first case study I used a framework of six categories where
drama could be seen to provide a pedagogy for ethical inquiry; in Chapter V I
proposed that Beckerman's distinctions between iconic and dialectic action could
provide a non-ideological approach to understanding moral engagement in drama;
and, although venturing into the area of comic drama, I emphasised that this
remains a greatly under-researched area in the field of process drama. All three
areas could become foci for more extensive research, particularly with primary
schoolchildren more experienced in the practices of the art form, or with older
children or students, whose concerns have not impinged at all on this particular
inquiry.
In suggesting that Macintyre's theories present a valuable and fresh
perspective from which drama teachers can plan for moral education, I have
implied a certain theoretical position. The principle underlying this position
recognizes the virtues as inherently social and communal and that it is open to
argument as to how they are best manifested in particular contexts. Children
should, by implication, be encouraged to explore the virtues and the vices in action
264
from within specific social roles - those of a mother, a leader, or a journalist, for
example - in order to understand them as thick concepts, not as abstract principles.
Such explorations should embrace ambivalence and avoid didacticism, not only
because drama derives its power from such ambivalence but because this matches
the ethical life as it is experienced at its most acute. As stories are the form
through which this understanding is most effectively conveyed, drama should
approach moral issues obliquely, through stories, rather than directly, through
overtly issue-based lessons. Story dramas of this sort should allow children to
linger in the complexities of particular situations and not seek to draw out
prescribed maxims or rules as lessons which the drama has taught; rather should
such stories illustrate that, in situations where right and wrong answers are elusive,
there can still be better or worse ways of living one's life. However, this theory is
not offered in any instructional sense but as a testing ground which has emerged
from my own theory in practice, a skeleton in need of flesh which can only be
nourished by further research into practice.
Throughout this inquiry, in issues of theory and practice, form and content,
values have been at the heart of things. Though conflictual and problematic, they
have also been unavoidable and essential. The model of reflective practitioner
research I have provided was adapted to my own particular circumstances within
the demands of a specific focus of inquiry. It may prove useful in informing the
thinking of fellow practitioner-researchers through the methodology it offers but,
more significantly, through its underlying principles and ethical concerns.
Fundamentally, these accept the inescapability of values but refuse to be paralysed
by their ubiquity or blind to their plurality. Rather are both research and practice
portrayed as activities where we must embrace what Schemer has called a "double
consciousness ... resoluteness under uncertainty", an attitude prepared for "the
redirection of such resoluteness with changing evidence." (1985, p. 114/115)
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Such an attitude recognizes that, although grand theory may no longer be the
objective of our inquiries, phronesis, or practical wisdom, remains our goal; and
that, although we can only ever partially obtain it, the knowledge we gain while
searching can sustain us on our quest.
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NOTES
1. See also Fox (1996)
2. Interestingly, Lipman's writings reject both moral developmental stage theory, which he sees
as "incompatible with philosophy and legitimate moral discussion" and the separation of the
affective and cognitive in moral education, which, he comments, is "to misunderstand the
nature of learning." See Lipman et al (1980), p.154 and p.162.
3. See Bennett (op. cit) p.470; p.217
4. Bennett has written two books to this effect: Our Children and Our Country: Improving
America's Schools and Affirming the Common Culture; and The De-Valuing of America:
The Fight for Our Culture and Our Children
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APPENDICES:
CASE STUDY I
APPENDIX 1
STORY 7: BRAH.MAN, TH IEF, AND OGRE
Once a certain poor brahman received a present of a pair of
cows, which had been brought up from young calves by feeding
with ghee, oil, salt, grass, and (other) wholesome foods, so that
they were very fat. And a certain thief saw them, and he
thought as follows: 'This very day 1 shall steal them.' So he
started out in the early evening, and as he went along some
unknown person touched him on the shoulder. Whereupon he
asked in alarm: 'Who are you?' And he spoke truthfully: 'I am
a night-roaming brahman-ogre.' You also tell me who you are.'
Said he: 'I am a thief.' And when the other asked again: 'Where
are you going?' he said: '1 intend to steal a pair of cows from a
certain brahman. But where are you going?' Then being
reassured by this information the brahman-ogre also said: 'I too
have started out to seize that same brahman.' Then they went
thither both together and stayed at one side, waiting for the
proper time. And when the brahman had gone to sleep the
brahman-ogre was creeping up to seize him first; when the thief
said to him: 'This is not the right way. After I have stolen his
two cows, then you may seize him.' Said the other: 'That too
wouki be wrong. Perchance the noise of the cows might wake
him, and then I should have come in vain.' The thief said: 'If
when you seize him he gets up and makes an outcry, then every-
body will be roused; and then I cannot steal his two cows. So I
will steal the cows first, and afterwards YOll may eat the brah-
man.' As they were thus disputing with one another they got
angry, and with their rivalry they straightway woke up the
brahman: Thereupon the thief said: 'Brahman, this brahman-
ogre wants to seize you.' But the brahman-ogre said: 'This thief
wants to steal your two cows.' Hearing this the brahman got up
and being put on his guard saved himself from the ogre by
reciting the mantra- of his sect's deity, and saved his two cows
from the thief by brandishing his cudgel. So both the thief and
the ogre ran away~.
(End of Story 7)
Therefore I say: 'Even enemies may be useful', etc. 'Moreover:
'It is also related, you know, that the noble and virtuous
Sibi gave his own flesh to the falcon to save the dove.3
'Therefore you also ought not to slay a fugitive.' Thereupon
he asked Wall-ear. And he toe gave the same advice. Then
I A br ahman (in a previous existence) changed, because of sinful actions,
into an ogre. Ogres (raA~asas) are monsters who live on the flesh of men.
• Sacred stanza.
, This stanza alludes to a w~ll-known story of a self-sacrificing king named
~ibi. The story is inserted secondarily at this point in one version.
APPENDIX2
NOTE: Appendices 2, 6 and 9 present summaries of the lessons taught
during each of the case studies' and are intended as a supplement to the narrative
accounts provided in the main body of the text. The format is intended to provide
a simple view of the strategies employed by the teacher; the activity of the
children; and the approximate length of time of each section of the lesson.
Sopbie's class
All lessons were taught in the classroom with the desks moved aside
All lessons were approximately I hour in length, lasting from 11.00 am to 12.00
noon.
Lessons took place on February 22nd, March lst, March 8th and March 15th.,
1994
There were 23 children in the class, 11 girls and 12boys
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Lesson 1
21 children present.
I.Teacher makes short
introduction and tells the
story.
Children sit in semi-circle 10 minutes
around the carpeted area
and listen. VIDEO: 1
2. Teacher asks children for Children discuss in small
ideas on possible moral for groups and vote for up to
the story. Refers to list
previously prepared on A I
paper and notes responses.
3. Teacher explains good
and bad ethical behaviour
and asks children for
examples from the story.
He notes their ideas in two
columns on the blackboard.
4. Teacher brings children
back around carpet. Goes
into role as publisher of
children's books and asks
children whether the ending
of the story should be
changed and, if so, how.
10minutes
three possible morals each.
Children gather around the 10 minutes
board and volunteer their
ideas.
Children discuss in small
groups and share ideas in
whole class forum.
15 minutes
5. Teacher asks children to Children prepare small
prepare these ideas for
dramatic presentation and
monitors the work.
15minutes
dramatic pieces and shaw
at end of session.
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LesISZD 2
22 children present
I.Teacher leads round to Children sit in circle 10minutes
recall previous week's work
and explains convention of
teacher in role, showing
items of costume to denote
possible roles.
2. Teacher in role as Thief's Children in role as 12minutes
wife solicits advice and help villagers seated n circle
3. Teacher narrates journey Children move around 3 minutes
through the wood to the classroom in role as
Brahmin's hut. Introduces villagers.
sacred thread to signal role
of Brahmin. VIDEO: 2
4. Teacher in role as Children in role as 10minutes
Brahmin. villagers warn Brahmin of
the Thief's approach.
Offer help and dissuade
himfrom using the stick to
defend himself. VIDEO: 2
5. Teacher narrates the Children in role as 3 minutes
approach of the Thief and villagers hide and watch.
enacts/narrates the Thief's
demand that the Brahmin
give him one of the calves
6. Teacher gathers children Children in circle on 7 minutes
to monitor understanding carpet
of this development and
explains the convention of
collective role. 286
7. Teacher in role as Thief
takes up the drama from
the point at which it was
halted.
Seven children in collective 10minutes
role as Brahmin stand
facing the Thief The rest,
in role as villagers, remain
seated on either side
8. Teacher halts the drama Children seated in circle
when Brahmin suggests he on chairs, in role as the
will pray to Vishnu for Gods. A variety of
guidance. Recasts the possible responses are
children in role as the discussed, with no firm
Gods, to discuss what their decision being reached
advice should be.
10minutes
Lesson 3
21 children present.
1. Teacher organizes a
round to recap the events
of the previous week.
Teacher then sets up next
exercise.
2. Teacher in role as Thief
justifies and argues his case
and explains why he
returned to the Brahmin
and made his demand.
3. Teacher organizes a
further meeting of the
Gods. In middle status
role as one of the Gods.
Children recap in groups
then sit in circle for the
round and instructions.
12 minutes
J0 children in role as Gods 10 minutes
disguise themselves as
humans and descend to
earth to find out why the
Thief acted as he did
Children in role as the 10 minutes
Gods jurther discuss what
should happen. They
decide that the Brahmin
and the Thief must be left
to resolve the dispute
themselves.
4. Teacher splits the class Children sit on chairs in 10 minutes
in half, one to collectively two rows facing eachother
play the Thief, the other to and argue their cases.
collectively play the
Brahmin. Teacher remains
on the sidelines. VIDEO: 3
5. Teacher halts the drama Children choose their own 15 minutes
and asks the children to
decide upon and enact an
ending to the story
groups of two or three to
decide upon, rehearse and
perform an ending to the
drama.
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Lesson 4
20 children present
Children remain seated at desks and complete work presented by teacher on prepared
handout (enclosed).
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Write the second part of the story of the Brahmin and the thief, imagining that
it is to be published in a book for children of your own age.
Use your own words. The list below may help you remember the events in
the story.
• In a nearby village, there lived afamily which was very poor ...
~ One evening, the woman came into the village, looking very worried
\ She approached the villagers .....
~ The villagers decided they could do something to help her .....
J Hiding in the wood near the Brahmin's cottage, they waitedfor the thief
to approach .....
• Imagine the Brahmin's surprise when the thief said, " .
•. Lord Vishnu had been listening to them and decided to help....
• But this was not the end of the story. Lord Vishnu was puzzled at what
the thief had said .....
~ The thief welcomed the band of traveling show people and began to talk
to them .....
• Lord Vishnu decided that the thief and the Brahmin must sort the problem
out for themselves
• In the end .
2.Answer the following questions about this story we created together.
(a)List as many reasons you can think of why the Brahmin ought to give the
thief one of his calves.
(b) List as many reason you can think of why the thief ought not to be given
one of the Brahmin's calves.
(c) Ifyou were Lord Vishnu, what advice would you offer to the thief at the
end of the story?
What advice would you offer to the Brahmin?
Martin's class
Both lessons were taught in the classroom with the tables moved aside.
Both were approximately fifty minutes in length, lasting from 1.10 pm till2.00 pm.
Lessons took place on March 10th and 17th, 1994.
There were 22 children in the class, 10 girls and 12 boys.
Because the first lesson was almost identical in structure to Lesson 1 with Sophie's
class, I describe only Lesson 2 below.
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Lesson 2
All children present
1. Teacher introduces
conventions of teacher in
role, showing items of
costume, and the use of the
teacher's chair to signal out
of role.
Children are gathered
informally around carpeted
area.
2. Teacher begins drama by Children in role as
storytelling and casts
children in role as villagers.
Enters in role as Thief's
wife, soliciting help.
Makes villagers promise
not to hurt the Thief
3. Teacher narrates children
through the wood. Takes
on role of villager to
demonstrate how to hide.
Goes out of role and uses
hide and seek technique
(counting to ten).
villagers agree to help,
eventually agreeing to set
off to intercept the Thief
before he arrives at the
Brahmin's cottage.
Children in role as
villagers creep through the
wood and hide.
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3 minutes
8 minutes
6 minutes
APPENDIX3
The Cane
The teacher
had some thin springy sticks
for making kites.
Reminds me
of the old days, he said;
and swished one.
The children
near his desk laughed nervously,
and pushed closer.
A cheeky girl .
held out her cheeky hand.
Go on, Sir!
said her friends.
Give her the stick, she's always
playing up!
The teacher
paused, then did as he was told.
Just a tap.
Oh, Sir!
We're going to tell on you,
The children said.
Other children
left their seats and crowded round
the teacher's desk.
Other hands
went out. Making kites was soon
forgotten.
My turn next!
He's had one go already!
That's not fair!
Soon the teacher,
to save himself from the crush,
called a halt.
(It was
either that or use the cane
for real.)
Reluctantly,
the children did as they were told
and sat down.
If you behave
yourselves, the teacher said,
I'll cane you later.
APPENDIX4
The Brahmin and the Thief
The lady approached she looked very worried. She came up to the villagers and said 'My
husband said I'm going to sort things out with that Brahmin. And I don't know where or
what the Brahmin has that my husband might want with the Brahmin, and also she said'
He had a cut on his head and he said he fell in the forest but I don't know why or what or
whether he is lying to me .So I wonder whether you can help me find where the Brahmin
lives so I can find out what he's been up to. The villagers said 'We'll help you" so they
went and told the Brahmin not to hit the thief, so the Brahmin said OK and the people said
we'll go and hide, and the thief came and said "I have not come to take one of your
calves, you are going to give me one. But the Brahmin to his astonishment said "But
suddenly the thief said if you don't give me one of your calves I will die and my wife will
die and my children will die. but the Brahmin said OK OK I will give you one of my calves
so The Brahmin was happy for what he had done.
THE END, AND WHAT A HAPPY ENDING IT WAS
If the Brahmin gave the thief one of his calves, the thief wouldn't steal any more.
The Brahmin should give the thief a calf because the Brahmin is a holy man.
The Brahmin should give the thief a calf because the Brahmin hit the thief over the head.
Why the Brahmin should not give the thief a calf.
Because the thief tried to steal from the Brahmin.
Because you should not be given everything you should try and work for yourself.
Because the Brahmin is a holy man and worked for the calves and was given them be
Lord Vishnu who was a god.
\/j~.i .~ere Lord Vishnu i wouid say to the Brahmin think about what the thief did and why he
/\ OIa It.
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At last the giant fell asleep, and snored
like the roaring of a cannon. Jack finding him
still asleep at daybreak, crept softly from
his hiding-place, seized the hen, and ran off
with her as fast as his legs could possibly
carry him.
APPENDIX6
The class were a mixed group of Year Iand Year 2 children, aged 5 and 6.
There were 21 children in the class, 12 boys and 9 girls. 4 children on free dinners.
The first lesson took place in the school hall, the second and third lessons in the
classroom, with the desks moved aside.
The lessons took place on October 5th, 12th and 19th, 1993, from 11.00 - 11.50 am.
Lesson 1
18 children present.
1. Teacher ieads children Children group in semi-
into the hall. Talks about circle. Listen and venture
the story and sets the scene comments.
for the drama. Introduces
the dramatic conventions
and items
of costume to denote
different roles he will be
playing.
10 minutes
Children grouped in semi-
2. Teacher in role as Jack's circle as Jack's friends.
mother casts children as Eventually venture that
friends of Jack. Asks for Jack has climbed the
their help in finding Jack. beanstalk and volunteer to
Makes them promise not to go and fitch him.
let him steal anything
10 minutes
Children mime climbing
3. Teacher narrates and the beanstalk.
demonstrates the climbing
of the beanstalk.
4 minutes
4. Teacher in role as old
Children in role question
the old woman and repeat
woman. Informs children promise made to Jack's
of wife's plight and solicits mother
further promise.
5 minutes
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5. Teacher in role as child Children in role explore
leads children toward the the land and knock on the
castle door of the castle. 5 minutes
6. Teacher in role as Ogre's Children in role talk to
wife refuses to let the wife and enquire after
children enter. Jack. 5 minutes
7. Teacher in role as child Children in role discuss
leads discussion on how the and eventually decide to
castle might be entered. climb through a window. 5 minutes
8. Teacher in role leads Children in role creep
children through the alongthecor.rldorbackto
window and quietly, still in the classroom.
role, back to the classroom. 5 minutes
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Lesson 2
19 children present
1. Teacher leads recap of
previous lesson and
Children group on carpet
in front of teacher, listen
introduces conventions for and respond to questions.
this session.
2. Teacher asks children to Children in role explore
explore Ogre's kitchen. the Ogre's kitchen and find
Organizes exercise similar hiding places.
to "hide and seek" to
rehearse for entrance of
Ogre.
3. Teacher in role as Jack. Children in role try to
persuade Jack to return
down the beanstalk.
4. Teacher in role as Ogre, Children in role hide and
counts money and falls
asleep.
5. Teacher comes out of
role. Organizes game of
"Grandmother's Footsteps"
to see if Jack will leave
with or without the money.
6. Teacher concludes
watch Ogre.
Children group in circle
around teacher. Girl
volunteers to play Jack.
She takes the money.
lesson with brief discussion. around teacher on carpet.
Children out of role group
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5 minutes
15 minutes
VIDEO: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
15 minutes
VIDEO: 12
6 minutes
6 minutes
3 minutes
Lesson 3
21 children present
1. Teacher questions about Children, grouped in front
previous week. of teacher on carpet,
respond to questioning. 5 minutes
2. Teacher organizes game
similar to "Control Tower"
to represent children's
escape from the Ogre's
kitchen.
Children take up positions
to create obstacles for
those trying to escape.
They take it in turns to act
as escapees 10minutes
3. Teacher in role as Ogre's Children in role attempt to
wife captures children in persuade wife to leave with
conidor of castle. Warns them.
them of their danger. 5 minutes
4. Teacher in role as wife Children hide and watch.
informs children the Ogre is
waking up. Plays both
roles in "Mistero Buffo"
fashion. Ogre falls asleep
again. 5 minutes
5. Teacher leads discussion Children decide to tie up
in role as child. How can the Ogre while he sleeps
we help the wife? and tell him off when he
awakes. 5 minutes
6. Teacher organizes a Children play the game
further game of and succeed
"Grandmother's Footsteps"
to see if children can tie up
the Ogre. 6 minutes
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7. Teacher in role as Ogre Children in role group
is seated on the floor while around teacher on the
the children begin to rebuke floor. Some begin to be
him. distracted 4 minutes
8. Teacher comes out of
role and sits on teacher's
chair. Discusses the
perceived problem.
Children group around
teacher on carpet and
agree to try again.
3 minutes
9. Teacher regroups Children in role scold the
children and this time sits in Ogre. VIDEO: 13, 14
front of them, on chair. 5 minutes
Bell interrupts and brings lesson to a conclusion.
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APPENDIX 7
Thefollowing is extracted from transcripts of the discussion the teacher had with
the class in between the second and third session of the drama. Editorial cuts
are shown by dotted lines.
T You were all pretending to be children of the village who were friends with
Jack. You all went up the beanstalk to get Jack down, which was a bit of
a risky business, wasn't it?
CHN Yeah!!
T A big, high beanstalk which had a Giant at the top. Now, why did you
agree? Jack's mother asked you to go and bring him back. Why did you
agree to do that for her? Karen.
CH Because he's our friend
T Because Jack's your friend. OK. Why are you friends with Jack, then?
.....What sort of things do we know about him that makes him one of our
friends?
CH He's nice to me and he lets me play in his garden and in his house.
T Right, I think it might be helpful if we make a list of things that we know
about Jack. Let's think first of all about all the good things about Jack.
Keely?
CH He plays.
T He plays with you.
CH He's kind
T He's kind
CH He's nice.
T He's nice.
CH He plays with me in my house.
CH He looks after you when you've fallen over.
CH He's rich
T Yes, he's got a lot of money now, hasn't he?
CH He's brave.
T Brave, because he keeps going back up that beanstalk, doesn't he?
.... Somebody says that he's ..
CHN STRONG
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T That's right, he must be very fit, mustn't he? Some more good things
about him. Richard?
CH He's friendly.
T Friendly, right.
CH He plays good games.
T He plays good games, does he, he's lots of fun to be with?
CH Yeah.
T OK, let's think about some of the things about Jack that aren't so good.
Christopher?
CH He breaks his promises
T He breaks promises, to his mother particularly. Ian?
CH He's lazy.
T He is a very lazy boy, isn't he? Cara?
CH He tells lies.
T Right. Hannah, what did you say?
CH I said he steaIs.
T He does, he steals from the Giant, doesn't he?
CH Cos he takes back things that don't belong to him.
T Yes?
CH He doesn't .. sometimes ...(too soft to hear)
T He doesn't tell his mummywhere he is playing, right?
CH He isn't helpful
T He isn't helpful at all, is he? When his mummyneeds him to do jobs
CH He's always daydreaming.
T He'd rather daydream, wouldn't he?
CH He's tired and lazy.
CH He lets his mum do all the work
CH He's naughty.
.....(Teacher stops the tape. She told me later that one child now
suggested that Jack swore and that there was some dispute over this and
that the childfinally said that "bum"was a swear word)
T When we stopped a minute ago, some of you said that Jack was naughty.
I wonder ifyou can give me any examples of why Jack's naughty? What's
he done that's naughty?
CH He told a lie.
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T What lie has Jack told? Think back to the story. Think about things that
Jack's done. When has he told a lie to someone?
CH To the Giant's wife.
T He lied to the Giant's wife, didn't he. What did he say?
CH He wouldn't cause her any trouble.
T Right. He told her he was only coming in to have a look round, that he
wasn't going to steal anything
CH But he did!
T But he did, right.
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APPENDIX 9
There were 27 children in the class, 11 boys and 16 girls. 5 were in receipt of free school
meals.
All lessons apart from the last took place in the school hall.
The lessons took place on November 21st, 22nd, 28th and 29th of November, 1994, with
a follow-up lesson on December 5th.
Between Lessons 2 and 3, I visited the school and worked in small groups with the
children, making the startlowers.
Lessons began at 1.15 pm and lasted between 1 hour and 1hour 15 minutes.
Lesson 1
26 children present
1. Teacher groups children Children listen
around him and reads the
story, showing the
illustrations. 15 minutes
2. Teacher demonstrates Children sit in a circle.
how to make a startlower They watch and comment.
from green and white
paper. 12 minutes
3. Teacher regroups the Children retell the story in
children and goes through their own words
the story again,
concentrating on the
illustrations. 10 minutes
4. Teacher begins work on Children work, both as
the dance. individuals and in groups,
around the hall. 25 minutes
5. Teacher looks forward Children regrouped as
to next session. whole class 5 minutes
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Lesson 2
25 children present
1. Teacher leads a round to Children sit in a circle
recall yesterday's session. 5 minutes.
2. Children complete work Children work as
on the dance and perform it individuals and in small
twice. groups and, finally, as a VIDEO: 15
whole e/ass. 30 minutes
3. Teacher questions Children, grouped infront ),'I,
children to elicit emotional of teacher, volunteer VIDEO: 16
responses to the dance. responses. 8 minutes
,I
4. Teacher hands around Children, seated in a
copy of the story and asks cire/e, circulate the book,
children to select two-word each volunteering a phrase
phrases from the text. He
notes these on large sheet
of paper. 8 minutes
S. Teacher asks children to Children choose phrases
invent a sequence of these from the sheet and watch
phrases which he notes in the poem form
the shape of a star-shaped VIDEO: 17
caligram. 8 minutes
6. Teacher reads the poem Children choose different
and invites children to do starting points from which VIDEO: 18
so. to read the poem. S minutes
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Lesson 3
27 children present
1. Teacher lays blue sugar Children do this in groups
paper on the floor and asks offour.
children to place their VIDEO; 19
starflowers on them 5 minutes
2. Teacher leads recap of Children grouped in horse-
the previous session shoe shape around the
"lake" 5 minutes
3. Teacher sets up and Children watch and answer
enacts the Chiefs dream. questions. Some
participate in the VIDEO: 20 & 21
enactment 10minutes
4. Teacherleads discussion Children, still grouped on
the.floor, offer ideas as to VIDEO: 22
the meaning of the dream. 10minutes
5. Teacher asks the children Children work in groups of
to work on a tableau to 3,4 or 5.
represent the actual
happenings which have
caused the dream. 10 minutes
6. Teacher helps Children group around and
interrogate one image and offer answers to teacher's
offers possible variations questions 5 minutes
7. Teacher assists groups Children complete work.
and organizes sharing and Gather in semi-circle and
interrogation of each image watch and comment on
each image in tum 15minutes
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Lesson 4
26 children present
1. Teacher organizes Children place starflowers
setting up of "lake" and on the lake and, seated in a
conducts a round to recap circle, discuss previous
on previous session. lesson in detail 15minutes
2. Teacher goes briefly into Children group informally VIDEO: 23
role as Grandfather. and observe 3 minutes
3. Teacher asks the children Children offer ideasfor
what they might ask the questions
Grandfather.
4. Teacher in role as
Grandfather
5. Teacher sets up task in
groups
5 minutes
Children hotseat the
Grandfather
VIDEO: 24, 25, 26, 27
10 minutes
Children create the
ambience of a busy, city
office. 5 minutes
6. Teacher enters in role as Childrenfind it difficult to
Grandfather, touring from sustain serious work.
office to office in search of
his grandson
7. Teacher comes out of
role. Gathers volunteers
to play the Grandfather
collectively. He joins rest
of class in collective role as
Chief
3 minutes
Children in two groups,
facing eachother, those in
role as Grandfather seated
on a bench. They role-
play their conversation in
the office.
VIDEO: 30
8 minutes
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8. Teacher in role as Chief Children in role as people
attempts to win over his of the tribe reject his
tribe to support his decision arguments
to sell the land.
9. Teacher asks children to
group according to their
sympathies out of role and
closes the lesson with brief
discussion.
Lesson 5
24 children present
Children all group around
the lake
VIDEO: 28, 29
12 minutes
6 minutes
"
Classwork. Children complete illustrated star poems entitled Touch Them Gently.
,I
,I
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APPENDIX 10
The Star Poem
Star sparkle
Blue sky
Star sisters
Star light
Water lilies
Touch gently
"I,
Creamy petals
Star Maiden
I
Blue lake .,
Night long
This poem was created in the form of a ca/ligram, ajive-pointed star. The
phrases were all taken from the last two pages of the book The Star Maiden. It is
possible to begin the poem at any point of the star, so the version above isjust
one of ten possible readings.
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APPENDIX 13

VIDEO MATERIAL
The video which accompanies this thesis contains edited extracts of the
lessons referred to in the case studies. The material has been chosen to illustrate
the transcripts analysed and aspects of the lessons used to support a line of
argument. Below the extracts are listed in numbered order, together with the
running time of each. The part of the particular lesson from which each extract
has been taken is indicated in the third column of the lesson summariesenclosed as
Appendices 2, 6 and 9.
CASE STUDY ONE: (APPENDIX 2)
1. Teacher tells the story: 9 minutes 30 seconds.
2. Teacher as Brahmin, children as villagers: 4 minutes.
3. Children argue in collective role of either Brahmin or Thief: 1minute.
4. Childrenbreak the stick: 1minute 45 seconds
5. Children in role as villagers argue with teacher in role as Brahmin: 1minute
20 seconds.
6. Children show their work: 1minute.
CASE STUDY TWO (APPENDIX 6)
7. Teacher in role as Jack, children as Jack's friends: 3 minutes.
8. (cont.): 10 seconds.
9. (cont.): 1minute 30 seconds.
10. (cont.): 45 seconds.
11. (cont.): 30 seconds.
12. Children hide and watch teacher in role as Ogre: 3 minutes.
13. Children in role scold the Ogre: 30 seconds.
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14. Children in role scold the Ogre: 45 seconds.
CASE STUDY THREE (APPENDIX 9)
15. Childrenperform the dance: 2 minutes 30 seconds
16. Children discuss the dance: 2 minutes 30 seconds
17. Composing the star poem: 30 seconds
18. Reading the star poem: 1minute
19. Forming the lake: 15 seconds
20. Staging the Chiefs dream: 7 minutes
21. Staging the Chiefs dream: 1minute 30 seconds
22. Discussing the dream: 7 minutes
23. Introducing the grandfather's costume: 30 seconds
24. Talking to teacher in role as the Grandfather: 45 seconds
25. Talking to teacher in role as the Grandfather: 15 seconds
26. Talking to teacher in role as the Grandfather: 45 seconds
27. Talking to theacher in role as the Grandfather: 1minute 15 seconds
28. Children in role as Tribe, teacher as Chief: 1 minute 30 seconds
29. Children in role as Tribe, teacher as Chief: 2 minutes
30. Children in collective role as Grandfather and Chief: 15 seconds
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